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ABSTRACT

Penfield, Christopher S. Ph.D., Purdue University, May 2015. Foucault, Kant, Deleuze,
and the Problem of Political Agency. Major Professor: Daniel Smith.

Political agency concerns the transformation of the conditions of social organization
through collective action. In order to treat the set of necessary conditions for such agency,
I develop a detailed reconstruction of Michel Foucault’s political philosophy, placed in
relation to the work of Immanuel Kant and Gilles Deleuze. I argue that the key to
Foucault’s political thought is contained in two crucial but neglected concepts, verticality
and transversality, and that the systematic exposition of these concepts yields an account
of what must obtain for political agency to be possible, realizable, and sustainable.

1

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1

Overview: On the Problem of Political Agency in Capitalist Society

While philosophy dissertations are often depicted as either detailed studies on a
philosopher or interventions concerning a more general philosophical problem, the
present thesis, if it is to be successful, must be both. It takes form largely as an exegetical
analysis, aiming to be as precise and comprehensive as possible, of a figure in the history
of philosophy – namely, Foucault, though also (and necessarily) Deleuze and Kant; and it
gives itself the task of constructing the beginnings of a political theory that would
respond to the problem of political agency in capitalist society. Political agency refers to
the power of individual or collective action to transform the conditions of social
production. To pose political agency as a philosophical problem, is both to inquire into its
necessary conditions and to diagnose the forces that undermine them. And to pose the
problem of political agency in the context of capitalism, is to suggest the historical
singularity of the power relations that defuse, exclude, or appropriate potentially
transformative agential force.
I will argue that this problem is the guiding impetus of Foucault’s political
philosophy, and indeed, of Foucault’s thought tout court, insofar as he situates his own
work in the critical tradition and takes its measure through its transformative effect.
Crucial to my argument will be to demonstrate that Foucault’s political thought hinges on
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two concepts that have remained almost entirely untreated, verticality and transversality,
and that their conceptual treatment provides the basis for a theory of political agency.
‘Verticality,’ philosophically grounded in both Kant and Nietzsche, refers in Foucault to
either (1) an intensive form of limit-experience irreducible to historical determination, or
(2) a critical ‘history of limits’ that shows how the exclusion of such experience plays a
constitutive role in the formation of western culture. ‘Transversality,’ a concept that
emerges through Foucault’s decades long exchange with Deleuze, refers to a
compositional principle of connection for creating dynamic lines of alliance between
various excluded or marginal groups over whom a common form of power is exercised.
Carefully charting the trajectory of Foucault’s work across thirty years, I aim to
show how vertical experience, transversal connection, and vertical critique satisfy,
respectively, political agency’s necessary conditions of possibility, realization, and
sustainability. I would also suggest that from popular uprisings, to sovereign debt crises,
to the basic inadequacies of representative democracy, the problem of political agency in
capitalist society is still, and especially, ours today. Indeed, if there is a reason to take
such care in reconstructing an original political theory from Foucault’s work, one that
would outline the set of necessary conditions for transformative politics, it is not only its
scholarly value but also its contemporary salience.
Now, in order for such salience and scholarship to be borne out, it must actually be
the case that Foucault took the contemporary exercise of power in capitalist society to be
problematic and its transformation, desirable. Such a claim, however, might seem to be
controverted by the recent view, centered on his 1979 Birth of Biopolitics lecture course
at the Collège de France, that Foucault was sympathetic to neoliberal governmentality.
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For example, someone as close to Foucault as François Ewald has been able to maintain
that Foucault, in fact, offers “the apology of neoliberalism – especially the apology of
Gary Becker,”1 insofar as the “Chicago School” theory of human capital allows for the
problem of government (how to govern or manage the conduct of individuals, of groups,
of the population) to be posed in non-moral and non-juridical terms (namely, in economic
terms of calculable self-interest).
Therefore, in order to clear the way for reconstructing Foucault’s critical political
philosophy of agency, I will introduce my thesis by arguing (1) that Foucault’s relation to
liberalism is best understood on the model of his relation to Kant, and (2) that doing so
provides the ground for denying that Foucault was an apologist for neoliberalism in any
sense, including Becker’s theory of human capital. This reading of Foucault also supports
the position taken recently by Frédéric Gros, who argues that a distinction must be drawn
between two forms of liberalism.2 On the one hand, there is “economic” or “political”
liberalism, which designates the biopolitical production and capture of the active forces
of a population for the profit of a dominant arrangement of power relations – in other
words, the form of governmentality corresponding to modern capitalism, which
intensifies the operation of power by exacerbating non-egalitarian social divisions (e.g.,
growing rates of economic inequality) while de-politicizing economic agents (as selfinterested private citizens) and impoverishing the possibilities for collective relations of
1

François Ewald, “American Neoliberalism and Michel Foucault’s 1979 Birth of Biopolitics Lectures: A
Conversation with Gary Becker, François Ewald, and Bernard Harcourt,” The University of Chicago – May
9, 2012, 4. Ewald, philosopher and historian in his own right, was an assistant to Foucault at the Collège de
France in the 1970s.
2
Frédéric Gros, “Y a-t-il un sujet biopolitique?”, Nóema, IV-1/2013.
3
Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, edited by Michel Senellart, translated by Graham Burchell, 319.
4
Ibid, 319-20.
25
I have opted
Frédéric
Gros,
to “Y
translate
a-t-il un
minoritaire
sujet biopolitique?”,
as ‘exclusive’
Nóema,
here so
IV-1/2013.
as to avoid confusing Gros’s use of
‘minoritarian’ – which I take to mean something like ‘the 1 percent’ – with Deleuze and Guattari’s use of
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solidarity (e.g., amongst workers, as in the decline of unions, of labor as an organized
political force, etc.). On the other hand, there is what Gros calls “critical liberalism,” or,
as Foucault puts it, liberalism as a “tool for the criticism of reality” and “form of critical
reflection on governmental practice,”3 which functions as a critique of excessive
government and activates or realizes the rights of the governed. In short, there would be a
positivist economico-political liberalism, a “regulative schema of governmental practice,”
but also a critical liberalism, “a sometimes radical oppositional theme”4 to excessive
forms of governance.
Further, these two forms of liberalism are not just distinct but diametrically opposed
to one another. Such is the upshot of Gros’s argument: (1) Foucault conceives
“biopolitical resistance” in terms of “the right of the governed,” a right realized or
expressed when those who are governed by an exercise of a power they deem unjust
“assert the will to exist otherwise”; (2) historically, on Foucault’s view, “this activation
of a right of the governed” is made possible by critical liberalism; therefore (3) critical
liberalism can be seen as the basis for resisting the biopolitical exercise of power proper
to economic or political liberalism.
Before being the doctrine of the sacred rights of the individual or the ideological
justification for capitalism, liberalism is that form of thought which, in the West,
posed the question of ‘too much government.’ Are we overly governed, and in
what sense? … Thus, if economic liberalism justifies a biopolitics that exploits vital
forces for the profit of exclusive [minoritaire5] politico-economic forces, critical
liberalism nourishes the forms of biopolitical resistance.6

3

Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, edited by Michel Senellart, translated by Graham Burchell, 319.
Ibid, 319-20.
5
I have opted to translate minoritaire as ‘exclusive’ here so as to avoid confusing Gros’s use of
‘minoritarian’ – which I take to mean something like ‘the 1 percent’ – with Deleuze and Guattari’s use of
the term.
6
Gros, “Y a-t-il un sujet biopolitique?”, 42, my translation.
4

5
Gros’s view thus has the virtue of accounting for the apparent ambivalence of
Foucault’s relation to liberalism, and the divergent interpretations that result: Foucault
could be read as both a critic of liberalism, taken as an economico-political regime, and
proponent of liberalism, taken as a mode of critique targeting the undue exercise of
power.
Indeed, the general distinction Gros draws between a form of positivism, which
Foucault would resist, and a form of critique, which would provide the means for such
resistance, runs deeper than even Gros suggests. I will argue that it fundamentally orients
Foucault’s view of his own philosophical project, expressed in his career-long
ambivalence toward Kant and culminating in his reflections on the Enlightenment.7 One
merit of this reading is to deny the view that Foucault’s lectures on liberalism mark an
inflection point along his political trajectory, one purportedly tending toward deradicalization or even conservatism, since what interests Foucault in critical liberalism is
consistent with his earliest formulations of critique.
Further, I will argue that such a consideration of Foucauldian critique provides the
basis for rejecting the view of Foucault as neoliberal apologist. Foucault’s favorable
remarks on Becker’s analysis of drug policy notwithstanding, he would ultimately not
defend neoliberalism as a critical form of thought, let alone as an economico-political
regime of power; for neoliberalism takes homo economicus – i.e., the neoliberal subject,
the form of individual as self-interested decision-making agent – as something
7

In Foucault’s early work, such as Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology (1961), “Preface to Transgression”
(1963), and The Order of Things (1966), Kant is both the thinker of constitutive finitude – hence opening a
tradition of reflection on transgressive forms of limit-experience, radicalized by Nietzsche and running
through Bataille – as well as the thinker of anthropological positivism, by which a more radical kind of
finitude (death of God) becomes territorialized in man. We will return to this point in greater detail in
Chapter 3.
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universally given or methodologically presupposed, and thus cannot analyze this form of
subject as being itself the contingent effect of historical power relations. Moreover, as
will be shown in the last section of Chapter 4, neoliberal governmentality effectively
impoverishes what Foucault calls the ‘relational fabric’ of society, and thus constitutes
precisely that biopolitical administration of social life that Foucault’s own ethico-politics
aims to resist.

1.2

Neoliberal Governmentality and the Two Kantian Traditions

By the end of his life, Foucault situated himself philosophically within a certain
tradition of Kant.8 However, in a manner perfectly analogous with the distinction drawn
between positivist and critical liberalism, he does so by sharply differentiating between
two opposed Kantian strains.9 On the one hand, there is the Kantian tradition that
Foucault calls the “analytic of truth”: coming out of Kant’s surreptitiously
anthropological critical project, the analytic of truth is an epistemological interrogation
into “the conditions of possibility of a true knowledge.”10 On Foucault’s view, this
tradition gives rise to a form of scientific and logical positivism that informs the “science
of the State,” that is, the form of governmental rationality that “selected as its instruments
procedures to rationalize the economy and society”11 – which is to say, precisely, liberal
governmentality. Indeed, Foucault analyzes liberalism itself in decidedly Kantian terms,

8

See, e.g., Foucault, “Foucault,” Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology: Essential Works of Foucault,
Volume 2, edited by James Faubion, translated by Robert Hurley, 459.
9
Foucault makes this distinction several times specifically with regard to Kant, e.g., in “What is Critique?”
(1977), in the The Government of Self and Others (1983), and in “What is Enlightenment?” (1984).
10
Foucault, The Government of Self and Others, edited by Gros, translated by Burchell, 20-1.
11
Foucault, “What is Critique?”, The Politics of Truth, edited by Sylvere Lotringer, translated by Lysa
Hochroth, 49-50.
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indicating the extent to which they belong to the same tradition: for example, echoing the
Copernican turn of transcendental idealism, liberal government does not act on “things in
themselves,” such as individuals, wealth, and land, but rather on the “phenomena of
politics,” namely, interests.12 Neoliberalism, in turn, rigorously follows the Kantian
notion of a regulative idea, specifically with respect to regulating rather than determining
the conditions of the market, e.g., achieving price control by stabilizing inflation through
credit policy (i.e., by managing interest rates) rather than by determining or fixing
prices.13 The market itself becomes a site of veridiction, e.g., of the ‘true’ or ‘natural’
price of commodities. Liberalism, in its positivist form as regulative schema of
governmental practice, is thus an analytic of truth linked to the science of the State, or to
a form of governmentality that acts upon interests (and thus upon the possible actions of
individuals) by regulating the conditions of the market.
On the other hand, there is, as Foucault emphasizes, a properly “critical tradition of
Kant,”14 stemming from Kant’s writings on Enlightenment and the French Revolution,
which critiques the forms of subjugation by which human beings are maintained in a
subordinate condition to an excessive form of authority. Precisely like critical liberalism,
the second Kantian tradition problematizes governance from the perspective of those who
are governed, thereby seeking to limit or reverse the exercise of power through a critical
movement that would itself constitute a practice of freedom. Foucault refers to this
second Kantian tradition, running from Hegel through Nietzsche and Weber to the

12

Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, 44-5.
Ibid, 138-9.
14
Foucault, “Foucault,” 459.
13
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Frankfurt School, as the “critical attitude”15 or “limit-attitude,”16 which couples a “call
for courage” for humanity to lift the “minority condition” in which it has been
“maintained in an authoritative way,”17 together with an “ontology of ourselves,” which
interrogates the historically contingent conditions, the techniques of
“governmentalization” that have delimited what it is possible to be, say, think, or do.18
As with the two kinds of liberalism, then, the two Kantian traditions are not merely
distinct from one another, but diametrically opposed: on the one hand, a positivist
analytic of truth enlisted to support the governmental rationality of a state system, and on
the other, a “critical attitude” that would precisely resist this form of governmentality. In
a general sense, these would be like the two strands of modernity, the one (major,
dominant) marked by the historical emergence of capitalism and general intensification,
proliferation, and diffusion of power relations, and the other (minor, oppositional), a
potentially revolutionary form of critique and practice of freedom. Foucault, of course,
locates himself in this second, more radical tradition of Kant. And indeed, even when
Foucault turns to Antiquity in the 1980s, in an apparent break from his research on power,
it is “to construct a genealogy of the critical attitude in Western philosophy,” finding in
the Greek concept of parrhesia (‘free speech,’ ‘outspokenness’) “the roots of what we
could call the ‘critical’ tradition in the West,” which he again opposes to the “analytics of
truth.”19 Thus, if Foucault is interested in liberalism, it is to the extent that it constitutes a
kind of critical attitude – and, more specifically, to the extent that this strand of critical
15

Foucault, “What is Critique?”, 42.
Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?”, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth: Essential Works of Foucault,
Volume 1, edited by Paul Rabinow, translated by Catherine Porter, 315.
17
Foucault, “What is Critique?”, 47-8.
18
Foucault, The Government of Self and Others, 20-1. See also, Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?”, 315-6.
19
Foucault, Fearless Speech, edited by Joseph Pearson, 170-1.
16
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liberalism is not only separate from dominant politico-economic liberalism, but in fact
would allow one to contest the latter.
Now, to defend the claim that critical liberalism is opposed to economic or political
liberalism in the way that the critical attitude is opposed to the analytic of truth, it must be
true that for Foucault, economic-political liberalism is in fact a form of ‘governing too
much.’ And indeed, throughout the Birth of Biopolitics, there are various ways in which
liberal governmentality is depicted as excessive: to pick three examples, (1) “liberal
reason is correlative with activation of the imperial principle,”20 allowing the worldwide
expansion of capitalist power relations through colonialism (including endo-colonization)
and later globalization; (2) liberalism is the form of governmentality proper to biopolitics,
the liberal State assuming “the task of continuously and effectively taking charge of
individuals and their well-being, health, and work, their way of being, behaving, and even
dying, etc.”21; and (3) liberalism is the form of governmentality to which corresponds the
historical emergence and exercise of what Foucault calls ‘disciplinary power,’ for “the
Panopticon is the very formula of liberal government.”22
More generally, we can say that for Foucault, liberalism is the form of
governmentality that corresponds to the economico-political function of power in
capitalist society. By this, I mean the following: if the economic refers to the problem of
capital accumulation and the political refers to the problem of the accumulation of human
beings (e.g., integrating the ‘floating populations’ into the industrial apparatus of
production through factory discipline; managing processes of urbanization and the
20

Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, 21.
Ibid, 62. Foucault would seem to have in mind here the Welfare State.
22
Ibid, 67.
21
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productive forces of a population), then the fundamental operation of modern power –
whether it be disciplinary power, biopower, or ‘debt power’ (Lazzarato) – will be
economico-political insofar as its “primary function” is to adjust the “accumulation of
men” to the “accumulation of capital.”23 Therefore, positivist liberalism, as the
“framework of political rationality”24 for the economico-political exercise of power,
constitutes precisely the kind of excessive form of governance that the critical attitude
would contest, insofar as this “power is exercised the way it is in order to maintain
capitalist exploitation.”25
However, one might argue that while this critical analysis is appropriate for
classical liberalism, it is less so for neoliberalism, especially Chicago School
neoliberalism, since Foucault himself speaks optimistically of the latter as suggesting a
non-normalizing possibility for governmental rationality, proceeding not through
coercion but by intervening at the level of interests.26 That is, the neoliberal exercise of

23

Foucault, Psychiatric Power, edited by Jacques Lagrange, translated by Burchell, 110. This holds just as
much for disciplinary power at the micropolitical level (producing politically docile, economically
productive subjects; controlling the plebeian population) at it does for biopolitics at the macropolitical level
(regulating, capturing the vital forces of a population). See Foucault, Discipline and Punish, translated by
Alan Sheridan, 218-21; and History of Sexuality, Volume 1, translated by Hurley, 140-1. We will return to
the topic of the economico-political function of power at greater length in Chapters 4 and 5.
24
Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, 317.
25
Foucault, “Intellectuals and Power,” Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, edited by Donald Bouchard,
translated by Bouchard and Sherry Simon, 216.
26
For example, Foucault seems sympathetic to Becker’s analysis of delinquency and penal policy, precisely
because it effaces the anthropology of the criminal and, by referring instead to his or her calculable
interests, is not moralizing, pathologizing, or normalizing: “First of all, there is an anthropological erasure
of the criminal. It should be said that this does not mean that the level of the individual is suppressed
[manuscript note: “not a nullification of the technologies aiming to influence individual behavior”], but
rather that an element, dimension, or level of behavior can be postulated which can be interpreted as
economic behavior and controlled as such. … In other words, all the distinctions that have been made
between born criminals, occasional criminals, the perverse and the not perverse, and recidivists are not
important. We must be prepared to accept that, in any case, however pathological the subject may be at a
certain level and when seen from a certain angle, he is nevertheless ‘responsive’ to some extent to possible
gains and losses, which means that penal action must act on the interplay of gains and losses or, in other
words, on the environment; we must act on the market milieu in which the individual makes his supply of
crime and encounters a positive or negative demand” (Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, 258-9).
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power would act on the conditions of action, on the field of possible actions,
disincentivizing undesirable behaviors and incentivizing desirable ones, rather than
disciplining the bodies and forces of individuals. Thus, on such a view, Foucault might
turn out to be an apologist for neoliberalism after all, not only in the sense of a criticalliberal right of the governed, but from the perspective of government itself, that is, in
terms of a positivist schema for managing the conduct of the population.
The key for understanding why such a view is misguided is the recognition that,
despite its pretentions to the contrary, neoliberal governmentality involves a fundamental
intensification of power’s exercise. This is because the economico-political function of
power, ever adjusting the double process of capitalization and control of conduct, has
come to capture and commodify the mental life of subjectivity: the very ‘freedoms’ that
the market provides, the arrays of individual choice that neoliberalism makes possible,
are themselves merely so many instruments for our subjection, that is, for producing and
putting to work our ‘interests, desires, and aspirations.’ Here is how Jason Read puts the
point:
As a mode of governmentality, neoliberalism operates on interests, desires, and
aspirations rather than through rights and obligations; it does not directly mark the
body, as sovereign power, or even curtail actions, as disciplinary power; rather, it
acts on the conditions of actions. Thus, neoliberal governmentality follows a
general trajectory of intensification. This trajectory follows a fundamental paradox;
as power becomes less restrictive, less corporeal, it also becomes more intense,
saturating the field of actions, and possible actions.27
Thus, just as disciplinary power, despite being less corporeal and restrictive than
sovereign power, is by no means an ‘improvement’ (pace humanist reformists) but
instead a more insidious and effective redoubling of power; so, too, neoliberal
27
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governmentality is a more insidious and effective redoubling of power when compared to
discipline, despite being even less corporeal and restrictive.
This point is indeed central to Foucault’s very analytic of power. The logic of
discipline is what Foucault terms ‘mildness-production-profit’ (rather than ‘levyingviolence’ proper to sovereign power), and the function of disciplinary power is to make
human multiplicities and the individuals who compose them more productive and more
docile (e.g., in factories, schools, army barracks, prisons, and hospitals). To the extent
that panopticism as a general strategy is effective, power will operate without ever having
to be coercively imposed, since individuals themselves become the relay and instruments
for power’s exercise.
Read’s argument is that we must say the very same thing about neoliberal
governmentality since it realizes the logic of mildness-production-profit, only to an even
greater degree: the seamless efficiency of a power that operates without having to coerce,
but rather through incitation, that is, by having been internalized and reproduced through
the actions and mental lives of individuals. Such actions appear to be freely chosen, such
mental lives to be freely experienced and pursued, but both are circumscribed within a
field of possibility precisely delimited by power. That is, neoliberalism allows an
intensification of political techniques of control: ever milder and less coercive in their
application, such techniques form individuals who are more productive and profitable,
governable and docile, precisely to the extent that individuals as economic agents are depoliticized, privatized, removed from (and set competitively against) collective relations
of solidarity with others. And all this functions without power needing to show its own
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exercise, for power has already operated upon the conditions of action and the field of
what is possible, which is to say, upon the interests of the subjects it helps to produce.
We may thus conclude that just as Foucault situates himself in the Kantian tradition
of the critical attitude, which would contest the positivist tradition of Kant, so, too,
Foucault critiques the excessive economico-political function of neoliberal
governmentality. The view that Foucault would be an apologist for neoliberalism,
however, might have one more recourse: might it not be the case that the Beckerian
theory of human capital provides a form of critical neoliberalism that would call into
question the undue exercise of power?
I would suggest that the answer must be ‘no,’ and that it is here where we see the
essential difference between Becker and Foucault. The Chicago School takes the
individual neoliberal subject – homo economicus, understood as an indivisible atom of
self-interested decision-making agency, attended by a naturalized form of rationality
(rational choice theory) – to be in some sense a universal given, or at least a necessary
methodological presupposition. What neoliberalism will not do is conceive of this form
of economic man as itself a product of power – an effect of a very specific process of
subjection –, one whose interests, preferences, desires, projects, etc. are themselves
produced in accordance with conditions of action made possible and regulated by
neoliberal governmentality (that is, the market principles of competition and private
enterprise). In other words, neoliberalism cannot adopt a critical attitude toward what is
the very site, effect, and relay of power in contemporary capitalist society.
For Foucault, the critical Kantian tradition contests the positivist analytic of truth by
transforming an epistemological interrogation into a political critique or ‘ontology of
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ourselves,’ posing the question: “In what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory,
what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary
constraints?”28 Because neoliberalism cannot put this question to its own formulation of
homo economicus, it cannot critique what is, in fact, the excessive exercise of
government proper to capitalism today.

28

Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?”, 315.

15

CHAPTER 2. THE DEGREE ZERO OF VERTICALITY: FREEDOM AND
TRANSGRESSION IN THE KANTIAN SUBLIME

“For Nietzsche, Bataille, Blanchot, …[w]hat is required is the maximum of intensity and
the maximum of impossibility at the same time…. [E]xperience has the function of
wrenching the subject from itself, of seeing to it that the subject is no longer itself, or that
it is brought to its annihilation or its dissolution.”
— Foucault29
“Taste promises everyone the happiness of an accomplished subjective unity; the sublime
speaks to a few of another unity, much less complete, ruined in a sense, and more ‘noble.’”
— Lyotard30
Before excavating the foundations of the concept of verticality that will be basic to
the account given here of ethical and political agency, the term itself must be unburdened
of some of its common connotations. ‘Verticality’ does not refer to a hierarchical relation,
the line of force of which would travel from above to below, or to associated notions like
social stratification and institutional centralization. Nor does it refer to a religious axis of
transcendence, construed in terms of otherworldliness above or below. Rather, a clue for
understanding the special sense given to ‘verticality’ by Foucault happens to be contained
in the etymology of the word sublime, the origins of which lie in the Greek noun hupsos
(height). ‘Sublime’ is derived from the Latin word sublīmus (uplifted, high, elevated,
exalted, towering), which the standard etymology renders as sub (up to) + līmen
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(threshold of a building). However, as Timothy Costelloe notes, there is a compelling
alternate etymology, suggested in 1967 by A. Ernout and A. Meillet in their Dictionnaire
étymologique de la langue latine, histoire des mots, that
…involves the connection made over time between sub (under or at the bottom) and
super (to raise, to bring to a standing position from below), and the postclassical
confusion among three different words and, consequently, three possible roots from
which it might arise: līmen (threshold or lintel), limes (a road bordering and
delimiting a field), and līmus (sidelong/oblique). Ernout and Meillet argue for līmus,
rendering sublīmis as ‘moving upward from a position below: hence rising
diagonally, or more specifically from below to above, along a diagonal path.’31
As should be clear later on, this oblique trajectory of sublime up-rising comes quite close
to describing the directionality of the vertical vector in Foucault, an elevating movement
emerging ‘from below’ that also involves a crossing-over of thresholds and trans-gressing
of delimitation.
It is indeed fitting, then, that the philosophical basis of Foucault’s concept of
verticality can be reconstructed out of Kant’s account of the sublime32 in the Critique of
Judgment. The very category of the limit-experience, central to a certain lineage of tragic
thought in which Foucault situates himself,33 finds perhaps its first distinctively modern
philosophical expression in the Kantian sublime. However, just as Foucault identifies a
deep tension between two opposed Kantian traditions, the critical limit-attitude and the
positivist analytic of truth, so a similar ambivalence can be discerned in Kant’s own
treatment of sublime feeling. On the one hand, Kant articulates the limit-experience of
31
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radical finitude by which the constitutive structures of the thinking subject and the
empirical world are undone. On the other hand, as though sensing some danger in this
‘abyss-deep thought’ (Nietzsche), Kant moralizes the aesthetic experience of sublime
terror and delight, invoking by way of explanation our ratio-volitional vocation and
respect for the moral law.34
In what follows in this chapter, I will analyze both of these aspects of the Kantian
sublime, beginning with the latter by examining the relation between sublime and moral
feeling. While this first reading of the sublime, since it takes Kant’s appeal to the moral
law at face value, is in some sense more traditional (or naïve) than the one to follow, my
interpretive strategy will be to invert the standard relation between moral and sublime
feeling, according to which the latter is parasitic on the former. Rather than merely
moralize sublime feeling by locating its source in our respect for the moral law within us,
my aim is, as it were, to ‘sublime’ moral feeling: I will argue that moral feeling serves for
Kant as the ratio cognoscendi of human freedom, and that such feeling can play this role
precisely by virtue of its aesthetic expression in the sublime.35 In short, I will argue that it
is sublime experience which satisfies a necessary condition of realization for ethical
34
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agency, a claim which anticipates an analogous and fundamental role played by vertical
experience in Foucault’s theory of political agency.
The second part of this chapter, in turn, will examine in greater detail the structure
of the sublime as a form of limit-experience, for it is here that we see how the Kantian
sublime supplies the conceptual foundations for Foucauldian verticality. Drawing from
Lyotard’s interpretation in Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime, I will demonstrate how
the sublime is an intensive experience of finitude – the precursor to what Nietzsche will
call the ‘tragic’; Heidegger, ‘transcendence’; Bataille, ‘transgression’; and Blanchot, ‘the
thought of the outside’ – by means of which thought is elevated to its highest vocation as
critique.

2.1 The Sublime Source of Ethical Agency
In arguing for the view that, for Kant, moral feeling is the ratio cognoscendi of
freedom, I am largely in agreement with the position recently advanced by Dieter
Schönecker, who interprets Kant as a special kind of ethical intuitionist insofar as the
moral feeling of respect is that through which “we recognize the validity of the moral
law.”36 What I aim to show, however, is that we can only understand how moral feeling
performs the ratio cognoscendi function – that is, to make us first aware of our practical
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freedom – by situating such feeling in relation to the sublime, with which it is “akin”37 in
formal conditions and structure. For Kant, the sublime is that form of aesthetic
experience by which we gain access to moral feeling, or which stirs such feeling in us.
Indeed, by disclosing to us our duty to the moral law within us, and by thus calling the
mind to its higher vocation, sublime feeling plays the same role as the controversial “fact
of reason” that is so central to the argument of the second Critique. The strategy, then,
will be to read the third Critique back into the second, analyzing the relations between
sublime and moral feeling so as to illuminate their essential place in Kant’s critical
system.
Basic to this interpretation will be to show how Kant’s account of both moral and
sublime feeling follows from his philosophical anthropology, where what distinguishes
the being of human being is to have a double nature as simultaneously sensible and
intelligible, homo phaenomenon and homo noumenon.38 I will use the term constitutive
limit to refer to the boundary that separates these two heterogeneous aspects (‘attributes,’
‘domains’) of our being – a dividing line which is the very site of sublime and moral
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feeling. This divide, which it is the singularity of human being to encompass, reflects the
‘immense gulf’ that separates the sensible and supersensible domains in general, and that
can only be bridged practically through the exercise of our freedom39: that is, through the
pursuit and cultivation of our supersensible vocation, for which we first require the
awareness of our autonomy, enabled by the feeling that manifests both the moral law
within us and the rational determinability of our will by this law.
Indeed, what is so “singular” and “peculiar”40 about moral and sublime feeling is
that through them – that is, through sensibility, albeit in a negative manner – we become
conscious of our freedom as rational agents or moral persons, which is to say, of a
supersensible power of the mind (rational volition). It is just insofar as moral and sublime
feeling involve both our sensible and intelligible aspects that we can recognize and
experience a freedom within ourselves that gives us practical access to that which
exceeds all standards of sense. And these special forms of feeling involve both our
sensible and intelligible aspects precisely insofar as they are experiences of our
constitutive limit. In this sense, human freedom and ethical agency cannot be grasped
independently of human finitude, of the limit that simultaneously divides our being and
makes possible the experience (in moral or sublime feeling) of this division as both pain
(from the perspective of our sensible side) and respect or elevation to our highest
vocation (from the perspective of our intelligible side).

39
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2.1.1

The Sublime as Aesthetic Expression of Moral Feeling

Let us begin with the sublime. Sublime feeling is an aesthetic reflective judgment
the quality of which is complex or double, containing two analytically distinct moments of
anguish (pain or displeasure) and exaltation (elevating respect). In the experience of the
mathematical sublime, which is occasioned by the immensity of a boundless object of
nature (e.g., a raging tempestuous sea or a craggy glacial pass) that carries with it the idea
of infinity, reason demands that the imagination present in sensibility an extensive
magnitude that is absolutely large, i.e., that takes as its basic unit of measure “the absolute
whole of nature, which, in the case of nature as appearance, is infinity comprehended.”41 In
turn, the imagination, because of its limitations as a finite faculty, necessarily fails and
cannot provide the requisite schema to form a sensible intuition of such an infinite
magnitude. But precisely because of this failure, which is first experienced as anguish, the
mind as a whole is called to a higher vocation insofar as sublime feeling calls to mind an
idea of reason (here, the idea of the supersensible substrate of nature) to which all
phenomenal presentations in nature are inadequate.
Accordingly, what is sublime is not the sensible object of nature at all but, rather,
the supersensible power of the mind: “For what is sublime, in the proper meaning of the
term, cannot be contained in any sensible form but concerns only ideas of reason, which,
though they cannot be exhibited adequately, are aroused and called to mind by this very
inadequacy, which can be exhibited in sensibility.”42 This ‘arousal’ and elevation of the
mind is then felt as exaltation, which not only is made possible by the inadequacy of
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imagination’s finite powers, but is indissociable from this very inadequacy: “Yet this
inadequacy itself is the arousal in us of the feeling that we have within us a supersensible
power.”43
Indeed, the two feelings of anguish and exaltation are one and the same experience
(the sublime), the first felt from the perspective of our sensible being and its limitations,
the second felt from the perspective of our supersensible being and its power to exceed
these limitations through the ideas of reason that we give to ourselves. It is important to
note that this second feeling of what exceeds sensible limits is not a special kind of
positive intuition. Rather, it is like the flip side of the negative feeling of inadequacy and
inadequation by which our imagination, constrained in its power of aesthetic estimation
by the standards of sensibility, feels its own limitations in impossibly striving to realize
an unattainable idea of reason; yet because this ceaseless striving also expresses our
respect for our ‘supersensible power,’ we are aroused by virtue of this negative feeling to
discover in our power of reason that which is superior to nature in us. This arousal, which
is the feeling of the imagination’s inadequacy, is also the feeling by which we are
elevated to a higher vocation than that of our career as sensibly determinable beings. And
this apparently ambivalent quality of sublime feeling, which is both an anguished
disliking and a ‘soul-stirring delight,’ can only be explained by the double nature of
human beings as simultaneously homo phaenomenon and homo noumenon.
At the interior limit that divides and doubles human being, the mathematical
sublime is thus the feeling of a limit-relation between the phenomenal and noumenal
dimensions of our being. In other words, the mathematical sublime is a limit-experience
43
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of the constitutive division that structures the being of human being as a rational and free
yet sensuously dependent creature.
The dynamical sublime possesses a similar structure: confronted by the destructive
chaos of nature in all its might (e.g., “volcanoes with all their destructive power,
hurricanes with all the devastation they leave behind”44), we face our own fragile
sensuous finitude and “recognize our physical impotence”45 to resist such might; yet at
the same time, and by virtue of first encountering our sensible powerlessness, we also
feel within ourselves a different, non-sensible power which is undominated by and hence
superior to nature. We thus judge the terrible forces of natural disaster as sublime because
“they raise the soul’s fortitude above its usual middle range,” stoking in us the courage to
believe that we could resist “nature’s seeming omnipotence” – not insofar as we could
oppose it with equal natural might, but insofar as we discover in ourselves a greater
strength of a higher order, that is, the “strength … to regard as small the [objects] of our
[natural] concerns: property, health, and life….”46
In other words – and indeed, in words that distinctly echo the famous ‘gallows
example’ by which Kant aims to illustrate the fact of reason in the second Critique – the
exaltation of the dynamical sublime is the feeling that nature’s might, irresistible though
it be with respect to our natural being, exerts no “dominance over us, as persons, that we
should have to bow if our highest principles were at stake and we had to choose between
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upholding or abandoning them.”47 The dynamical sublime thus “keeps the humanity in
our person from being degraded,”48 for, as in the gallows example, the power to ‘regard
as small’ even our strongest natural inclination (love of life) demonstrates the
motivational and ratio-volitional force of morality within us, which is irreducible to
sensible determination. In such a way does the sublime serve as the ratio cognoscendi of
human freedom.
There is thus a double movement that animates sublime feeling, reflecting the
double nature of human being from each side of the divide: on the one hand, we
experience anguish when we confront our own sensible limitation, yet ‘at the same time,’
the very inadequacy of our sensible finitude reveals to us a heterogeneous and
supersensible power of our minds that is superior to either the immensity or might of
nature. In the mathematical sublime, the mind is elevated by the idea of the supersensible
substrate of nature, which contains infinity under itself as a unit; in the dynamical
sublime, the mind is elevated by the ideas of rational volition (freedom as unconditioned
causation) and the absolute worth of ‘the humanity of our person,’ which empower us to
uphold our ‘highest principles’ regardless of natural pressures or inclinations to the
contrary, even at the risk of our most basic material concerns. In both cases, the pain of
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encountering our own sensible finitude in its failings or limitations is simultaneously the
exalting feeling by which “the mind can come to feel its own sublimity, which lies in its
vocation and elevates it even above nature.”49
What is sublime, then, is the auto-elevating power of the mind by which we become
aware of our dignity and calling as rational agents that contain within ourselves the power
to autonomously determine our will. It is by demanding of ourselves the realization of an
idea of reason, to which we strive to become adequate and which striving becomes a law
for us, that we simultaneously come up against our own sensible “limits and inadequacy”
and discover the feeling of “respect for our own vocation,”50 a vocation that exceeds all
sensible mensuration and, as Kant puts it in the second Critique, “elevates a human being
above himself (as part of the sensible world).”51
Such respect – which Kant defines as the “feeling that it is beyond our ability to
attain to an idea that is a law for us,”52 and which is already active in the imagination’s
impossible striving to meet the demand of reason in the mathematical sublime – is the
aesthetic expression of what in moral feeling will be understood as duty to the moral law
within us. For indeed, moral feeling forms the very basis of sublime judgments: “But it is
this idea [of the supersensible] that is aroused in us when, as we judge an object
aesthetically, this judging strains the imagination to its limit, whether of expansion
(mathematically) or of its might over the mind (dynamically). The judging strains the
imagination because it is based on a feeling that the mind has a vocation that wholly
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transcends the domain of nature (namely, moral feeling)….”53 The imagination is pushed
to the limit of its exercise, compelled to confront the boundary of its sensible finitude in
sensibility (anguish) and, at the same time, to awaken the mind through this feeling to its
supersensible vocation as a free rational agent (respect), which ‘wholly transcends’ the
limits of nature’s domain. And this feeling of the mind of respect for its supersensible
vocation just is moral feeling, by which we disclose to ourselves the rational
determinability of our will.
However, sublime feeling seems to naturally involve a certain subreptive illusion
whereby the object of the sublime is mistaken as a sensible object of nature rather than a
moral vocation of the powers of the mind.54 Therefore, in order to in fact become
conscious of our freedom as moral agents through sublime feeling, sublime judgment
must offer a critical corrective to the fallacy of subreption, identifying the anguish and
exaltation not with respect to the immense or mighty object of sensible nature (which is a
mere occasion for sublime judgment) but to a sublime attunement of the mental powers.
Indeed, if we mistook the sublime object as something sensible (a hurricane, crashing
waterfall, etc.); and if we correctly understood the sublime as disclosing an idea of reason
that “even to be able to think proves that the mind has a power surpassing any standard of
sense”55; then sublime feeling would degenerate into the dangerous delusion of
fanaticism, that is, “the delusion of wanting to SEE something beyond all bounds of
53
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sensibility….”56 By critically restricting the sublime to a “pure, elevating, and merely
negative exhibition of morality”57 – one which is expressed through the aesthetic
reflective feeling of anguish and exaltation – the idea of freedom can be disclosed to us
without our lapsing into fanatical delusion.
Moreover, because the sublime object proper is the vocation of the mind, involving
a mental attunement or discordant harmony of the faculties that universally pertains to all
human beings qua free, rational, sensibly dependent beings, sublime aesthetic reflective
judgments are therefore necessary judgments, for they have their
…foundation in human nature: in something that, along with common sense, we
may require and demand of everyone, namely, the predisposition to the feeling for
(practical) ideas, i.e., to moral feeling. This is what underlies the necessity – which
we include in our judgment about the sublime – of the assent of other people’s
judgments to our own. … [W]e presuppose moral feeling in man. And so we
attribute necessity to this [kind of] aesthetic judgment as well.58
The predisposition to moral feeling in human beings – that by which pure reason
becomes practical and our wills rationally determinable insofar as the moral law holds a
practical (rather than pathological) incentive for us – is the necessary and universal
(hence a priori) condition of possibility for sublime feeling, as well as that which grounds
sublime judgment’s modal claim to (subjective) necessity. As we will see below, moral
feeling is itself cognizable a priori, just as humiliation is a universal and necessary feeling
for all human beings who contrast their sensibly dependent self-conceit to the austere
majesty of the moral law within them. Kant can thus help himself to the presupposition of
‘moral feeling in man,’ and he does so by again relying upon the double nature of human

56

Ibid, “General Comment,” 275.
Ibid.
58
Ibid, §29, 265-6.
57

28
beings, i.e., the limit-relation between the phenomenal and noumenal dimensions of our
being.59
A triple relation therefore obtains between sublime and moral feeling. First, the
universality of moral feeling in human beings grounds the necessity of sublime
judgments and thereby secures sublime feeling its licensed place within transcendental
philosophy.60 Second, the two feelings are “akin” with respect to their structure and
“formal conditions” inasmuch as both elevate us to respect our supersensible vocation as
autonomous moral agents by “overcoming” the “obstacles” of our sensual dependence.61
Indeed, sublime judgments disclose to us our duty toward an idea of reason – the
attainment of which we give to ourselves as a law but can yet never be adequate to – and
thus express (negatively exhibit) the rational determinability of our will, “which
determinability is moral feeling.”62 Thus, third, sublime feeling is the aesthetic expression
of moral feeling that makes manifest our duty to the moral law in ourselves and elevates
us through respect for our supersensible vocation. Indeed, in (dynamical) sublime feeling
we take an intellectual liking to the moral law because we experience our rationally
determinable will as a might that is independent of and superior to the sensible might of
nature outside or within us. In short, moral feeling, realized aesthetically through the
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sublime, discloses to us our vocation as free rational agents; it thus serves in sensibility as
the ratio cognoscendi of freedom.63

2.1.2

Moral Feeling as the Ratio Cognoscendi of Human Freedom

In light of this reading of the third Critique, let us now approach moral feeling in
the second, inquiring further into its structure and the role it plays in the practical
incentive of the moral law. Insofar as the moral law commands that our free will be
exclusively determined by the law, the law provides a negative incentive, for it rules out
the sensible inclinations and impulses that stem from our pathological determinations as
sensibly affected creatures. Yet this proscriptive effect, which ‘can be cognized a priori’
since it is merely negative, is itself felt precisely as the pain of privation by the
pathologically determinable self:
So far, then, the effect of the moral law as incentive is only negative, and as such
this incentive can be cognized a priori. For, all inclination and every sensible
impulse is based on feeling, and the negative effect on feeling (by the infringement
upon the inclinations that take place) is itself feeling. Hence we can see a priori that
the moral law, as the determining ground of the will, must by thwarting all our
inclinations produce a feeling that can be called pain; and here we have the first and
perhaps the only case in which we can determine a priori from concepts the relation
of a cognition (here the cognition of pure practical reason) to the feeling of pleasure
and displeasure.64
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Specifically, when the moral law serves as the sole and immediate determining
ground of the will, the inclinations belonging to self-love are brought into line with the
demands of agreement with the law, and the inclinations belonging to self-conceit –
which are antecedent to the law, and upon which we base our arrogant self-satisfaction –
are nullified insofar as “certainty of a disposition in accord with this law is the first
condition of any worth of a person.”65 Self-conceit, which robs human personality of its
dignity, is the form of deluded self-worth of a human being who, having never
encountered her constitutive limit, takes her sensible self (homo phaenomenon) to
constitute her entire being (to the exclusion of homo noumenon), treating self-love as
though it were “the unconditional practical principle.”66
Further, the delusion of self-conceit contains a subreptive illusion, for we mistake
our sensibly determinable self for our rational lawgiving self. When we fall under this
illusion, we treat our own subjective determining grounds, our self-love, as though it
were a universal and objectively valid principle for acting. This is, moreover, precisely
how Kant here defines ‘delusion,’ namely, as “the internal practical deception of taking
what is subjective in a motive for something objective.”67 Accordingly, in the critical first
moment of moral feeling, we feel humiliated because our self-conceit – that by which we
prescribe “as laws the subjective conditions of self-love”68 – is disclosed, belied, and
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debased. This humiliation, suffered by our pathologically determinable selves at the
hands of the moral law, is necessary and universal (hence cognizable a priori) for all
human beings: “Now, what in our own judgment infringes upon our self-conceit
humiliates. Hence the moral law unavoidably humiliates every human being when he
compares with it the sensible propensity of his nature.”69 Thus, in feeling the proscriptive
force of the moral law within us and ‘our own judgment’ restrict the sway of our
inclinations, we compare ourselves in our sensuous finitude to the moral law “in its
solemn majesty”70 and feel ourselves degraded.
However, this first negative moment of pain and humiliation flows directly into a
second, positive moment of moral feeling, for the humiliation itself by which self-conceit
is ‘struck down’ is simultaneously the feeling of respect: “inasmuch as it even strikes
downs self-conceit, that is, humiliates it, it is an object of the greatest respect and so too
the ground of a positive feeling that is not of empirical origin and is cognized a priori.”71
Insofar as the moral law is “something in itself positive – namely the form of an
intellectual causality, that is, of freedom”72; and insofar as we freely give ourselves this
law by legislating it as the determining ground of our own will; the law elicits the
positive feeling of respect. Kant writes: “If something represented as a determining
ground of our will humiliates us in our self-consciousness, it awakens respect for itself
insofar as it is positive and a determining ground.”73
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It is what humiliates us, then, that stirs the feeling of respect; the negative feeling is
a precondition for the positive. Indeed, in a formulation strikingly similar to that of the
dynamical sublime, Kant argues that this feeling of respect is owed to the moral law
overcoming the resistance of our pained sensuous inclinations that struggle against it:
As the effect of consciousness of the moral law, and consequently in relation to an
intelligible cause, namely the subject of pure practical reason as the supreme
lawgiver, this feeling of a rational subject affected by inclinations is indeed called
humiliation (intellectual contempt); but in relation to its positive ground, the law, it
is at the same time called respect for the law; there is indeed no feeling for this law,
but inasmuch as it moves resistance out of the way, in the judgment of reason this
removal of a hindrance is esteemed equivalent to a positive furthering of its
causality. Because of this, this feeling can now also be called a feeling of respect for
the moral law, while on both grounds together it can be called a moral feeling.74
Moral feeling is thus always double and ambivalent, for, like sublime feeling, it is an
experience of our constitutive limit. The moral law in us humiliates us in our selfconsciousness as pathologically determinable beings; yet in so doing, this law clears the
way of any sensuous obstacles that would prevent it from being the sole determining
ground of the will, and it thereby commands respect. In this regard, as in the dynamical
sublime, we are conscious that nature in us (our inclinations) has no sway or dominance
over us (since it need not determine the ground of our will), and we are thus elevated
above the heteronomous and contingent conditions of our natural or sensuous being.
Our debasement and our elevation therefore belong to the same movement, the
same feeling of the mind, and differ only insofar as they reflect separate sides of the
divided self: “the lowering of pretensions to moral self-esteem – that is, humiliation on
the sensible side – is an elevation of the moral – that is, practical – esteem for the law
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itself on the intellectual side.”75 Accordingly, there is no temporal priority between
humiliation and respect, for they are each a different perspective (one of homo
phaenomenon, the other of homo noumenon) on the same experience. When Kant does
write in a manner that suggests a serial relation between humiliation and respect, the
priority of the former might be best understood as logical priority. In this sense, as with
the inadequacy of the imagination in sublime feeling, humiliation is indeed a necessary
first condition for respect, which is why respect – felt in the wake of the removal of
resistance to the determination of the will by the moral law, a removal the proscriptive
force of which unavoidably humiliates every human being who feels it – is an indirect
effect of the moral law. As Kant writes: “respect for the moral law must be regarded as
also a positive though indirect effect of the moral law on feeling insofar as the law
weakens the hindering influence of the inclinations by humiliating self-conceit….”76
Further, because the moral law is one that we give to ourselves as the determining
ground of our will, the respect that we feel for the law in us elevates us to a higher
vocation as autonomous though finite beings. In other words, moral feeling gives us
insight into our freedom as moral persons, for through respect we feel within ourselves an
incentive of pure practical reason that is both free and arises from the moral law itself:
As submission to a law, that is, as a command (indicating constraint for the sensibly
affected subject), it therefore contains in it no pleasure but instead, so far,
displeasure in the action. On the other hand, however, since this constraint is
exercised only by the lawgiving of his own reason, it also contains something
elevating, and the subjective effect on feeling, inasmuch as pure practical reason is
the sole cause of it, can thus be called self-approbation with reference to pure
practical reason, inasmuch as he cognized himself as determined to it solely by the
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law and without any interest, and now becomes conscious of an altogether different
interest subjectively produced by the law, which is purely practical and free….77
The supersensible vocation to which we are elevated in the feeling of respect is precisely
our duty to act from the moral law in such a way that the law (which we freely give to
ourselves) exclusively and immediately determines our will. And it is respect, and the
duty it discloses, that the moral law must effect in the mind insofar as there can be an
incentive of pure practical reason.
Indeed, this moral feeling of the mind reveals to the human being her personality,
which is to say, her freedom as a moral agent. Inquiring into the origin of duty,78 Kant
answers:
It can be nothing less than what elevates a human being above himself (as a part of
the sensible world) … It is nothing other than personality, that is, freedom and
independence from the mechanism of the whole of nature, regarded nevertheless as
also a capacity of a being subject to special laws – namely pure practical laws given
by his own reason, so that a person as belonging to the sensible world is subject to
his own personality insofar as he also belongs to the intelligible world…. This idea
of personality [awakens] respect by setting before our eyes the sublimity of our
nature (in its vocation) while at the same time showing us the lack of accord of our
conduct with respect to it and thus striking down self-conceit….79
So it is by virtue of this affection of the mind – the elevation of respect following the
debasement of humiliation – that we are able to feel the free incentive of pure practical
reason and, thereby, to become aware of our duty or vocation as moral persons who are
autonomous with respect to nature and free unconditioned causes with respect to
ourselves.
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In this sense, our nature and its vocation are sublime because we are not dominated
by the might of nature in us, yet it is only insofar as we feel degraded by the moral law
that we can have the elevated feeling of respect. That is, in order to overcome or ascend
above our heteronomous limitations as sensibly affected beings, we must precisely
encounter the painful failings of those limitations and feel shame when comparing these
to the austere perfection of the moral law. Again like sublime feeling, moral feeling is
made possible by the power of reason in us to confront our constitutive limit.
Moral feeling is not, of course, the objective ground of the moral law, but it is the
subjective sign through which we are affected by and made aware of the moral law; and
the capacity for this feeling is a necessary condition for the determinability of the will by
the moral law, which is also to say, for the exercise of human freedom. So it is by virtue
of moral feeling – respect for the law, and also the law in us, the self-giving law that
thereby elevates us in our supersensible vocation above our pathologically determinable
selves – that we are made conscious of our freedom, which consciousness is identical to
the fact of reason. Thus, if the moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of freedom – that is,
“the condition under which we can first become aware of freedom”80 – it is so by virtue
of moral feeling, for it is through moral feeling that the moral law becomes a subjective
determining ground or incentive of pure practical reason. Moral feeling is that by which
we can become aware of our supersensible vocation, that is, our duty and its origin in
moral personality, that is, the dignity of our humanity, which is elevated above the limitconditions of our finite, pathologically determinable sensuous selves. However, such
moral feeling is made possible precisely because we are finite sensuous selves who feel
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humiliation when the moral law in us determines our will and restricts our sensuous
inclinations and pathological desires, thereby inciting pain and degradation.
In short, only by encountering the constitutive limit of our ontological self-division
can we feel and cognize what exceeds our sensible finitude in us: namely, our
supersensible vocation as free rational beings.81 And as we have seen, it is in the
experience of the sublime that we are confronted by this limit. Indeed, more than any
merely hypothetical formulation, such as the gallows example, it is the anguish and
exaltation of sublime feeling that awakens in us the ‘idea of personality’ by means of
which our freedom becomes binding for us. That is, the auto-elevating movement of
sublime experience, once a critical corrective to the natural subreption it involves has
been applied, calls to mind our proper vocation, eliciting the moral feeling on the basis of
which we recognize our freedom. Operating in sensibility to open thought to that which,
in thought, is irreducible to sensibility, the sublime therefore provides the conditions of
realization – what, in the context of Foucault, I will call the conditions of material
expression – for ethical agency.
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2.2

Anguish and Exaltation: The Limit-Experience of Transgression and the Critical
Vocation of Thought

“The limit-experience is the answer man receives once he decides to call himself
radically into question. … To man, such as he is and such as will be, there belongs an
essential lack, from which comes this right to call himself forever into question. … If he
comes to feel this surplus of nothingness, …if he lets himself be seized by the infinity of
finality [l’infini de la fin], then he must respond to another exigency, no longer to
produce but to expend… Inner experience demands this event that does not belong to
possibility; it opens in completed being an infinitesimal interstice by which all that is lets
itself be suddenly overcome and deposed by a surfeit that escapes and exceeds it. Strange
surplus …, surplus of void, surfeit of ‘negativity’ that is in us the infinite heart of the
passion of thought.”
— Blanchot82
“But such an experience … discloses as its own secret and clarification, its intrinsic
finitude, the limitless reign of the Limit, and the emptiness of those excesses [le vide de ce
franchissement] in which it spends itself and where it is found wanting. In this sense, the
inner experience is, throughout, an experience of the impossible (the impossible being
both that which we experience and that which constitutes the experience).”
— Foucault83
Like the Kantian sublime, Foucault will articulate the concept of an intensive form
of experience that enables the realization of human agency and the practice of freedom.
Of course, Foucauldian verticality will make no appeal to the universal validity of a
moral law or our supersensible vocation84, so the reading of the sublime given above may
appear to be of limited instruction. However, a closer analysis of the mathematical
sublime in the third Critique reveals another possible interpretation of sublime experience,
one that allows us to dispense with Kant’s invocation of either a supersensible substrate
of nature or a transcendent moral law. Indeed, what such a reading prepares is the tragic
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concept of a vertical form of limit-experience, which Foucault paradigmatically refers to
as transgression, by which the constituent subject or ‘moi-sujet’ (Bataille) is undone
through an auto-intensifying movement of thought. It is this auto-elevating movement
proper to the sublime, I will argue, that discloses thought’s highest vocation as vertical
critique.
The general form of the limit-experience can be provisionally characterized
according to the following eight traits:
i.

Fundamentally, it is an experience of radical or absolute finitude: that is, the
limit experienced not (or not only) as privation or limitation but as constitutive
condition of possibility.

ii.

This experience of absolute finitude arises through an encounter with that
which radically exceeds the limits of possible (phenomenal) experience – e.g.,
the idea of the infinite – and is thus an experience of the impossible.

iii.

In this movement by which the conditions of sensible experience and
cognition are transcended or transgressed (yet still within sensibility itself),
the experience of the impossible ruptures the unity of the subject (opening it
to that which absolutely exceeds it) and at the same time ruptures the unity of
the object (as an object of possible knowledge).85
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iv.

Because the forms of subject and object are themselves the products of
processes of limitation, the fracturing of these forms opens thought to the
absolute or limitless, to an abyss (‘strange surplus of void’) that is at once a
source of terror and joy.

v.

In the face of this unboundedness, thought is compelled to express the
absolute, but precisely because thought itself is finite, it can only do so
negatively by presenting the absolute as irrecoverable absence.

vi.

Since it exceeds the conditions of phenomenal experience yet takes form
through an expanded mode of sensibility, this negative presentation of the
absolute, which elevates thought to the very heights of its powers, can take
form only in the feeling that thought experiences when confronting the
absolute.

vii.

This feeling – which constitutes the proper object and criterion of the limitexperience – is simultaneously anguish suffered in the face of thought’s
proper limit (the impossibility of positively presenting the absolute) and
exaltation affirmed in the movement by which thought is transported to this
very limit and able to apprehend it as such;86 for only in this way can thought
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touch upon its own absolute, the limit being the a priori (hence unconditioned)
condition of possibility for thought itself.
viii.

As such, the limit is itself limitless (‘the limitless reign of the Limit’) and, by
becoming an object of thought, opens thought to the only form of the infinite
to which it has proper access: an infinite or radical finitude, ‘l’infini de la fin.’

In brief, and to invoke Lyotard: the limit-experience is a differend of feeling
(anguish and exaltation: what Bataille calls ‘ravishment’ and Blanchot, ‘ravaging joy’)
that is the feeling of the differend of absolute finitude and the absolute infinite on the
occasion of thought’s being propelled to its own fundamental limit and taking this limit
as its proper object.
The remainder of this chapter, then, will offer an analysis of the Kantian sublime
oriented by these eight aspects or moments of the limit-experience. This interpretation
becomes possible if, as Lyotard suggests, the rational idea proper to the sublime, which
reason demands that the imagination present to thought in sensation, is understood to be
the idea of the limit, rather than the idea of nature as supersensible substrate or the idea of
absolute freedom as unconditioned causality. In sublime experience, for a mode of
thought capable of feeling (or, to speak with Lyotard, of tautegorically87 reflecting upon)
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its constitutive finitude, it is precisely the idea of the limit that indicates the absolute of
thought itself (its a priori condition), opening the power of thinking to what is, for it,
infinite.

2.2.1

The Sublime as (i) Experience of Absolute Finitude and (ii) Experience of
Impossibility

Whereas a judgment of beauty (aesthetic reflective judgment of taste) is occasioned
by the singular form of an object, which exhibits a “purposiveness” (though without a
determinant purpose) “by which the object seems as it were predetermined for our power
of judgment, so that this beauty constitutes in itself an object of our liking”88; sublime
judgment, on the other hand, is occasioned “by a formless object, insofar as we present
unboundedness”89: “in what we usually call sublime in nature there is such an utter lack
of anything leading to particular objective principles and to forms of nature conforming
to them, that it is rather in its chaos that nature most arouses our ideas of the sublime, or
in its wildest and most ruleless disarray and devastation, provided it displays magnitude
and might.”90 Beauty, given in the superabundant richness of form, delights the mind by
facilitating the harmonious and free interplay of imagination and understanding, which
are faculties that in their cognitive employment operate on the basis of limitation and
determination to render knowledge possible (schematization in the case of the
imagination, subsumption of intuitions under concepts in the case of the understanding).
By contrast, the sublime, which is also a source of delight, appears “contrapurposive for
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our power of judgment”91 precisely because of the formlessness or limitlessness of the
magnitude or might of nature that in its chaos gives rise to sublime feeling.
This unboundedness exceeds the delimitative operations of aesthetic comprehension
and mensuration by which the imagination presents to the understanding a sensible object
taken as extensive magnitude. This is why, as we have seen, there is strictly speaking no
phenomenal object of sublime experience, though there are phenomenal occasions for it.
Confronted with the impossibility of presenting what it must nonetheless struggle to
present, the imagination, at the limit of what it can do, feels its own failing; and it is
precisely this failing that ‘can be exhibited in sensibility’ and thereby form the sensible
basis (anguish) for the sublime feeling by which thought is called to that which
transcends the conditions of possible experience.92
The finitude of the imagination is thus itself a necessary condition for the possibility
of an experience (in sublime feeling) of that which exceeds the very limits of possible
experience. Despite (or, rather, by virtue of) the fact that it is contrapurposive for the
imagination, the sublime bespeaks another, more elevated purposiveness of the mind by
which thought encounters the absolute. The sublime is thus an experience of the
impossible in two distinct but indissociable senses: (1) the impossibility that the
imagination suffers when faced with the demand to present the unbounded (absolute) in
intuition; and (2) the impossible as the sublime object proper, which ‘cannot be contained
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in any sensible form’ and thus exceeds the limits of possible experience that condition
objects of sense, yet which is nevertheless presented (negatively) in sensibility through
sublime feeling.
This dynamic of double impossibility is on display in Kant’s account of the
mathematical sublime:
Hence, considered on this basis, nothing that can be an object of the senses is to be
called sublime. [What happens is that] our imagination strives to progress toward
infinity, while our reason demands absolute totality as a real idea, and so [the
imagination,] our power of estimating the magnitude of things in the world of sense,
is inadequate to that idea. Yet this inadequacy itself is the arousal in us of the
feeling that we have within us a supersensible power; and what is absolutely large is
not an object of sense, but is the use that judgment makes naturally of certain
objects so as to [arouse] this (feeling), and in contrast with that use any other use is
small. Hence what is to be called sublime is not the object, but the attunement that
the intellect [gets] through a certain presentation that occupies reflective
judgment.93
Considered in its mathematical aspect, the sublime is “what is absolutely [schlechthin]
large,”94 which is to say, “what is large beyond all comparison,”95 an absolute magnitude
that exceeds any form of comparative measurement. The sublime is a kind of measureless
measure or ‘mesure démesurée’ (Foucault): an infinite magnitude that admits of no
numerical measurement; an absolute magnitude that gives to itself its own measure.
“Clearly, in that case [viz., the sublime], we do not permit a standard adequate to it to be
sought outside it, but only within it. It is a magnitude that is equal only to itself.”96 There
can be no adequation between the absolutely large and anything outside it, for
inadequation is the very mark of the absolute. And for that reason, the imagination can
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possess no sensible standard by means of which it could present an adequate estimate of
the sublime.
Let us consider the problem in more detail. The imagination is ‘our power of
estimating the magnitude of things in the world of sense,’ which is to say, the power of
thought to give an aesthetic “estimation of magnitudes in mere intuition (by the eye).”97
Aesthetic estimation of magnitude is distinguished from the mathematical estimation of
magnitude, which employs the understanding and operates “by means of numerical
concepts (or their signs in algebra).”98 Although “all logical estimation of magnitude is
mathematical” insofar as “we must use numbers …, whose unity is [the unit we use as]
the measure” in order to obtain “determinate concepts of how large something is,”
mathematical estimation presupposes that the “magnitude of the measure” is known.99
That is, the measure used to estimate mathematical magnitude is also a magnitude that
must be measured in turn, and thus cannot itself be constituted mathematically. Rather,
all mathematical estimation of magnitude depends upon a “first or basic measure,” which
can only by given by an aesthetic estimation of magnitude as the limit of what we are
able to “take in [fassen] directly in one intuition.”100 Lyotard puts the point as follows:
“the very notion of measure ... proceeds from the ‘aesthetic’ limitation of the
comprehension of the manifold in a single presentation. This is the ‘first or fundamental
measure’ by which all mathematical measure is made possible as numerical

97

Ibid, §26, 251.
Ibid.
99
Ibid.
100
Ibid.
98

45
determination. The ‘horizon’ of comprehension is the magnitude of the measure that
makes the measure of magnitudes possible.”101
Now, because the sublime is the absolutely large, the experience of the sublime
presents to thought a magnitude that exceeds the first measure of aesthetic estimation and
thus cannot be determined by means of numerical concepts: “estimation has been pushed
to the point where the ability of our imagination is inadequate to exhibit the concept of
magnitude.”102 Indeed, this is the constitutive inadequacy of the imagination that makes
sublime experience possible. The ‘idea of the sublime’ is awakened at the very moment
that thought, struggling to present that which surpasses its ‘power of estimating
magnitude in the world of sense,’ confronts its own ‘first or basic measure’ as the
absolute subjective limit of aesthetic comprehension:
Now even though there is no maximum for the mathematical estimation of
magnitude (inasmuch as the power of numbers progresses to infinity), yet for the
aesthetic estimation of magnitude there is indeed a maximum. And regarding this
latter maximum I say that when it is judged as [the] absolute measure beyond
which no larger is subjectively possible (i.e., possible for the judging subject), then
it carries with it the idea of the sublime and gives rise to that emotion which no
mathematical estimation of magnitude by means of numbers can produce….103
The idea of the sublime arises through a reflection by thought upon its proper finitude –
upon the absolute limit of its powers of presentation and comprehension – and this
reflection is occasioned by those “appearances” of nature “whose intuition carries with it
the idea of their infinity.”104
In a way that must still be clarified, the idea of the infinite (which attends an
appearance of nature in its chaotic and ruleless disarray) – by virtue of the intrinsic
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excess by which it surpasses, as absolute magnitude, the limits of the presentable –
prompts thought to judge its own first measure as an absolute limit (the absolute of the
finite). It is this reflective judgment of thought upon its constitutive limit that opens
thought to the idea and feeling of the sublime: “This limit is the absolute, felt subjectively
or aesthetically, of what the faculty of presentation can grasp in terms of presentable
magnitude. It is enough for thought to feel this measure as insurmountable, as
subjectively absolute, for this aesthetic maximum to convey ‘the idea of the sublime’ and
to call for the ‘emotion’ that characterizes this feeling.”105
It remains to articulate this ‘idea of the sublime’ in its specificity. No doubt it is an
idea of reason, and it might seem to be simply the idea of the infinite as a whole or
‘absolute totality,’ which reason (impossibly) demands that the imagination present in
sensibility. However, the text of the Critique cited above suggests a more complicated
story, for it is precisely because the ‘first or basic’ limit of the imagination is judged to be
an ‘absolute measure’ that the thought and feeling of the sublime become possible. That
is, the idea of the sublime owes at least as much to the absolute of the finite as to the
absolute infinite: “The only way for this [viz., for nature to be sublime in those of its
appearances whose intuition carries with it the idea of their infinity] to occur is through
the inadequacy of even the greatest effort of our imagination to estimate an object’s
magnitude.”106 Indeed, both of these absolutes are at work in the experience of the
impossible that constitutes sublime feeling. Let us take a closer look, then, at the infinite
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demand of reason that compels the imagination to “advance toward what is impossible
for it.”107
When working in conjunction with the understanding in the mathematical
estimation of magnitude, the imagination has no difficulty progressing toward infinity by
means of numerical concepts. However, because reason “demands totality for all given
magnitudes,” “reason demands comprehension in one intuition, and exhibition of all the
members of a progressively increasing numerical series, and it exempts from this demand
not even the infinite (space and past time). Rather, reason makes us unavoidably think of
the infinite … as given in its entirety (in its totality).”108 By requiring totalization, the
command of reason that issues in the sublime is contrapurposive for the imagination with
respect to the latter’s powers of ‘comprehension’ and ‘exhibition’: the thought that
presents cannot think the infinite as an absolute and actual whole.
But what exactly does the imagination’s failure consist in? Precisely the inability of
the subjective syntheses of apprehension and comprehension (comprehensio aesthetica)
to take in – in one intuition, at one time, and as a whole – a progression the magnitude of
which exceeds the first measure of aesthetic estimation:
Hence it must be the aesthetic estimation of magnitude where we feel that effort,
our imagination’s effort to perform a comprehension that surpasses its ability to
encompass [begreifen] the progressive apprehension in a whole of intuition, and
where at the same time we perceive the inadequacy of the imagination – unbounded
though it is as far as progressing is concerned – for taking in and using, for the
estimation of magnitude, a basic measure that is suitable for this….109
The imagination’s powers of comprehension falter before the infinite demand of reason,
not only because comprehension (and thus aesthetic magnitude) has a limit, but because
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comprehension itself is a delimitative operation and thus necessarily inadequate for
presenting what is formless or limitless: “Comprehension … is limitation itself before
any conceptual rule, for it consists in a putting into form, and form is a limitation.”110
This point, to which we will return below, will be crucial for the claim that the idea of the
limit is that by which thought thinks its own absolute, its proper a priori condition of
possibility.

2.2.2

The Sublime as (iii) Rupture of the Unities of Subject and Object and (iv) Opening
of Thought to the Absolute
It is difficult to overstate the devastation that this impossibility of comprehension

wrecks upon the constitutive basis of the subject. To begin with, the violence the
imagination does to itself (under the command of reason) consists in a violation of the
three syntheses (apprehension, reproduction, recognition) that Kant analyzes in the A
Deduction of the first Critique, and which constitute the “‘subjective sources’ that
establish the transcendental possibility of the knowledge of objects.”111 The synthetic
activity of comprehension is the power of the imagination to apprehend and hold together
the unity of the manifold in intuition and to reproduce this unity over time as a condition
for temporal succession (which, when employed for cognition, enables objects of
intuition to be recognized and subsumed under concepts). As we have seen, the limit of
(and condition for) the synthesis of apprehension is the first measure of aesthetic
estimation, the maximum that we can ‘take in directly in one intuition.’ Therefore, when
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this limit is exceeded (by the absolute largeness of the sublime) and can no longer
function to give unity and form to the manifold, the comprehensive synthesis breaks
downs, for apprehension is overwhelmed and intuition itself rendered impossible.
In this way, the experience of the sublime disrupts the unities of both self and world.
On the side of the world, by forcing thought beyond the limit of its “subjective absolute
in the presentation of a magnitude,”112 the encounter with absolute magnitude undoes the
unity of the manifold (by disabling the synthetic activity of the mind that holds together
this unity). Dizzied before the abyss it beholds in the absence of presentable intuition and
blinded in the face of its proper limit, thought is seized by the terror characteristic of
sublime experience: “at the moment of passing beyond this absolute limit, the
comprehensive synthesis of magnitude becomes impossible, and the quality of the state,
in which the thought that imagines finds itself, is reversed: it is afraid of this
Überschwengliche, of this transcendent, this movable and confused (schwingen) beyond
(über) ‘like an abyss [Abgrund] in which it fears to lose itself.’”113 Thought trembles
before the unpresentable ‘presence’ of the absolute, the object of the sublime which
cannot be grasped or contained in sensible form.114
On the side of the self, there is a breakdown of all three elementary syntheses that
are the ‘subjective sources’ by which understanding is made possible: the failure of the
apprehensive synthesis consigns to the same fate the reproductive synthesis that is
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“inseparably bound up with”115 it, as well as the recognitive synthesis that requires
objects of intuition to be comprehended (formed, delimited) so as to bring them under
concepts. Moreover, sublime experience, by thus undermining object- and worldawareness from a point of view (that of the subject, the absolute subjective limit of which
has been transgressed), fractures the originary synthetic unity of the ‘I think.’ There can
be no “formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of
representations”116 if this manifold cannot be synthesized. As Kant says, “the mind could
never think its identity in the manifoldness of its representations, and indeed think this
identity a priori, if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its act, whereby it
subordinates all synthesis of apprehension … to a transcendental unity”117; but since the
sublime forecloses ‘all synthesis of apprehension,’ the latter cannot be subordinated to a
transcendental unity, and the mind is thus deprived the identity of the act by which it
could think its proper identity.
Indeed, given Kant’s claim that the “original and necessary consciousness of the
identity of the self is thus at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity
of the synthesis of all appearance according to concepts,”118 it follows that the failure of
the three subjective syntheses in sublime experience (which renders impossible the ‘unity
of the synthesis of all appearance according to concepts’) subverts the consciousness of
self-identity and disables transcendental apperception. “One does not see how in the
absence of the elementary syntheses, ‘subjective sources’ that ‘make possible
understanding,’ the unity of a subject (here, the subject of sublime feeling) could be
115
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deduced. … There seems to be no question that the most elementary conditions (the
syntheses of time) for the synthesis of a Selbst are lacking here.”119
How does the experience of the sublime undermine ‘the syntheses of time’? We
have already seen that the reproductive synthesis (indissociable though analytically
distinct from apprehension) enables the progression of the imagination and its
presentation of temporal succession. This progression or form of successive apprehension
provides what Kant calls ‘the condition of time’ proper to the imagination, which makes
it possible for the imagination to follow the understanding in providing the measure for
mathematical estimations of ever-greater magnitudes.
Now, in the sublime, reason demands that the imagination comprehend and exhibit
‘in one intuition … all the members of a progressively increasing numerical series’: the
imagination must “comprehend in one instant what is apprehended successively,” an
operation of thought termed “regression” that “cancels the condition of time in the
imagination’s progression.”120 Since time, for Kant, is “the form of inner sense, that is, of
the intuition of ourselves and of our inner state,”121 the canceling procedure of regression
inflicts violence upon the constitutive condition of the subject: “Hence, (since temporal
succession is a condition of the inner sense and of an intuition) it [viz., regression] is a
subjective movement of the imagination by which it does violence to inner sense, and this
violence must be the more significant the larger the quantum is that the imagination
comprehends in one intuition.”122 Because sublime magnitude is absolutely large, the
regression demanded by reason in the experience of the sublime inflicts, by the auto119
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violation of imagination, an infinite violence upon the very foundation of the subject, the
temporal condition of the ‘I think.’123

2.2.3 The Sublime as (v) Negative Presentation of the Absolute, (vi) Elevation of
Thought, and (vii) Feeling of Anguish and Exaltation
Nevertheless, sublime experience must speak to some form of subjectivity insofar
as it is an aesthetic reflective judgment based upon feeling, and insofar as it contains a
higher (subjective) purposiveness for the power of judging (which alone, for Kant, can
account for the sublime’s affirmative dimension as ‘soul-stirring delight’). The
experience of the impossible is not itself an impossible experience: sublime experience is
empirically real, and so an account must be given of how it can elevate thought despite
(or by virtue of) the absence of the ‘I think.’ Indeed, the point is not that thought falters
when the subject is undermined but, rather, that it thereby receives a higher calling: “this
same violence that the imagination inflicts on the subject is still judged purposive for the
whole vocation of the mind.”124
We have seen what the failure of the imagination consists in, but we must more
closely examine how it is constitutive of sublime experience. That Kant takes this failure
to be constitutive is clear: the confrontation of the imagination with its absolute
(subjective or aesthetic) limit ‘carries with it the idea of the sublime and gives rise to that
emotion’; the imagination strives to present what it cannot, yet ‘this inadequacy itself is
123
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the arousal in us of the feeling that we have within us a supersensible power.’ Or again:
“the subject’s own inability uncovers in him the consciousness of an unlimited ability
which is also his, and … the mind can judge this ability aesthetically only by that
inability.”125 So the feeling of the imagination’s inadequacy yields (to) the feeling of a
boundless power proper to thought, which is, in the end, the real object of the sublime:
‘what is to be called sublime is not the object, but the attunement that the intellect [gets]
through a certain presentation that occupies reflective judgment.’
The situation, then, is as follows: a formless object provides the occasion for
thought to feel the absolute limit of its presentational power (anguish, terror) and, thereby,
to feel another power of thinking that is unlimited, which is to say, unconditioned,
absolute (exaltation); and it is this other power or ‘way of thinking’126 that is properly
judged sublime. Accordingly, we must inquire into this exaltation that thought feels as it
is called to its proper vocation.
Now, as we saw in our discussion of the formlessness of the appearances in nature
that occasion the sublime, the inadequacy of the imagination ‘arouses and calls to mind’
‘ideas of reason’ because such ideas are precisely what cannot be presented in intuition.
“In the case of the sublime, the without-form immediately suggests a concept of
speculative reason, for the object of such a concept is by definition forbidden presentation
and there is no presentation without form.”127 (We will return in the following section to
the crucial question of which particular idea of reason is called to mind in the sublime.)
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Nevertheless, reason makes the impossible demand that imagination present this idea of
reason; and imagination, answering the call of reason to breach the absolute limit of its
first measure, feels, at the threshold of what exceeds the sensible, the expansive thrill of
boundlessness: “For though the imagination finds nothing beyond the sensible that could
support it, this very removal of its barriers also makes it feel unbounded, so that its
separation [from the sensible] is an exhibition of the infinite; and though an exhibition of
the infinite can as such never be more than merely negative, it still expands the soul.”128
The imagination exhibits, bears witness to the infinite negatively in the very
movement by which it separates itself from the sensible. In this nearly impossible and
uncertain gesture, which borders on delirium, the imagination finds itself unsupported
and without ground; yet it is not the Ab-grund that it beholds, the abyss that had filled the
imagination with terror on the occasion of the breakdown of its elementary subjective
syntheses. Rather, the demand reason issues to the imagination, which Kant describes in
the Dynamical Sublime as “the dominance that reason exerts over sensibility”129 by
which reason qua might is superior to the might of sensibility that resists it,130 expands
the very powers of the imagination, “letting it look outward toward the infinite, which for
sensibility is an abyss.”131 But in what sense is the imagination, separated from sensibility
yet remaining the power of thought to present, able to ‘look outward toward’ what is
infinite? What precisely is ‘the infinite’ in this case, and what more does the imagination
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‘look’ upon there where sensibility perceives only the void? Surely not a positive ‘vision,’
which would collapse thought into fanaticism and mania, for, as we have seen, the
imagination’s presentation of the infinite must remain strictly negative. Of what, then,
does the exhibition of the absolute consist if “it is neither the absence of presentation nor
the presentation of nothingness,” and if “it is negative in the eyes of the sensible but at
the same time is still a ‘mode of presentation”?132
The answer, which concerns the nature of aesthetic reflective judgment itself, lies in
feeling, for such judgments have no criterion other than the feeling (pleasure or
displeasure) of thought itself occasioned by the form of the object (in the case of beauty)
or the lack thereof (in the case of the sublime).133 This is the ‘tautegorical’ character of
aesthetic reflection that Lyotard emphasizes, the ‘perfect coincidence of what feels and
what is felt’: that is, “the identity of form and content”134 of the judgment, the doubling of
thinking (la pensée) by what is thought (le pensé) in the ‘dazzling immediacy’ of
thought’s auto-affection.135 Accordingly, if in sublime judgments thought is able to
(negatively) present the absolute to itself, it must be through the feeling that thought itself
experiences, a feeling that is the proper object of the sublime: “Only through its sensation
can the thought that imagines be aware of this ‘presence’ without presentation.”136
What is this feeling? Precisely that of thought itself as it withdraws from the
sensible by judging, on the basis of its anguish, its ‘first measure’ as an absolute
132
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subjective limit – a judgment which thus frees the imagination (however momentarily)
from the delimitative operations of comprehension, insofar as it (imagination) can reflect
upon the fundamental condition (first measure, absolute of the finite) that makes such
operations possible. In this reflexive feeling, which is a negative presentation because the
condition for the feeling is the sacrifice of the imagination’s powers of comprehension by
which it could present an object of intuition,137 the imagination takes possession of its
expanded powers: the feeling of the imagination when it touches upon its constitutive
limit, which contains an ineliminable moment of anguish, gives way to a feeling of
unboundedness – groundlessness experienced as an elevation or exaltation that ‘expands
the soul’ – as thought discovers in the order of presentation the power to reflect upon its
own absolute (its own a priori condition of possibility).
Indeed, as we saw above, what is properly called sublime (infinite, absolutely large)
is the employment of thought itself when it thinks the absolute and thus exceeds the
limits of sensibility; or, more precisely, the feeling of thought on the occasion of (and as
the basis for) this employment. Therefore, not only must the absolute be felt in order to
be ‘present’ to thought, but the feeling of thought must itself be felt as absolute. These are,
in fact, two sides of the same tautegorical coin:
Because it is a reflective judgment, the Idea of the absolute is only ‘present’ and
this presence is that of the ‘soul-stirring delight’ that thinking feels on the occasion
of the object it judges sublime. This sensation, and this sensation alone, signals the
call of reason that the critique makes explicit. Thus for reflective judgment it
matters less that the object of this Idea is absolute …. What matters is that the
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delight is felt to be absolute. The reflective absolute predicates not an object, but a
state of thought.138
The infinite that the imagination ‘looks outward toward’ is thus not an infinite beyond but
the feeling of a particular power of thought, one that is auto-expansive (hence soulstirring) by virtue of violently suspending the normal operations of the subject and
transgressing the limits that condition the sensible. But how are we to characterize this
power of thought, and in what sense can the feeling of it be understood as absolute? As
we will see, these questions concern what is essential to the sublime as a limit-experience
and to critical thought as a whole.

2.2.4

The Sublime as (viii) Thought of the Limitless Limit

As we examined in the first part of this chapter, Kant terms ‘supersensible’ the
expanded power of thought by which the imagination, by virtue of both its finitude and
its ability to reflect (through feeling) upon the absoluteness of this finitude, calls to mind
idea(s) of reason. I have suggested that this our second interpretation of the sublime
allows us to dispense with Kant’s specific explanatory appeal to the ideas of a
supersensible substrate of nature and universal moral law. The time has now come to
articulate the alternative idea of reason by and toward which the imagination is
impossibly and irresistibly summoned.
Let us return once more to Kant’s treatment of the mathematical sublime. The first
measure that the imagination employs in making aesthetic estimations of magnitude is
overwhelmed on the occasion of the sublime, and thought’s synthetic activity of
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comprehension is thus violently disrupted, but this failure is itself purposive for the
vocation of the mind as a whole. In order to explain this purposiveness, Kant transposes a
problem from the first antinomy in the first Critique. The imagination falters in the
mathematical sublime not simply because its basic aesthetic measure is exceeded but,
further, because the measure it would need to estimate the absolute magnitude or
largeness of the sublime is the ‘absolute whole of nature’: “Now the proper unchangeable
basic measure of nature is the absolute whole of nature, which, in the case of nature as
appearance, is infinity comprehended. This basic measure, however, is a selfcontradictory concept (because an absolute totality of an endless progression is
impossible).”139
Within the sensible conditions of nature as appearance, to grasp nature in its totality
as an absolute whole would be to comprehend the infinite, which would require the
synthetic comprehension in intuition of an unlimited progression. Not only is this an
impossibility for the imagination, which cannot provide the requisite schema to form a
sensible intuition for the understanding to cognize, but the very concept of the whole of
nature as an absolute totality is self-contradictory within the phenomenal sphere.
The reason is given in the analysis of the first antinomy, where Kant raises the
aporetic question of whether the world is spatiotemporally limited or unlimited, showing
that it can be neither so long as the question is posed at the level of nature as appearance.
It is the latter impossibility that is of particular relevance to the sublime: “It [viz., the
world] cannot be unlimited because a spontaneous totality (space) or a successive totality
(time) of states of things cannot be given in the forms of sensibility if totality is
139
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infinite.”140 This is indeed why the basic measure of nature as an absolute whole – which
reason, demanding ‘absolute totality as a real idea,’ effectively requires the imagination
to deploy in the mathematical sublime – is self-contradictory within the limits of the
sensible. We can begin to understand how sublime feeling is an experience of
impossibility that contains, as Lyotard puts it, the differend of the absolute finite and the
absolute infinite: “Thinking feels a sublime feeling when it comes up against the aporia
expounded in the first antinomy, but in the order of presentation rather than of concepts.
Yet it must still be pushed or attracted by an almost insane demand of reason.”141
Since an infinite totality cannot be given in intuition, Kant concludes that the
encounter with absolute magnitude in the sublime and the constitutive failure of the
imagination “must lead the concept of nature to a supersensible substrate.”142 He does so
again by virtue of his reasoning in the first antinomy: since, considered as appearance,
nature can be neither unlimited nor limited,143 the question cannot be determined by
understanding (lacking, as it does, “the sensible intuition corresponding either to the
unlimited or to what the limited leaves ‘outside’ of itself”144) but, rather, must be referred
to speculative ideas of reason belonging to the supersensible sphere. It is thus only by
virtue of rational ideas that the mind, without contradiction, is “able even to think the
infinite as a whole,” and this ability “indicates a mental power that surpasses any
standard of sense”: “If the human mind is nonetheless to be able even to think the given
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infinite without contradiction, it must have within itself a power that is supersensible,
whose idea of a noumenon cannot be intuited but can yet be regarded as the substrate
underlying what is mere appearance, namely, our intuition of the world.”145
However, Kant’s insistence notwithstanding, it is not at all clear that the speculative
idea of reason aroused by the experience of the mathematical sublime must be the idea of
nature as supersensible substrate. A look at Lyotard’s reading of the resolution of the first
antinomy suggests why: “Both claims [the thesis that the world is unlimited and the
antithesis that the world is limited] are nonsuited, at least as theses of understanding.
Nonetheless, the very concept of the limit persists, even when it can only be speculative.
The limit is the object of an Idea of reason, a ‘being of reason.’”146 Transposed into the
mathematical sublime, the idea of the limit is called to mind at the moment when the
imagination – overwhelmed, distressed, and displaced – takes the limit itself as an object
of thought by judging its own first measure as an absolute (subjective) limit; for “an
absolute limit … cannot be a phenomenon, because it is always supposed to be
unconditioned.”147 It is for this reason that the inadequacy of the imagination – its
finitude felt first as privation, then as the ‘presence’ in sensibility of the absolute – is
constitutive of sublime experience and purposive for the powers of thought as a whole.
Yet if it is not to refer us to the concept of the supersensible substrate of nature and
to the idea of freedom as unconditioned causation, how are we to understand the higher
purposiveness of the sublime attunement by which the mind is called to its proper
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vocation? And if, given the tautegorical character of aesthetic reflective judgment, it is
only insofar as sublime feeling feels itself to be absolute that the absolute itself can be felt
as such, what explains the absoluteness of the delight?
The answers can only emerge when thought is considered in its critical vocation.
We have already seen that the imagination, as the power of comprehension, operates on
the basis of delimitation (‘comprehension is limitation itself before any conceptual rule’),
as does the understanding with which it collaborates in cognition. For this reason, neither
faculty can take the limit itself as an object, not only because the idea of the limit belongs
to speculative reason (the limit implying an unlimited ‘outside’ it that cannot be given in
sensible form) but, further, because the limit itself is the ‘method’ of imagination and
understanding – their a priori ground or constitutive condition – and, as such, constitutes
their absolute:
It is the limit itself that understanding cannot conceive of as its object. … The limit
is not an object for understanding. It is its method: all the categories of
understanding are the operators of determination, that is, of limitation. Furthermore,
the faculties of intuition or presentation, sensibility and imagination, respectively,
also proceed, in their order, by means of limitations: schemas when these
limitations work for knowledge, and free forms when they work toward the pleasure
of the beautiful. This is precisely what the Preliminary Remark to the deduction of
the pure concepts of understanding in the first Critique shows: understanding
cannot be ‘deduced’ in the critical sense, that is, legitimated in claiming to know the
givens of intuition by determining them through concepts, if the concepts have not
been delimited beforehand, that is, puts into elementary forms by the three
syntheses of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition. This is where the limit
first operates, making all presentation possible.148
It is precisely these elementary subjective syntheses that sublime experience
subverts; and yet, in the very movement of the subject’s collapse and the object’s
dispersal, the imagination feels its powers expanded as it beholds the infinite and
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negatively presents the absolute in the feeling of its proper unboundedness. This is only
possible insofar as the imagination judges its first measure to be an absolute limit on the
occasion of its transgression: that is, insofar as the thought that presents can think (feel)
the limit itself as an object of thought. And since this judgment is one of aesthetic
reflection, the idea of the limit – which contains “the differend to be found at the heart of
sublime feeling … of the absolute of the infinite and the absolute of the finite”149 – can
only be ‘present’ to thought on the basis of the feeling of thought itself that is both
anguish and exaltation.
Now, since the first measure of aesthetic comprehension is also ‘where the limit
first operates’ as the a priori condition ‘making all presentation possible,’ it follows that
the limit is the absolute of thought itself, its unconditioned condition of possibility, and
thus that the limit as an idea of reason can only arise by virtue of the feeling of thought
by which thought reflects upon, touches its proper absolute. Indeed, this ‘idea of the
sublime’ arises in the very elevation by which the imagination, groundless, takes its own
ground (or its ruins) as a (negative) object in the order of presentation. Only in such a
way can thought, which “is destined for the absolute,”150 both discover and achieve this
destination. The feeling of thought reflecting upon its own absolute limit and first
condition awakens the calling by which thought comes into possession of its proper
vocation:
Thus in sublime feeling thought feels sensation as … a soul-stirring delight, a sharp
pleasure. Why is this? Because this appeal actualizes the destination (Bestimmung)
of our Geistesvermögen, of our spiritual faculty – of the power of thought at its
strongest – as it discovers this destination. One hears the Stimme in the vocation of
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the Bestimmung, the destination. … If the appeal exalts thought it is because it
comes from the very ‘place,’ the transcendental place toward which it is already
turned, toward which (to which?) it ‘is going and giving itself’….151
The expansive, auto-elevating power of thought, which Kant takes to be supersensible,
can thus be understood as properly critical: the sublime feeling of exaltation expresses,
realizes the freedom of thought in its critical vocation when, in aesthetic reflective
judgment, thought takes as an object its own constitutive condition of possibility (‘the
limitless reign of the Limit,’ ‘l’infini de la fin’).
It is a general feature of critical thought that its only access to the absolute
(thought’s destination) is by way of transcendental conditions: “A priori conditions of
possibility must, by hypothesis, be unconditioned, or else they would not be a priori. Yet
if the critical examination can establish them as such, it must be able to see the
nothingness of the condition that is ‘behind’ them”152; and this is precisely what is
achieved in the sublime through the negative presentation of the absolute. If the
imagination in its expanded powers is able to ‘look outward toward the infinite’ and ‘see’
there more than mere abyss, this is by virtue of the sublime feeling through which
thought beholds its constitutive finitude, first as inescapable limitation (anguish) and then
as limitless limit (exaltation). On the basis of sublime feeling, then, thought is elevated to
the absolute, called to its destination, elected to its vocation as critical reflection; and the
feeling itself of soul-stirring delight, which is the proper object and criterion of sublime
experience, “is an absolute delight, because it is the absolute vocation of thought to think
the absolute.”153
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2.3

Conclusion

In our first interpretation of the Kantian sublime, situated in relation to moral
feeling as the ratio cognoscendi of freedom, sublime feeling was shown to be a form of
aesthetic experience that enables the realization of ethical agency. The sublime, an
experience arising in sensibility, gives material expression to that which is irreducible to
sensibility, which expression is a necessary condition for the practice of human freedom.
In turn, our second interpretation of the sublime, while retaining its crucial feature
as an experience of the irreducible (experience of impossibility), allowed us to jettison
Kant’s explanatory strategy that refers sublime feeling to a form of moral transcendence.
Rather than appeal to the supersensible vocation of human personality (homo noumenon),
the sublime can instead be understood as a limit-experience of radical finitude. The
vertical movement of auto-elevation by which ‘the mind can come to feel its own
sublimity, which lies in its vocation and elevates it even above nature,’ finds its source in
the nature of thought qua critique: that is, in the expansive, auto-affective relation of
thought to itself when it takes its own constitutive limit as unconditioned condition of
possibility. If the vocation of critical thought is super-sensible, that is, if it is elevated
above the field of sensibility, this is by virtue not of some transport ‘beyond,’ but the
movement of reflection by which thought feels – and in feeling, thinks – its own absolute
limit as an a priori condition for the field of sensibility itself. And indeed, it is only in the
transgression of this absolute limit, when the constitutive syntheses of self and world are
undone, that thought ‘can come to feel its own sublimity’: as Foucault puts it in this
chapter’s first epigraph, ‘what is required is the maximum of intensity and the maximum
of impossibility at the same time.’
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Understood in such a way, the Kantian sublime anticipates Foucault’s twofold
concept of verticality as both (1) a form of intensive limit-experience (transgression) and
(2) a mode of critical thought, the double function of which is to enable the practice of
freedom by ‘wrenching the subject from itself’ and ‘seeing to its dissolution’ (Foucault).
Like the sublime, the vertical is the experience of that which is irreducible to the causal
order of the given – whether this ‘given’ be the sensible manifold or history, where the
latter is construed as the set of determining political, economic, social, and cultural
conditions, relations, and processes. And like the sublime, the vertical is also the autocritical activity of thought that is necessary for the realization of human agency insofar as
it confronts or transgresses the constitutive conditions of the given. Where Foucauldian
verticality goes beyond the Kantian sublime is in the transformative agency to which it
gives rise: for as we will see, what begins for Foucault as an aesthetic experience of
impossibility will become the political experience of the intolerable and the germ of
popular uprising.
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CHAPTER 3. FOUCAULT’S ‘SECRET VERTICALITY’: TOWARD THE
POLITICAL PROBLEM OF MATERIAL EXPRESSION

The concept of verticality has gone almost entirely unnoticed by Foucault
scholarship despite playing a truly fundamental role in his thought, from his first essay on
existential psychology to his late ethico-politics. What Foucault terms the ‘vertical
dimension’ or ‘axis’ orients his initial engagement with Dasein analysis, his subsequent
history of madness, his writings over the next decade on literature and aesthetics, his
formulation of genealogical critique as historical ontology, and his account of popular
revolt. What’s more, the concept of verticality sheds light on the transformative aims of
Foucault’s work and his conception of political resistance, from the contestation of
western culture’s forms of exclusion, to the dislocation of the subject effected through
modern literature’s ‘transgressive fold,’ to the critical intervention of thought in the
historical field of force relations.154
Perhaps it would be more remarkable that such an important concept has remained
nearly invisible were it not for the obscurity of the concept itself. Foucault’s discussion of
verticality, especially prominent in his earlier work, tends to appear in some of the more
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abstruse passages of his corpus: for example, in his analyses of the existential coordinates
of the death dream in Binswanger; the tragic expression and experience of unreason in
History of Madness; and the being of literary language made manifest in writing from
Mallarmé to Klossowski. Nevertheless, as I hope to show, the concept of the vertical is a
key for grasping the trajectory of Foucault’s thought, opening a new interpretation of his
oeuvre that sets into relief the basic philosophical problematic to which his work would
serve as a response.
Foucault’s formulation of verticality can be roughly divided into three periods: (1)
an extended early period (1954-1970), from his initial work on Binswanger and madness
through The Birth of the Clinic to his many essays on literature; (2) a brief middle period
(1970-1971), centered around Foucault’s engagement with Deleuzian metaphysics and
Nietzsche’s Genealogy; and (3) a late period (1979ff.), in which the vertical resurfaces in
Foucault’s writings on revolt and historico-critical ontology. In what follows in this
chapter, I will map and analyze the first period.155 Our peregrination from the death
dream, through unreason, to vertical critique and literary language will provide the
resources for a preliminary conceptual treatment, showing how verticality grounds
Foucault’s early politics of transgression and epistemic transformation. In turn, the results
of this analysis will prepare the account of political agency given in Chapter 6; for, as
already indicated by the Kantian sublime, the concept of the vertical refers to both a form
of experience and a form of critique, and these two aspects of verticality serve,
respectively, as necessary conditions for the possibility and sustainability of political
agency.
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3.1

The ‘Vertical Axis’ of the Death Dream: Foucault’s Existential Poetics of Tragic
Expression
Foucault’s first published essay, an introduction to Binswanger’s “Dream and

Existence,” explores the application of existential psychology’s Dasein analysis to
dreams, or to that “most original form of human freedom,” the existentially singularizing
self-constitution of the dreaming imagination.156 Like the dizzying freedom of anxiety,
the dream is a transcendent157 limit-experience – what Heidegger, referring to the
“moment of vision” by which one’s being-toward-death is disclosed, calls a “limitSituation”158 – in which Dasein hovers relationless, suspended beyond the limits of the
diurnal world before its originary encounter with the nothing.159
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Foucault will locate in the works of Blanchot, Bataille, and others.
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The dream is the work of existence making itself into a world prior to and as a
condition for its entrance into the public world: “it’s the originary movement of freedom,
the birth of the world in the very movement of existence.”160 In dreams, then, the being of
Dasein can be grasped in the primordial movement of its becoming, which “is why the
analysis of dreams is decisive for bringing to light the fundamental meanings of
existence.”161 True to early Heideggerian form,162 for Foucault, it is the death dream that
“fulfills the ultimate vocation” of the dream insofar as the dreamer encounters her proper
being-toward-death and experiences the authenticity or inauthenticity of her ownmost
mode of existence: “In the depth of his dream, what man encounters is his death, a death
which in its most inauthentic form is but the brutal and bloody interruption of life, yet in
its authentic form, is his very existence being accomplished. … The dream of death
appears as what existence can learn that is most fundamental about itself.”163 The death
dream is thus a privileged mode of access for Dasein, by way of the dreaming
imagination, to encounter its ontological ground in the very movement of its selfconstitution; and the experience of death in the dream as either “anguished or serene”164
expresses the existential inauthenticity or authenticity of the dreamer.
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Now, crucially, within the “primitive coordinates” of “oneiric space” that disclose
the existential-temporal modality of the dreaming imagination, it is the vertical axis of
the death dream, “the movement of ascent and fall,” that indicates the form of
authenticity or inauthenticity of the dreamer.165 Simplifying somewhat: when Dasein falls,
it flees from the nothing before which it is suspended, and its death in the dream is
experienced as sinking or violent anguish; on the other hand, when Dasein ascends, it
confronts the nothing serenely and experiences in its own death the joy of existential
achievement. “It is along this vertical direction of existence, and according to the
structures of temporality, that the authentic and inauthentic forms of existence can best be
allocated. … One must turn to the vertical dimension to grasp existence making itself,
turn to the vertical dimension in that form of absolutely original presence in which
Dasein is defined.”166
The vertical axis thus holds the key for understanding the primordial directionality
and existential authenticity of a singular existence (Dasein) as it constitutes itself through
the radical expressive freedom of the dreaming imagination. Foucault emphasizes that
this vertical form of expression is decidedly tragic in structure: a limit-experience at the
summit of existence by which one encounters the nocturnal face of death in an authentic
mode, the very accomplishment of which, however, anticipates already the imminence of
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one’s fall. “[T]he axis of tragic expression is located along the vertical axis of existence.
The tragic movement is always of the order of ascent and fall. Its special mark is that
privileged moment in which it completes its rise, and balances imperceptibly, still, yet
oscillating, before faltering.”167 Yet if the ‘privileged moment’ of ascent is always
followed by a downward collapse, the vertex always succumbing to vertigo, then this
raises the problem of how to maintain oneself authentically in the space of this limitexperience through the freedom of vertico-tragic expression – a problem which we will
see reappear at the heart of History of Madness.
In addition, there is a more general problem with dreams as forms of limitexperience. On the one hand, dreams are perhaps the most universal form of limitexperience, one to which everyone has access. But on the other hand, the dream is in
effect universally inaccessible since the waking light of day and the reified images it
recollects from the preceding night never fail to betray the nocturnal movement of the
dreaming imagination. If oneiric experience is divided from diurnal consciousness as a
limit one can only traverse by falling into dream, how can the freedom of the dreamer be
connected back into that social world in which Dasein, precisely as being-in-the-world,
must necessarily dwell? Indeed, Foucault specifically raises the question of this “paradox”
as his chief interest in Binswanger, this “gamble to want to circumscribe the positive
content of existence by reference to a mode in which it is least engaged in the world.”168
Foucault’s own response here to this problem is suggestive but sketchy: “to be
authentic,” the imagination must be “purified in the fire of the dream” so that it can
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express – “as its absolute truth, its ‘unshatterable kernal of night’” – the elemental
movement of existence constituting itself.169 “But on the other side of the dream, the
movement of imagination continues”: having experienced, in the depths of oneiric space,
“that which in existence is most irreducible to history,” the nocturnally sanctified powers
of imagination must now be deployed in the socio-historical world, “taken up in the work
of expression that gives a new meaning to truth and freedom.”170 That is, the imagination
must learn to express, without the betrayal of reification, the vertical axis of existence in
concrete works; and this expressive project, which directs the imagination on “its path of
freedom,” constitutes “an ethical task and an historical necessity”: “expression is
language, work of art, the ethical….”171
Thus, anticipating by nearly three decades a convergence of the historical, ethical
and aesthetic lines that will later appear in his notion of an ‘aesthetics of existence,’
Foucault calls for a kind of existential poetics as a practice of freedom. The task is to
cultivate a form of tragic expression, faithful to the vertical limit-experience of the death
dream, that could open the dreaming imagination onto the world and thereby create new
possiblities for thought. And far from being merely the enigmatic and little known fancy
of a young Foucault, this vertico-existential poetics is Foucault’s first response to a
fundamental problem that will continue to orient the direction of his work: namely, what
I will term the problem of material expression.
At this early stage, the problem might be put thusly: how can the force of that which
is ‘most irreducible to history’ – that which, at a remove across the oneiric divide from
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the world of social reality and historical causation, nevertheless discloses a more
originary truth about the constitution of that public world and those existences which
compose it – be expressed, realized, sustained in the form of a work, such that it be
capable of both crossing over the limit that separates it from the socio-historical world
and transforming the conditions of the latter? In other words, if the concept of the vertical
designates an axis of existence that is irreducible to history, situated at its (history’s) limit
or degree zero; then the problem of material expression refers to the challenge of
realizing or constructing the force of this verticality so that it can act upon history – the
work of vertical expression thereby constituting transformative agential force, or freedom.
And if Foucault’s initial response to this problem remains underdeveloped, the problem
itself will not cease to function as the obscure impetus animating his thought.
In sum, then, we may conclude that the death dream is a kind of tragic limitexperience by which the dreaming imagination expresses, along its vertical vector, the
mode of in/authenticity proper to the movement by which existence constitutes itself.
Further, precisely in light of this basic existential movement, the death dream can be
understood as an ontologically productive event of thought, for as we have seen,
thought’s passage along the vertical axis of the dream expresses ‘the originary movement
of freedom, the birth of the world in the very movement of existence.’ In short, the death
dream is a vertical form of experience and expression by which the auto-generative event
of (an) existence constituting itself is realized. The ethical task becomes one of
introducing this evental force or constituent power into historical reality through forms of
expression and experience that would not fall on the other side of the oneiric limit.
Perhaps it is for this reason that Foucault ultimately leaves Binswanger’s Dasein-analysis

74
behind, proceeding toward other forms of tragic limit-experience and -expression:
namely, unreason and literature.

3.2
3.2.1

The ‘Constant Verticality’ of Unreason in History of Madness

The ‘Vertical Dimension’ of Tragic Experience in Foucault’s ‘History of Limits’

The second place to locate Foucault’s concept of verticality is in the figure of
unreason in the History of Madness, where Foucault imports something like the vertical
analysis of ontologico-existential authenticity from Dream and Existence. Foucault
situates his work on madness “beneath the sun of the great Nietzschean quest”172 in Birth
of Tragedy, according to which the history of reason begins with Socrates
misunderstanding, forgetting and excluding the truth of tragic experience. What tragic
works of art express is a disquieting vision of the nothing, ‘the gaze seared by gruesome
night’ (Nietzsche)173: an abyssal vision that discloses the intrinsic groundlessness and
contingency not only of human being, but of existence itself, or the structure, foundation
and intelligibility of reality (and with it, reason, morality, religion, etc.). Foucault’s thesis,
in brief, is that the exclusion of this limit-experience of the tragic – which opens onto and
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discloses “the nothing of existence,”174 or what he sometimes calls the “void”175 –
grounds and makes possible the historical formation of western reason and culture:
We could write a history of limits—of those obscure gestures, necessarily forgotten
as soon as they are accomplished, through which a culture rejects something which
for it will be the Exterior …. [T]his is the originary thickness in which a culture
takes shape. To interrogate a culture about its limit-experiences is to question it at
the confines of history about a tear that is something like the birth of its history. …
At the center of these limit-experiences of the Western world is the explosion, of
course, of the tragic itself—Nietzsche having shown that the tragic structure from
which the history of the Western world is made is nothing other than the refusal, the
forgetting, and the silent collapse of tragedy.176
The world of reason constitutes itself, to use Foucault’s earlier Heideggerian
terminology, ‘inauthentically’ insofar as it repels the tragic encounter with the groundless
void of existence and then disavows this originary gesture of exclusion – the very act of
division by which a culture “gives itself the face of its positivity”177 –, instead assuming
for itself a putatively necessary foundation and installing itself along a line of teleological
progress. It is therefore by contrast to this ‘horizontal’ vector of western reason that
Foucault locates a vertical vector, which “would confront the dialectics of history with
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way of seeing the day” (Foucault, History of Madness, 243). It will be the ruse of tragic works of unreason
to transvalue this optical relation to light and dark: rather than one who cannot see, the poet of unreason
will become the one who sees the nothing, who possesses, as Artaud puts it, the ‘superior lucidity’ of
abyssal vision; rather than la nuit en plein jour, unreason will behold le jour en plein nuit, just as
Nietzsche’s madman, beholding the death of God and lighting “a lantern in the bright morning hours,” sees
the world “straying as through an infinite nothing” and feels “the breath of empty space” (Nietzsche, Gay
Science, translated by Walter Kaufman, §125, 181). For another instance of Foucault referring to ‘void,’
see his discussion of Nietzsche’s madness, which “is the way in which that thought opens onto the modern
world. … By the madness that interrupts it, an œuvre opens a void, a moment of silence, a question without
an answer, opening an unhealable wound that the world is forced to address” (Foucault, History of Madness,
537).
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the immobile structures of the tragic,”178 contesting the dominant historical forms and
practices of western culture from the site of its exclusion:
Where might this interrogation lead, following not reason in its horizontal
becoming, but seeking to retrace in time this constant verticality, which, the length
of Western culture, confronts it with what it is not, measuring it with its own
extravagance [démesure]? Towards what region might it take us, which is neither
the history of knowledge nor history plain and simple, which is commanded neither
by the teleology of the truth nor the rational concatenation of causes, which only
have value or meaning beyond the division? A region, no doubt, where it would be
a question more of the limits than of the identity of a culture.179
Just as in Dream and Existence, where the ‘vertical direction of existence,’ that
which is ‘most irreducible to history,’ alone renders graspable, through a mode of tragic
experience, the auto-generative event of ‘existence making itself’; so, too, verticality here
refers to a liminal dimension or ‘region’ of existence – accessible through a tragic form
of limit-experience, irreducible to conditions of historical causation, and unintelligible
according to the standards of diurnal consciousness – that discloses the ontologically
productive movement of a world constituting itself. However, while the vertical axis of
the death dream opens onto the ‘absolutely original presence’ proper to Dasein, in the
History of Madness, the origin made manifest along the tragic-vertical vector, like the
“original contradiction and original pain at the heart of the primordial unity”180 in
Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy, is riven by division. Or rather, what is originary is the very
activity of division itself: “The gesture that divides madness is the constitutive one….
The caesura that establishes the distance between reason and non-reason is the origin
[originaire]….”181
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In the theoretical development, then, from the existential-phenomenological
framework of Dasein analysis to a tragic proto-genealogical one – which is to say, in the
philosophical movement from Heidegger to Nietzsche182 – Foucault’s concept of
verticality attains critical political force, positing the thought of constitutive division and
thereby anticipating his later formulation of historical ontology.183 Indeed, in opposition
to the teleological horizontality of the human sciences – e.g., psychiatry, which “grows
up in the calm that returns after the division is made”184 and narrates reason’s progressive
mastery or neutralization of non-reason –, the excessive and ‘constant verticality’ that is
excluded as an exterior limit of the social formation ‘confronts the dialectics of history’
by attesting to the unacknowledged and unjustifiable first condition of reason, the
groundless ground of western culture.
As a vertical mode of ‘interrogation,’ the History of Madness is thus a ‘history of
limits’ in at least two senses: (1) because madness in its tragic form is itself an experience
of the limit, “the still undivided experience of division itself”185; and (2) because this very
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division, situated at the “degree zero of the history of madness,”186 is constitutive not only
for madness but for western culture, a ‘tear’ at the ‘confines of history’ that ushers in ‘the
birth of its history.’ The limit-experience of madness, in other words, bears witness to the
originary or genetic violence that institutes the order of the social world and must be
covered over as a condition for that order’s retroactive and tacitly reactive selflegitimation. Foucault’s work will thus function both as “the archeology of that
silence,”187 aiming to recover the vertical experience of the tragic and make visible the
arbitrary violence of its refusal, as well as a critical counter-history of reason, locating in
this ‘silent collapse of tragedy’ a singular and contingent (rather than universal and
necessary) condition of possibility for the western social formation. A vertical history of
limits, then, conducted at the vertical limits of history.
Further, within the history of madness itself, there is a division between two
different regimes of madness that correspond to the horizontal and vertical vectors,
respectively: mental illness, which becomes the object of scientific knowledge and
medico-juridical discourse, undergirded by institutional structures of confinement and
subjection; and unreason, which is a form of tragic limit-experience expressed through
works of art, contesting the authority of rationalist thought and its horizontal history. The
cleft between these two regimes first emerges during the early Renaissance in the
disparity between the moralizing humanist discourse on folly (Erasmus) and the
apocalyptic phantasmagoria of tragic painting (Bosch).188 Along the horizontal line,
which ultimately issues into the positivism of clinical psychiatry, madness becomes
186
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appropriated by the language of reason to designate the broad field of abnormal human
attributes and activities: to use Foucault’s language, madness takes the form within man
of an errant and defective self-relation for which he is ultimately to blame. An experience
of madness thus emerges that is bound up in normalizing relations of moral guilt, social
division and political exclusion, all of which constitutes the continuity of “the passage
from the medieval and humanist experience of madness to the experience that is our own,
which confines madness in mental illness.”189
Along the vertical line, by contrast, the tragic-cosmic experience of madness
discloses “the vertiginous unreason of the world”190 through the painterly delirium of
chaotically concatenated bestial images, which, unmoored from the rigorous theological
organization of Gothic symbology, herald a double revelation: (1) that madness, as “that
which goes against nature, or the seething mass of a senseless presence immanent in the
earth,”191 expresses an abyssal or subterranean truth beyond the order of God; and (2) that
this terrible truth is none other than the secret of man’s own nature in its infernal and
contingent animality,192 “the experience of an animal unreason that formed the absolute
limit of the incarnation of reason, and the scandal of the human condition.”193 We can
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thus already see that the tragic expression of unreason in apocalyptic painting cryptically
announces the double death of God and man, which will find its fuller articulation
centuries later in the works of Nietzsche,194 Artaud,195 and Bataille – that is, the discovery
that the “death of God restores us not to a limited and positivistic world but to a world
exposed by the experience of its limits, made and unmade by that excess which
transgresses it.”196 Indeed, this disclosure of radical finitude through the limit-experience
of unreason is the key for threading together “the great broken line that stretches from the
Ship of Fools to the last words of Nietzsche and perhaps Artaud’s cries of rage….”197
Taken as a whole, then, the History of Madness tells the story of the fracture and
divergence within the experience of madness of its horizontal and vertical vectors.198 As
in Dream and Existence, Foucault orients his project along the privileged vertical axis,
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only now the tragic structures that this axis expresses, the same which ‘confront the
dialectics of history,’ are “the great structures of unreason in their most general form –
those which slumber beneath the surface of Western culture, just below the temporality of
historians”199:
The linearity that led rationalist thought to consider madness as a form of mental
illness must be reinterpreted in a vertical dimension. Only then does it become
apparent that each of its incarnations is a more complete, but more perilous masking
of tragic experience – an experience that it nonetheless failed to obliterate. When
constraints were at their most oppressive, an explosion was necessary, and that is
what we have seen since Nietzsche.200
When reinterpreted ‘vertically’ – that is, from the perspective of tragic limit-experiences
and the constitutive force of their exclusion –, the history of the discursive and
institutional forms by which reason apprehends madness as mental illness can be grasped
as so many attempts to refuse and forget the tragic truth of groundlessness at the heart of
existence. And if tragic experience fails to be ‘obliterated’ under the ‘linearity’ of
rationalist thought, this is owed to the works of unreason that provide it with a form of
expression through literature, painting, and philosophy.

3.2.2

The Critical Force of Tragic Expression: ‘Ruse and New Triumph of Madness’

Along the vertical axis of Foucault’s counter-history, then, there emerges a
discontinuous lineage of artists and poets – from Bosch, through Goya and Sade, to
Nietzsche, Van Gogh, and Artaud – who give voice and force to the tragic. As we have
seen, the limit-experience of unreason is akin to that of the death dream, for both concern
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‘the nothing of existence’ and the fundamental finitude it discloses; but whereas death is
the terminal external expression of this nothingness as the end of an existence, unreason
expresses the internal folding of the nothing at the core of existence itself: “The
substitution of the theme of madness for that of death is not the sign of a rupture, but
rather of a new twist within the same preoccupation. It is still the nothingness of
existence that is at stake, but this nothingness is no longer experienced as an end exterior
to being, a threat and a conclusion: it is felt from within, as the continuous and constant
form of existence.”201 Though Foucault is here discussing the emergence of the tragiccosmic experience of madness within the cultural imagination of the early Renaissance,
his own substitution of a history of madness for the previous death dream analysis
suggests that unreason provides a response to the problem of material expression first
posed at the end of Dream and Existence: namely, the problem of realizing a vertical
form of tragic expression that, by opening onto the social world, would in turn transform
that world by giving ‘a new meaning to truth and freedom.’
Whereas the dream had provided a form of access to one’s ownmost being-towarddeath that nevertheless remained on the other side of the oneiric limit, unreason opens a
new relation to the nothing at the heart of diurnal existence, which is to say, historical
reality. Articulating the conditions for sustaining the expression of this relation thus
becomes one of the central problems taken up in History of Madness. Though cast within
a more complex historico-political framework than the work on Binswanger, this problem
is still inflected by the existential accents of Dasein analysis, for the tragic vision of
unreason contests the normative and exclusionary ordering of reality precisely by
201
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disclosing the most singular and primordial forms of human experience. Like the dream,
both an expression and experience of transcendence where man, in the night of his
solitude, encounters what is most fundamental about himself: “But in that night [of
Goya’s Sleep of Reason], man communicates with what is deepest in himself, what is
most solitary. … Through Sade and Goya, the Western world received the possibility of
transcending its reason in violence, and of recovering tragic experience beyond the
promises of dialectic.”202
Rather than revealing ‘the freedom of man in its most original form,’ however, the
vertical axis of tragic expression now instead bespeaks “the end of man, who sinks into
[sombre dans] the night.”203 Rather than unveiling the temporal forms of authenticity as
the truth of existence, the vertical vector discloses the inauthenticity of a primary act of
division, the sovereign and dominant gesture of reason, which founds and cleaves the
modes of being of western culture, constituting the very form of man qua subject. And
thus, if transcendence is still a vertical limit-experience or ‘original revelation of the
nothing’ (Heidegger), what arises in the depths of this experience is no longer akin to the
Heideggerian ‘being beyond beings’ but, rather, something closer to the ‘original
contradiction and original pain’ invoked by Nietzsche: an abyssal vision, given
expressive force through unreason’s tragic poets, of genetic violence, that is, of an
originary rupture which, in its absolute contingency, serves as the unjustifiable and
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disavowed condition of possibility for the constitution of given historico-ontological and
-epistemic forms.204
The subversive effect of the works of unreason is therefore to call into question the
authenticity and positivist foundation of reason and its sciences of man, arraigning reason
before its inauthentic fleeing of groundlessness by which it expels the tragic from itself:
“Ruse and new triumph of madness: the world that thought to measure and justify
madness through psychology must justify itself before madness, since in its struggles
[effort] and agonies [débats] it measures itself by the excess [démesure] of works like
204

As noted at the beginning of this chapter, Althusser is one of the few to have treated Foucauldian
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those of Nietzsche, of Van Gogh, of Artaud. And nothing in itself, especially not what it
can know of madness, assures the world that it is justified by such works of madness.”205
Like the death dream, unreason is also a tragic mode of limit-experience that beholds the
abyssal forces of the night; but this mode of experience is now imbued with an explicit
political charge because the nocturnal forces it expresses – which doubly displace the
forms of God and man that organized the epistemic formations of the classical and
modern periods, respectively206 –, threaten to destabilize the foundations of western
reason and culture:
This madness, which knots and divides time, which curves the world in the loop of
night, …does it not utter to those who can hear them, like Nietzsche and Artaud, the
scarcely audible words of classical unreason, where all was nothingness and night,
but now amplified into screams and fury? Giving them for the first time expression,
a droit de cité [‘right of abode’], and a grasp on Western culture, a point from
which all contestation becomes possible, as well as the contestation of all things [la
contestation totale]?207
The historical, aesthetic, and ethical task outlined at the end of Dream and
Existence to develop a vertical existential poetics thus becomes, in addition, a political
project to recover and give voice to unreason as the vertical form of tragic expression
uniquely capable of transforming the conditions of the social world. Indeed, it is precisely
at the point where unreason acquires the powers of expression that ‘all contestation
becomes possible.’ And this ‘work of expression’ is thus a necessary condition of
205
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possibility for radical contestation because the expulsion and silencing of unreason
institutes the historical unfolding of reason. Foucault’s theorization of transformative
political agency first emerges, then, through this concept of the verticality of unreason
that disrupts the horizontal history of reason, problematizing the latter’s forms of thought
and institutional structures and practices. In other words, the problem of material
expression becomes the problem of resistance.
However, if, from the perspective precisely of expression, the promise unreason
holds as a form of limit-experience is that it opens on the near side of the oneiric limit,
the downfall is that its painters and poets collapse into madness. Like the unsustainability
of the dreamer’s ascent to the summit of the vertical axis, the tragic artists of unreason
are deprived the support necessary to prolong their limit-vision, and the height of their
lucidity anticipates or even precipitates their breakdown into catatonia or suicide. Here
again, the vertical vector has become political, for the dividing practices of western
culture that exclude the tragic are the very same that render the experience of unreason
unsupportable.208 And if the expression of unreason is a condition of possibility for ‘the
total contestation’ against the organization and structure of western culture and society,
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an analysis of the conditions of impossibility for sustaining this expression will pose a
problem of power that is central to the very ‘essence of the modern world.’ Naming
Hölderlin, Nerval, Nietzsche, Van Gogh, Roussel, and Artaud, all of whom pursued the
experience of unreason unto death, Foucault writes:
And each of those existences, each of the words that made up those existences
repeats with the insistence of time the same question, which probably concerns the
essence of the modern world: why is it not possible to remain in the difference that
is unreason? Why is it that unreason always has to separate from itself, fascinated in
the delirium of the sensible and trapped in the retreat that is madness? How was it at
this point deprived of language? What is this power that petrifies all those who dare
look upon its face, condemning to madness all those who have tried the test
[l’épreuve] of Unreason?209
This set of questions cuts to the heart of Foucault’s work and allows us to
summarize his conceptual development from Dream and Existence, where the problem
was one of maintaining oneself authentically in the vertical space of a nocturnal limitexperience and transposing the truth of this transcendence into the historical world
through the expressive freedom of the imagination. Foucault’s reformulation of this
problem in History of Madness is twofold. First, it is in artistic works of unreason that we
can locate a vertical mode of tragic expression in the world, one which restores to the
world a form of limit-experience that it has systematically excluded, and which contests
the horizontal course of rationalist thought. The transposition of the truth of
transcendence through a vertico-existential poetics, which was already a question of
crossing over a limit (the oneiric divide), now attains political force as transgression.
Second, if the fugitive vertical space of unreason remains irrespirable – such that its
tragic poets, like the ‘authentically insane’ in Artaud who are ‘suicided by society,’
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cannot maintain themselves in its difference and collapse instead into madness –, this is
both an indictment of the inauthenticity of western culture and an insight into the
fundamental violence that founds the modern world.
The vertical dimension thus performs two functions in Foucault’s analysis, both of
which culminate in the event of the ‘ruse and new triumph of madness’ with which the
History of Madness ends: (1) the critical function of confronting and arresting the linear
development of reason (and the forms of mental illness through which rationalist thought
seeks to apprehend, institutionalize and control madness) by disclosing the historically
contingent and arbitrarily violent dividing practices that betray reason’s own lack of
ground and justification; and (2) the affirmative function of manifesting and realizing,
through the transgressive force of tragic expression, the abyssal vision of groundlessness
at the heart of existence – which is to say, the radicalization of finitude that the death of
God had enabled, but which had been defused and territorialized in the form of man.210 In
other words, the ‘constant verticality’ of unreason (1) suspends and breaks with the
dominant organization of the epistemic and social formations of western culture, and it
does so (2) by recovering or realizing a form of limit-experience and -expression along
the vertical axis that opens thought (and, through it, the social world) to a production of
the new.
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This double critical-affirmative function of verticality helps to unpack the two
senses of the vertical operative in our earlier formulation of Foucault’s work on madness
as a vertical history of limits at the vertical limits of history. In the first instance, the
vertical refers to a form of historico-critical analysis – here, an ‘archeology of silence’ –
that takes as its object the constitutive dividing practices through which western reason,
as both epistemic and social formation, takes shape and takes hold. In the second instance,
the vertical refers to the experience of a dimension or axis of existence of and at the limit:
that is, a limit-experience situated at the degree zero of history, hence irreducible to
historical determination and thereby capable, in principle and by virtue of its exteriority,
of generating a kind of radically transformative force. There are thus two aspects or
dimensions of verticality – Critique and Experience – that form essential moments in the
process of transformative political agency, entering into complex relations with one
another. Here, they function as each other’s double, which is to say, their relation is one
of (1) reciprocal determination – critique serves as the condition for recovering the
experience (archeology of silence), while experience provides the condition for directing
the critique (experience of the limit qua constitutive division) – and (2) superimposition,
for the History of Madness is composed as a critical counter-history that is itself a tragic
work, giving expression to a kind of disquieting limit-experience that would prepare the
conditions for ‘total contestation.’211
At its most ambitious, then, the History of Madness can be read as Foucault’s own
answer to the problem of material expression: that is, as an effort to realize a vertical211

It is in just this sense that History of Madness as a book is itself an experience. Cf. Foucault’s
interpretation of his own books as forms of limit-experience (or, as Timothy O’Leary in his Foucault and
Fiction puts it, ‘experience-books’): “Interview with Michel Foucault,” Power, 239ff.
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tragic poetics that would facilitate emergent forms of thought and practices of freedom.
In this way, Foucault quite clearly positions his own work within the disrupted and
disruptive lineage of unreason – precisely there, in the wake of Nietzsche and Artaud,
where the tragic limit-experience has acquired ‘for the first time expression,’ and thereby
a grip on and against western culture. More modestly, the aim of the book would be to
attune its readers to the transformative force of such limit-experiences, given expression
along the broken chain of unreason, as well as to the myriad marks of silencing and
exclusion that scar the confines of history. In both capacities, the political problem, which
is also (and still) the ‘ethical task and historical necessity’ from the end of Dream and
Existence, is ultimately to provide the conditions of material expression that would
support and sustain the vertical limit-experience of unreason. And as we will see, this
exigency will inform Foucault’s literary politics of transgression over the following
decade.
*
Before proceeding to map the vertical axis in Foucault’s thought throughout the
1960s, let us pause to venture some brief interpretive hypotheses, both to distill where we
have come and to signpost where we are going. First, the problem of material expression,
whether with respect to the radical freedom of the poetic imagination or the radical
resistance of unreason, orients the direction of Foucault’s early work; one of the
exegetical aims of this thesis going forward will be to show how this problem remains
fundamental in determining the trajectory of Foucault’s thought, from his work on
aesthetics and epistemology through his analytic of power to his late ethico-politics.
Second, the problem of material expression is itself indexed on the concept of verticality,
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for it is the tragic-expressive force of the vertical axis, at the irreducible limit of history,
that must be provided with the conditions of support necessary for its realization within
historical reality, precisely in order to transform the normalizing and impoverishing
conditions governing the social order; verticality is thus the first concept through which
Foucault theorizes resistance, and it will remain essential to his political thought. Third,
verticality is analyzable in general according to its two attributes or aspects: (1) the
verticality of critical thought and (2) the verticality of the limit-experience.
The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to analyzing the two attributes of
verticality through to the end of Foucault’s early period: that is, the vertical critique of
positivism and the vertical experience of literature.

3.3
3.3.1

Early Critique: The ‘Vertical Investigation’ of Positivism
The Medical Capture of Death in The Birth of the Clinic

Having established a form of ‘vertical reinterpretation’ as the analytical method for
an archeology of silence, Foucault will deploy a similar kind of critical-vertical analysis
in his subsequent book. While smaller in scope than the work on madness, The Birth of
the Clinic, set at the same historical moment as the ‘birth of the asylum,’212 “concerns
one of those periods that mark an ineradicable chronological threshold: the period in
which illness, counter-nature, death, in short, the whole dark underside of disease came to
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This phrase, the title of the penultimate chapter of History of Madness, announces the transformation
from the classical to the modern period in the late 18th century, marked iconically in the history of
psychiatry by the image of Philippe Pinel ‘liberating’ the mad from their shackles at Bicêtre.
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light, at the same time illuminating and eliminating itself like night, in the deep, visible,
solid, enclosed, but accessible space of the human body.”213
Just as unreason, as ‘that which goes against nature,’ had constituted the tragic inner
torsion of the relation with the nothing at the heart of existence, so, too, the ‘dark
underside of disease’ is a nocturnal and counter-natural force by which the relation to
existential void becomes internalized, experienced obscurely from within. And just as the
tragic threat of unreason is defused and silenced by the reassuring monologue of reason
about madness (psychiatry), appropriated as the naturalized and normalized phenomenon
of mental illness and thus captured as an object of medico-moral positivism; so, too, the
threat of disease in its cryptic relation to death and transgression of right natural order is
“exorcized” insofar as disease itself, rather than being linked to “the metaphysic of evil,”
becomes the object of a medical positivism that can know and master it.214
This abrupt shift in the structure of medical discourse, which announces a more
fundamental transformation in the epistemic formation of western culture, emerges
historically together with “the anatomo-clinical method” of pathological anatomy, in
which the previously sealed off contours of the corpse become an operable field of
visibility and intelligibility. The definitude of death thereby becomes situated in the body
with surgical precision and etiological clarity:
Conceived in relation to nature, disease was the non-assignable negative of which
the causes, forms, and manifestations were offered only indirectly and against an
213

Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception, translated by A.M. Sheridan
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Ibid, 196-8. The fuller passage reads: “This structure, in which space, language, and death are
articulated – what is known, in fact, as the anatomo-clinical method – constitutes the historical condition of
a medicine that is given and accepted as positive. Positive here should be taken in the strong sense. Disease
breaks away from the metaphysic of evil, to which it had been related for centuries; and it finds in the
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ever-receding background; seen in relation to death, disease becomes exhaustively
legible, open without remainder to the sovereign dissection of language and of the
gaze. It is when death became the concrete a priori of medical experience that death
could detach itself from counter-nature and become embodied in the living bodies
of individuals. It will no doubt remain a decisive fact about our culture that its first
scientific discourse concerning the individual had to pass through this stage of death.
… [F]rom the experience of Unreason was born psychology, the very possibility of
psychology; from the integration of death into medical thought is born a medicine
that is given as a science of the individual.215
The limit-relation to death, emplaced in the body as the ‘concrete a priori of medical
experience,’ is akin to the limit-experience of unreason, due not only to its tragic
dimension or proximity to nothingness, but also to the fact that its confinement,
neutralization, or corporeal circumscription is a condition of possibility for the horizontal
development of a form of rationalist thought that would take as its object the individual
subject. In both cases, what was once a terror linked to obscure cosmic forces becomes
territorialized in the form of man.
Indeed, among all the human sciences, clinical medicine enjoys not only a
“methodological” privilege, but an “ontological” one “in that it concerns man’s being as
an object of positive knowledge. The possibility for the individual of being both subject
and object of his own knowledge” – which, for Foucault, will later come to define the
individualizing process of subjection216 – “implies an inversion in the structure of
finitude.”217 Whereas finitude in the classical period, having “no other content than the
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negation of the infinite,” had been grasped privatively in relation to the God-form that
organized the production of knowledge and subjectivity, “the thought that was born at the
end of the eighteenth century gave it,” finitude, “the powers of the positive: the
anthropological structure that then appeared played both the critical role of limit and the
founding role of origin.”218
At the philosophical level, this “reversal”219 is inaugurated through the Copernican
turn of Kantian critique, whereby the finite conditions of the transcendental subject,
rather than the infinitude of God, become constitutive for knowledge. Yet precisely what
interested Foucault in Kant’s Anthropology, which he had translated and written an
introduction to as his secondary doctoral thesis two years prior, is the slippage from
critical to anthropological thought, in light of which the three Critiques appear to have
taken as their “secret guide” “a certain concrete image of man.”220 Thus, while Kant’s
thought of “constituent finitude” displaces the idea of “original infinity”221 as epistemic
foundation, thereby opening a new form of possible thought, “Kant ended by closing this
opening when he ultimately relegated all critical investigations to an anthropological
question….”222
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Rather than conceiving constitutive finitude in a way that, by deposing God,
unmoors reason from any positive foundation, grasping the absolute contingency and
arbitrary violence of ‘a world exposed by the experience of its limits’ – which is to say,
rather than conceiving the finite tragically –, the Kantian critical turn surreptitiously
installs a kind of anthropological positivism: “the Anthropology indicates the absence of
God, and occupies the void that the infinite leaves in its wake.”223 This double movement
in Kant, which collapses a more radical possibility for critical thought by referring it to
the horizontal enterprise of reason, reflects, as though in germ form, the birth of the
modern episteme and its circumscription by the ‘anthropological circle,’224 wherein man
serves as both the starting-point in the inquiry for truth and the end-point to which this
knowledge refers back.225 Whence arises the need for “the Nietzschean figures of tragedy,
of Dionysus, of the death of God, of the philosopher’s hammer, of the overman
approaching with the steps of a dove, of the Return,”226 to which Foucault’s early work is
devoted and which would restore to the finite its tragic force, thereby contesting the
socio-epistemic formation of man.227
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Now, if the ‘anthropological structure’ of thought establishes “the philosophical
condition for the organization of a positive medicine,” conversely, the latter provides the
former with the empirical condition for its realization as a form of experience: “medicine
offers modern man the obstinate, yet reassuring face of his finitude; in it, death is
endlessly repeated, but it is also exorcized; and although it ceaselessly reminds man of
the limit that he bears within him, it also speaks to him of that technical world that is the
armed, positive, full form of his finitude.”228 The development of clinical medicine
introduces “that fundamental relation that binds modern man to his original finitude”229
by positing as an object of knowledge his own death, situated in the living body as
disease; yet insofar as modern man is also the subject of this knowledge, he retains a
measure of control over its object, which is to say, over his proper death, the tragic force
of which he has through ‘armed’ expulsion ‘exorcized,’ repelled from the ‘limited and
positivistic world’ in which he would install himself. In such a way, Foucault’s project in
The Birth of the Clinic once again suggests the problem of recovering a counter-natural
force of the tragic from its neutralization, appropriation, or exclusion by the
anthropological circle of rationalist thought.230
Foucault will thus characterize his critical counter-history of ‘positive medicine’
precisely as “a vertical investigation of this positivism.”231 As in History of Madness,
vertical critique, rather than following the progressive linearity of reason, locates this so228
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called positivism (whether psychiatry or clinical medicine) in the historically contingent
conditions of its realization. And like the vertical re-interpretation of mental illness, so,
too, this ‘vertical investigation’ of clinical disease situates these conditions for the
emergence of modern medicine in the experience of a limit (in this case, death, or the
‘original finitude’ of human being), the tragic force of which is rejected, forgotten, or
silenced beneath the reassuring monologue of reason. In other words, a critical vertical
analysis will be one that confronts a form of rational positivism, grounded in the
epistemic formation of man, with the contingent conditions of its own historical
emergence (‘Pudenda origo,’ as Foucault was fond of citing from Nietzsche232); and
these conditions are themselves shown to be rationally unjustifiable insofar as they betray
a reactive or inauthentic gesture that would seek to exorcise the thought of tragic
groundlessness and its threat to any horizontal form of knowledge.

3.3.2

‘For That I Must Ascend into the Depths’: Critical Renewal along the ‘Vertical
Line’ of Nietzschean Interpretation

From History of Madness to The Birth of the Clinic, then, there is the continuity of a
vertical critique mounted against the positivism of the human sciences, understood
broadly as the dominant form of thought and experience of modern western culture. This
line of critical verticality – which, beginning ‘under the sun of the great Nietzschean
quest,’ is first oriented by the double death of God and man and will later issue into the
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more fully articulated concept of genealogy – receives further elaboration in the essay
Foucault presented in 1964 at a conference on Nietzsche organized by Deleuze:233
There is in Nietzsche a critique of ideal depth, of depth of conscience [conscience],
which he denounces as an invention of philosophers; this depth would be the pure
and interior search for truth. Nietzsche shows how it implies resignation, hypocrisy,
the mask; so that the interpreter must, when he examines signs in order to denounce
them, descend along the vertical line and show that this depth of interiority is in
reality something other than what it says. Consequently, it is necessary that the
interpreter descend, that he be, as Nietzsche says, ‘the good excavator of the lower
depths.’ But, in reality, when one interprets one can trace this descending line only
to restore the glittering exteriority that was covered up and buried. For if the
interpreter must go to the bottom himself, like an excavator, the movement of
interpretation is, on the contrary, that of a projection [surplomb], of a more and
more elevated projection, which always leaves depth above it to be displayed in a
more and more visible fashion; and depth is now restored as an absolutely
superficial secret, in such a way that the flight of the eagle, the ascension of the
mountain, all the verticality that is so important for Zarathustra is in the strict sense
the reversal of depth, the discovery that depth was only a game and a surface
fold.234
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In order to understand this paradoxical vertical movement of Nietzschean
interpretation, let us first briefly examine Nietzsche’s critique of the ‘depth of conscience,’
noting before doing so that Foucault’s phrase, la profondeur de conscience, can equally
mean ‘the depth of conscience’ and ‘the depth of consciousness.’ While the former is the
more natural rendering, especially given the context of Nietzsche’s critique of bad
conscience, both senses must be kept in mind simultaneously since, on Nietzsche’s
account, the historical origin of bad conscience, “the internalizing of man,”235 is the same
process that gives rise to the idea of the soul, that is, the ‘ideal depth’ which would house
consciousness as the seat of the subject. Indeed, it is precisely the consciousness of
rational thought that purports to be ‘the pure and interior search for truth,’ a positivist
mask belied by vertical critique, which will ‘show that this depth of interiority is in
reality something other than what it says.’ And on Nietzsche’s view, in reality, the birth
of bad conscience or the modern soul is the result of a doubly reactive process proper to
herd society: namely, that of ressentiment turning against itself.
Ressentiment, as exemplified in slave morality, is a reactive structure of
identification predicated upon a kind of constitutive division, a primary gesture of
rejection that “says ‘no’ to an ‘outside,’ to a ‘different,’ to a ‘not-self’ …. [T]he very
nature of ressentiment […is to] need, psychologically speaking, external stimuli in order
to be able to act at all, – its action is, from the ground up, reaction.”236 In this light, the
structure of positivism itself – that is, the form of rational thought that requires the
exteriorization and rejection of the tragic as its own condition of possibility – is
235
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fundamentally reactive in nature, a reactivity that must be constantly covered over on
pain of exposing reason’s lack of founding justification. Such is also the case for modern
morality, which emerges through what Nietzsche terms ‘the slave revolt in morality,’ the
original gesture of which is to reject as ‘evil’ what had previously constituted the ‘good’
of noble morality (in brief, auto-affirmative active force); only afterward is a new ‘good’
then posited, namely, as what is not-evil (that is, precisely what is opposite active force
and had designated the ‘bad’ in the older system of values). The modern value of the
good, which purports to serve as the positive foundation of moral truth, is thus, in fact,
merely the derivative of this primary rejection.
Now, for Nietzsche, the formation of any herd society is contingent upon some
“stronger power” establishing, through force and “as soon as it is in any way strong
enough to do so,” a system of law or “justice” to control and “put an end to the senseless
raging of ressentiment among weaker parties subordinated to it (whether groups or
individuals).”237 Individuals within a herd society therefore cannot exercise their desire
for revenge upon others; yet the motive principle of agency for these individuals,
precisely as creatures of ressentiment (for whom ‘action is, from the ground up,
reaction’), is this very desire. Thus, rather than somehow disappearing through an
historical process of acculturation and domestication, such reactive drives, blocked from
external realization, become re-directed internally; there is a kind of second order
reaction where the desire for revenge, itself a reaction, reacts in the face of what blocks it
and returns within and against the one who desires it. The interior dimension carved out
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through this process of folding or doubling back defines the psychical topos of modern
man:
All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly turn themselves inwards –
this is what I call the internalizing of man: thus first grows in man that which he
later calls his ‘soul.’ The entire inner world, originally thin as if inserted between
two skins, has spread and unfolded, has taken on depth, breadth, height to the same
extent that man’s outward discharging has been obstructed. … Hostility, cruelty,
pleasure in persecution, in assault, in change, in destruction – all of that turning
itself against the possessors of such instincts: that is the origin of ‘bad
conscience.’238
Through Nietzsche’s critique of the ideal depth of conscience and consciousness,
the soul, as both subject and object of a certain moral positivism, is unmasked as ‘in
reality something other than what it says.’ That is, the coordinates of psychological
inwardness proper to modern man, rather than defining the mental or spiritual domain of
the ‘pure and interior search for truth,’ are instead disclosed as the historically contingent
effect of the play of forces in herd society. Depth’s ‘absolutely superficial secret’ is that
the seat of reason is neither a divine trace nor itself a rational ground, but the product of a
reactive modality of will to power, a ‘surface fold’ in the historical field of force relations.
Nietzschean interpretation thus functions as a form of vertical critique insofar as it
unearths the singular and contingent conditions of realization for a form of positivism,
illuminating the disavowed reactive structure that belies this positivism’s own claims to
rational justification and, in the same movement, ‘restor[ing] the glittering exteriority that
was covered up and buried.’ Hence Foucault’s assertion that ‘the interpreter must
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descend along the vertical line’ to reveal the depth of man’s interiority as other than what
it claims. Foucault’s formulation here strongly suggests the opening movement of
Zarathustra – the passage initially published as the final paragraph of The Gay Science,
entitled “Incipit tragoedia,”239 and doubling as the first paragraph of Thus Spoke
Zarathustra – when, greeting the sun, Zarathustra announces his ‘going-under’: “For that
I must descend to the depths [Dazu muss ich in die Tiefe steigen], as you do in the
evening when you go behind the sea and still bring light to the underworld, you over-rich
star.”240
Nietzsche’s very language, in fact, provides a key to understanding Foucault’s
counter-intuitive imagery of an excavation of the depths that gives rise to ‘a more and
more elevated projection [surplomb],’ for the German word translated as ‘descend,’
steigen, refers to a rise or upward climb.241 Thus, in order to begin his tragic undergoing,
Zarathustra must ascend into the depths. And this is not merely a semantic ‘reversal of
depth’ at the level of diction or image, for unlike the ideal depth of psychological
inwardness, which would belong to the diurnal coordinates of consciousness, what opens
in Nietzsche’s ‘abyss-deep thought,’ expressed through ‘all the verticality that is so
important for Zarathustra,’ is the nocturnal or tragic dimension of the vertical axis – the
privileged point of which remains, as in Dream and Existence, that instant of hovering at
the vertex, overhanging and projected out into the nothing.
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Indeed, Foucault describes the activity of Nietzschean critique precisely in terms of
such an overhanging projection: Foucault’s word, surplomb, translated as ‘projection,’
principally means ‘overhang’ and is defined in French as both (1) the part that is ‘en
saillie’ in relation to the base, i.e., the vertical position projected above, out and over
empty space, and (2) the position of that which fait saillie, i.e., that which advances out
into the void. Unlike the ‘tragic movement’ of the dreaming imagination, however, which
‘completes its rise’ at the summit of the authentic death dream, ‘the movement of
interpretation is that of a more and more elevated projection’: the motive force of critique
is never completed and, like ‘the sun of the great Nietzschean quest’ or Zarathustra’s line
of becoming (metamorphosis, going-under), passes ever along its vertical axis, crossing
over the limit of the horizon.
The trajectory of vertical critique thus constitutes a kind of transgressive experience
of continuous passage that would ‘restore the glittering exteriority,’ the silenced Exterior,
that had been ‘covered up and buried’ beneath the reactively structured foundations of
positivism. And in this affirmative dimension of critique – as in the recovery of the limitexperience of unreason and the project of vertical-existential poetics –, Foucault
formulates a response to the problem of material expression that would be situated along
the vertical vector. If the tragic expression of the dreaming imagination ran aground of
the oneiric divide; and if the tragic expression of unreason faltered at the intensive
threshold where its poets fall into madness; the movement of critical interpretation, by
contrast, bears within itself the principle of its proper motility, providing the conditions to
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restore and sustain the force of vertical expression and thereby ‘bring light to the
underworld’ (Nietzsche), which is to say, to the social world of man.242
What, then, accounts for this auto-recreative activity of vertical interpretation, this
ceaselessly renewed labor of critique?243 Foucault provides a clue at the end of
“Nietzsche, Freud, Marx” when he writes that “interpretation finds itself with the
obligation to interpret itself to infinity, always to resume. … [A] hermeneutic that wraps
itself in itself enters the domain of languages which do not cease to implicate themselves,
that intermediate region of madness and pure language. It is there that we recognize
Nietzsche.”244 Because Nietzschean interpretation, by contrast to semiology, eschews any
appeal to essences as a foundational bedrock of meaning, it follows that the
hermeneutical task is infinite: not in the sense of a pernicious regress but, rather, in the
sense that there are only interpretations, so interpretation will necessarily take itself as an
object, referring back to, implicating, or doubling itself in an infinitely recursive process.
It is this doubling or auto-implicative function that imbues interpretation with its powers
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of intrinsic renewal, linking it to the obscure liminal or ‘intermediate region of madness
and pure language’ – the region, that is, of intransitive expression that does not take the
extensive or diurnal world of things or objects as its field of reference. The general name
Foucault will reserve for this vertical dimension of language is ‘literature.’

3.4

Early Experience: The Verticality of Literary Language

3.4.1 The ‘Vertical Writing’ of Transgression: Literature’s Recursive Auto-Doubling
Function
Throughout the 1960s, and in conjunction with his development of vertical critique
as a historico-philosophical form of analysis, Foucault will pursue the space of literature
as a contemporary response to the problem of material expression; and the project of
political contestation that first surfaces in History of Madness will take form as a certain
literary politics of transgression. Indeed, the key to understanding “that strange proximity
between madness and literature”245 and the political project emerging therein is once
again provided by the concept of the vertical, for (as with critique) it is the verticality of
literary language that accounts for its subversive and auto-transformative force.
Now, notwithstanding Foucault’s wide-ranging impact on literature and language
fields in the humanities,246 remarkably little scholarship has taken up Foucault’s
conceptual treatment of literature itself in any great detail. One notable exception is
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Timothy O’Leary’s recent book, Foucault and Fiction,247 which is also one of the only
texts on Foucault that identifies the concept of verticality. Indeed, O’Leary, though
without developing the concept, locates its centrality with respect to Foucault’s work on
literature. Referring to Foucault’s essay “Language to Infinity,” O’Leary writes that for
Foucault,
…literature is born from a certain use of language as a means of keeping death at
bay. … Language, in the image Foucault uses, sets up a vertical mirror in the face
of death; and in the virtual space between this mirror and death an infinite mirroring
and doubling is made possible…. For Foucault, therefore, literary language can be
defined in terms of the virtual space that is created when a vertical mirror is set up
in the face of death, thus creating the possibility of an infinite murmuring of
language; while the non-literary or more straightforwardly communicative use of
language is defined as a horizontal conveyance of meaning. … It is this relation
between language and death, and the corresponding function of literature to keep
open and constantly explore this relation, which Foucault characterized as the
‘verticality’ of literary language.248
O’Leary thus provides the argument that literature, for Foucault, is a specifically
vertical form of language: if literary language is defined by the ‘virtual space’ it creates
through a certain mirroring or doubling relation with death; and if ‘this relation between
language and death’ is ‘characterized as the “verticality” of literary language’; then it will
be verticality that defines literature as such. Literature would thus be contrasted to
‘horizontal’ modes of language (e.g., any discourse that takes language to be a
representational medium), the principle function of which is to communicate or convey a
set of established meanings.
We will return at greater length below to “Language to Infinity” and O’Leary’s
interpretation of, as he puts it, the ‘vertical mirror’ that literary language erects ‘in the
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face of death.’ By way of approach, let us prepare a more thorough conceptual analysis of
literary verticality by mapping its emergence in two of Foucault’s earlier essays.249
Following History of Madness, the first major instance250 of Foucault discussing
what he will term ‘vertical writing’ appears in 1962 in his “Introduction to Rousseau’s
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Dialogues” – an essay closely aligned with the History of Madness insofar as the
Dialogues compose a work of unreason, written at the limit of an imminent madness.
What sets the Dialogues apart from the majority of Rousseau’s oeuvre is their stark
contrast to the use of “linear” language, which is the “genre of writing,” exemplified by
the Confessions, that Rousseau had “always privileged … because he saw it – in music
and in language – as the most natural kind of expression, the one in which the speaking
subject is fully present, without reserve or reticence, in each of the forms of what it
says.”251 Such a horizontal form of writing, composed on the model of musical melody,
issues from an immediately self-present, original, natural subject and aims for the pure
transparency of a “continuous expression, indefinitely faithful to the course of time, and
following it like a thread.”252
As opposed to the linearity of this communicative discourse, “The Dialogues, on
the contrary, are constructed on a vertical writing. The subject that speaks in that
disciplined [dressé253], harmonically structured language is a disunited subject,
superimposed on itself, lacunar, and incapable of being made present except through an
addition that is never completed – as if it appeared at a receding point [un point de fuite]
that only a certain convergence would enable one to locate.”254 What had been the
absolute sincerity and immediate self-presence of the confessional subject’s continuous
chronology now becomes a vertically fractured or schizoid subject, a discordant harmony
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of multiple conflicting subjects: the “Jean-Jacques Rousseau” who had been author and
subject of the Confessions “in his concrete unity is absent from the Dialogues – or, rather,
through them, and perhaps by them, is disunited.”255
Through the latter text, the speaking subject is fragmented into four characters: “an
anonymous Frenchman,” who represents the French people “who have stolen Rousseau’s
name”; his interlocutor, “a certain Rousseau, who, without any concrete determination
other than his honesty, bears the name that the public has robbed from the real Rousseau,”
and who knows the works that properly belong to Rousseau; “a third [tierce256] but
constant presence, one who is no longer called anything but le Jean-Jacques,” the
“singularity” about whom the Frenchman and Rousseau speak; yet, since the Frenchman
envisions Jean-Jacques as the “author of crimes” while Rousseau knows him as the
“author of books,” le Jean-Jacques is himself subdivided into Jean-Jacques-for-theFrenchman and Jean-Jacques-for-Rousseau, between whom there is an incompossible
relation (“since the author of the crimes cannot be the author of the books whose sole
purpose is to win hearts over to virtue”).257 If the subject of language is split into the
subject who speaks and the subject that is spoken about, then we can say that whereas the
horizontal language of the Confessions posits an indissociable subjective unity (the
speaking subject and the subject spoken being exactly identical in the immediate selfpresence of a reflexive first person singular), the Dialogues, by contrast, mine and
multiply the division, splitting in turn the subject who speaks (the Frenchman and
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Rousseau) and the subject spoken about (Jean-Jacques-for-the-Frenchman and JeanJacques-for-Rousseau).
In such a way does vertical writing dislocate and disperse the position of the
speaking subject. The ‘disunited subject,’ having proliferated into mutually exclusive
parts, becomes both ‘superimposed on itself’ and ‘lacunar,’ marked by the fundamental
or constitutive absence of a unity whose promised presence is but a ‘receding point’ that
remains at an unbreachable distance, an irrecoverable limit:
It is through these four characters that the real Jean-Jacques Rousseau (the one who
said so simply and supremely ‘myself alone’ in the Confessions) is gradually
identified. Even so, he is never presented in flesh and blood, and he never speaks….
That is how distant and inaccessible that character is now whose immediate
presence made possible the language of the Confessions; henceforth he will be
positioned at the outer limit of speech, already beyond it, at the virtual, neverperceived vertex of the triangle formed by the two interlocutors and the four
characters defined by their dialogue.258
This impossible vertical ‘point de fuite’ indicates the Exterior, the ‘outer limit of speech,’
which is to say, the outside in relation to the conditions of enunciability and intelligibility
that govern both the subjective investment of a speaker in language and the horizontal
transmission of discourse. As with the exteriority of unreason in relation to the horizontal
history of reason that excludes it; and as with the Nietzschean interpretation of ideal
depth from the perspective of the vertical critique that transgresses it; so, too, vertical
writing undoes the positivism of the rational subject in its original or ‘immediate
presence,’ displacing the seat of thought in its fundamental self-relation and thereby
calling into question the ground of socio-epistemic order.
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The vertical space of language that structures Rousseau’s Dialogues thus constitutes
a ‘virtual’ region that is irreducible to history – which, in this context, means irreducible
to the conditions of possibility that determine what can be said, perceived, or thought in a
given episteme. Whence the subversive, anti-normalizing, and potentially transformative
force of such literature, which, qua work of unreason, remains anterior and hostile to the
division that would found the psychological category of mental illness: “The categories
of the normal and the pathological, of madness and delirium, cannot be applied to this
language; for it is a primary breakthrough [franchissement], a pure transgression.”259
Foucault’s literary politics thus emerges from this conception of a transgressive
limit-experience of language, the expression of which, by undermining the major form of
subjectivation proper to the modern period (i.e., the man-form), would constitute a kind
of contestation to the dominant discursive (hence social, historical) conditions of thought
in western culture. Moreover, it is precisely this kind of transgressive vertical writing that
takes as its task the recovery or recreation of those forces of ‘counter-nature’ which, as
we have seen in The Birth of the Clinic, were exorcized by positive medicine. As
Foucault suggests in “So Cruel a Knowledge” (1963), the “truly transgressive forms of
eroticism are now found … in the direction of the counternatural,”260 a region mapped
out and maintained through certain subversive literary works in the late eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries.
One such example is Les Egarements du coeur et d’esprit, an erotic novel of terror
by Claude-Prosper Crébillon. What this work gives voice to is the “deep geometry” that
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structures the “system of ‘erotic knowledge,’” or that counter-knowledge proper to the
modern period, in terms of “the experience of the Limit and that of the Light.”261 Here
again, the concept of verticality will play an important role in Foucault’s analysis, for the
figure of the veil, vital to the novel’s intimation of the “obscure, essential link … between
Knowledge and Desire,” manifests the vertical line of this ‘deep geometry’:
The veil is that thin surface which chance, haste, and modesty have placed and do
their best to maintain; but its line of force is dictated by the vertical of the drop
[chute]. The veil unveils, through a fatality which is that of its light fabric and its
supple form. To play its role, which is to cover and to be exact, the veil must
conform precisely to the surfaces, repeat the lines, course over the volumes without
superfluous discourse, and highlight the forms with a glittering whiteness, stripping
them of their shadow. … It plays its opaque and protective role well but only for the
one who uses it to cover herself, for the groping, fumbling, feverish hand that
defends itself. But for the one who witnesses all these efforts and who remains on
the watch from a distance, this veil is revealing. Paradoxically, the veil hides
modesty from itself and draws its attention away from its main object of caution;
but in manifesting this caution to the indiscreet, it allows him to see indiscreetly that
which it withholds. Doubly traitorous, the veil shows what it averts and conceals,
from what it is meant to hide, the fact that it unveils it.262
The vertical is thus an expressive ‘line of force,’ defining the trajectory of the fall,
along which a ‘traitorous’ doubling function is performed, for the veil constitutes a kind
of subversive repetition that unveils, by the very exactitude of its veiling, the fact and
stark outlines of the object that it veils. Yet the structure is complicated further insofar as
this simple betrayal of a concealment that reveals also conceals the fact of this reveal to
the one who would remain concealed – and this, precisely, by virtue of the original
enclosure of concealment. That is, the verticality of the veil is ‘doubly traitorous’: to the
indiscreet gaze ‘at a distance,’ outside, the veil reveals what it conceals; and to the
discrete one close at hand, inside, the veil conceals that it reveals. Like the vertical
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writing of the Dialogues that doubles both sides of an already doubled subject, the
doubling function of the veil is itself double: the vertical line of force thus enacts a kind
of recursive doubling procedure.

3.4.2

Radical Finitude and the Immanent Infinity of Literature’s ‘Vertical System of
Mirrors’

We can perhaps begin to see in what sense the virtual space of literature is infinite:
namely, in the vertical movement by which the doubling function of literary language is
raised to an ever higher order or power. In this light, let us return to “Language to Infinity”
and the discussion of the vertical mirroring relation between language and death.
For Foucault, as we have seen O’Leary point out, literature begins as the power of
language to hold death at bay:
Before the imminence of death, language rushes forth, but it also starts again, tells
of itself, discovers the story of the story and the possibility that this interpretation
might never end. Headed toward death, language turns back upon itself; it
encounters something like a mirror; and to stop this death which would stop it, it
possesses but a single power – that of giving birth to its own image in a play of
mirrors that has no limits.263
Like the vertical trajectory of Nietzschean hermeneutics, which recursively interprets
interpretations to infinity, literary language is auto-implicative, endlessly doubling back
on itself. Taking as examples certain moments of language’s implicit self-reference – “in
The Thousand and One Nights, where an episode recounted by Scheherazade tells why
she was obliged for a thousand and one nights, and so on”; and “an episode in [Diderot’s]
The Nun where Suzanne explains the history of a letter to a correspondent …[,] of
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precisely this letter in which she explains to her correspondent, and so on” –, Foucault
argues that “the forms of this superimposition” are “essential to the construction of any
work”: “The reduplication of language, even if it is concealed, constitutes its being as a
work….”264 And in this ceaseless movement of auto-relay, as in the eternally returned
reflec tion of infinite mirror play, there opens a “virtual space” where an actual infinite is
immanent and “where speech discovers the endless resourcefulness of its own image.”265
In this way, the recursive doubling function proper to vertical writing makes
possible the infinite virtual space of literature, such that language constitutes a work
(literature) only if it is a vertical writing, for “in every work language is superimposed on
itself in a secret verticality.”266 The vertical dimension opened by this “mirror to infinity,
to which every language gives birth once it erects itself vertically against death,”267
“forms one of the most decisive ontological events of language,”268 establishing the
historico-transcendental condition for the emergence of literature: “The possibility of a
work of language finds its original fold in this duplication.”269 As in Dream and
Existence, the vertical axis of existence, disclosed through the experience of an originary
limit-relation with death, marks the site of an ontologically productive event of thought:
in this case, the limitless auto-doubling of language, which constitutes the becomingliterature of language, “a murmuring that repeats, recounts, and redoubles itself
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endlessly.”270 However, unlike the undeveloped project of the earlier existential poetics,
in which it remained unclear how the tragic vertical force of the dreaming imagination
could translate across the oneiric limit, the ‘mirror to infinity’ provides the conditions for
realizing and sustaining an irreducible vertical space; and unlike the tragic expression of
unreason, which ultimately breaks down into the suicided silence of madness, literary
language finds the principle of its auto-generative becoming precisely in the self-relation
it maintains at the limit with death.
Now, while Foucault suggests that speech in general may contain “an essential
affinity between death, endless striving, and the self-representation of language,”271 he
nevertheless argues that, strictly speaking, literature proper only appears in the modern
period, emerging in the empty epistemic space left vacant by the death of God.
It seems to me that a change was produced in the relationship of language to its
indefinite repetition at the end of the eighteenth century – nearly coinciding with the
moment in which works of language became what they are now for us, that is,
literature. This is the time (or very nearly so) when Hölderlin became aware, to the
point of blindness, that he could only speak in the space marked by the
disappearance of the gods, and that language could only depend on its own power to
keep death at a distance. Thus, an opening was traced on the horizon toward which
our speech has ceaselessly advanced.272
The vertical mirroring movement of a language that ‘discovers the endless
resourcefulness of its own image’ is thus born from “a lyrical experience … bound up
with a return to the forms of finitude”273: in the wake of the epistemic transformation by
which an original infinite is displaced by a constituent finitude, language harnesses its
own ‘power’ qua literature to ‘keep death at a distance.’ If literature, defined in terms of
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the auto-superimposition or self-doubling of language, thus only appears at the advent of
the modern epoch, in the “transformation … roughly indicated by the simultaneous
appearance at the end of the eighteenth century of the works of Sade and the tales of
terror”274; then this is because the infinity it constructs no longer refers to the
immortalized glory of the epic – where, as with the transcendent God-form, “the work
placed the infinite outside of itself,”275 in the promise of a heroic hereafter (that is, its
reception and transmission across the ages) – but to an immanent infinitude generated
through its intrinsic verticality. Literature is thus “a language fated to be infinite because
it can no longer support itself upon the speech of infinity. But within itself, it finds the
possibility of its own division, of its own repetition, the power to create a vertical system
of mirrors, self images, analogies[,] …postpon[ing] death indefinitely by ceaselessly
opening a space where it is always the analogue of itself.”276
It is thus necessary to amend O’Leary’s reading of literary verticality when he
writes that for Foucault, language ‘sets up a vertical mirror in the face of death; and in the
virtual space between this mirror and death an infinite mirroring and doubling is made
possible.’ Such an interpretation gives the impression that, by erecting a mirror ‘in the
face of death,’ literature in some sense reflects the face of death, forming ‘an infinite
mirroring and doubling’ ‘between this mirror and death’: thus, something like the mirror
as a shield that, through the dazzling surface effect of its reflection, would captivate
Medusa’s gaze, transfixing and neutralizing death. However, the mirror-play in
Foucault’s image does not occur between language (or the mirror) and death; rather, as
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Foucault writes, language ‘encounters something like a mirror’ when, ‘headed toward
death, language turns back upon itself.’ It would therefore be more accurate to say that
the mirror constitutes the doubling function of the relation of language with itself when
language, ‘returning to the forms of finitude,’ enters into proximity with death (the
liminal region of the vertical dimension, precisely): that is, an auto-mirroring self-relation
that effects the becoming-literature of language, raising language to a higher order or
power and thereby satisfying the condition of possibility for the language-work.
Thus, when approaching the limit of death, language, discovering within itself this
higher power – that is, constructing the vertical, virtual space proper to it as literature –,
expresses an immanent, actual infinite capable of staying the imminence of death as a
limit: not insofar as the poet would be immortalized, as in the Homeric model; nor,
despite appearances, insofar as language would internally reflect back on itself in a
perfect circle of incessant self-reference; but, rather, insofar as literary language opens
onto the thought of the outside, the dispersal of the speaking subject, and hence the
displacement of death itself as a limit. For none such exists for language in the infinite
streaming of its abyssal and subjectless auto-production:
…the event that gave rise to what we call ‘literature’ in the strict sense is only
superficially an interiorization; it is far more a question of a passage to the ‘outside’:
language escapes the mode of being of discourse – in other words, the dynasty of
representation – and literary speech develops from itself, forming a network in
which each point is distinct, distanced even from its closest neighbors, and has a
position in relation to every other point in a space that simultaneously holds and
separates them all. … The ‘subject’ of literature (what speaks in it and what it
speaks about) is less language in its positivity than the void that language takes as
its space when it articulates itself in the nakedness of ‘I speak.’277
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Along the vertical vector of literature’s line of force, generated through the event of
language’s infinitely recursive auto-doubling function, ‘literary speech develops from
itself,’ breaking with the classical epistemic formation (which had been governed by ‘the
dynasty of representation,’ the horizontal mode of language’s being qua discourse) by
giving voice to that which is irreducibly exterior to that episteme’s archaeological
conditions (conditions of intelligibility, enunciability): in other words, by attaining,
through the expression of vertical writing, to ‘the outer limit of speech.’
Through the self-disclosure of the naked abyssal being of language, achieved
through a fractured lineage of writers bearing remarkable resemblance to the tragic
tradition of unreason (Sade, Hölderlin, Mallarmé, Nietzsche, Roussel, Artaud, Bataille,
Klossowski, Blanchot278), ‘an opening was traced on the horizon toward which our
speech has ceaselessly advanced.’ It is the same opening that emerged in the radical
possibility of Kantian critique, which was closed off by Kant himself within the
anthropological circle and remained philosophically shuttered until the tragico-critical
thought of Nietzsche; and it will be the same portentous opening that recurs in The Order
of Things, “a sign of the approaching birth, or, even less than that, of the very first glow,
low in the sky, of a day scarcely even heralded as yet, but in which we can already divine
that thought … is about to re-apprehend itself in its entirety, and to illuminate itself once
more in the lightning flash of being.”279

278

In Foucault’s books, such as History of Madness, the conclusion of Birth of the Clinic, and The Order of
Things, this literary lineage most often begins with Sade and Hölderlin and ends with Roussel and Artaud.
In Foucault’s essays, the line of writers is expanded to include his (near-) contemporaries, notably, “these
extreme forms of language in which [Georges] Bataille, Maurice Blanchot, and Pierre Klossowski have
made their home, which they have made the summits of thought” (Foucault, “A Preface to Transgression,”
76).
279
Foucault, The Order of Things, 306.

119
Indeed, what we may now conclude is that it is precisely the verticality of literary
language, as with the verticality of unreason before it, that opens this form of limitexperience bespeaking the death of man and auguring thought’s production of the new:
“From within language experienced and traversed as language” – which is to say, from
within the virtual (vertical, infinite) space of literature –, “what emerges is that man has
‘come to an end’ [l’homme est «fini»], and that, by reaching the summit of all possible
speech, he arrives not at the very heart of himself but at the brink of that which limits
him…. [T]he void left by man’s disappearance … is nothing more, and nothing less, than
the unfolding of a space in which it is once more possible to think.”280
Just as the anthropological structure of thought is transgressed and arraigned before
the vertical critique that overhangs and ungrounds it, so, too, is the positivism of the manform undone when, at the vertical, exterior limit of language, it is confronted with its
radical finitude by the experience of literature. Modern works open a ‘void’ in which the
speaking subject is fractured and dispersed by the endless redoubling of the being of
literary language. And like the tragic expression of the ‘gaze seared by gruesome night’
(Nietzsche), literature illumines ‘in the lightning flash of being’ the abyss in which the
subject is scattered and language, freed.

3.4.3

The Structural Esotericism of Madness and Literature: On the Material
Expression of Transgression

We are also now better positioned to understand the ‘strange proximity’ that
connects the tragic experience of unreason with that of literature, as well as the
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conceptual movement that takes Foucault from the question of madness to that of literary
language. If the experience of “madness par excellence – which psychiatrists term
schizophrenia” – is that by which one “sees welling up … the very hollowness of our
existence [,…] the finitude upon the basis of which we are, and think, and know”281; then
it will be vertical writing, through the thought of the outside it makes possible, that best
expresses this limit-experience of radical finitude:
It was inevitable that this new mode of being of literature should have been
revealed in works like those of Artaud or Roussel …. And as if this experiencing of
the forms of finitude in language were insupportable, or inadequate (perhaps its
very inadequacy was insupportable), it is within madness that it manifested itself –
the figure of finitude thus positing itself in language (as that which unveils itself
within it), but also before it, preceding it, as that formless, mute unsignifying region
where language can find its freedom.282
As in Dream and Existence, where oneiric space opens onto ‘the world at the dawn of its
first explosion’ and the dreaming imagination expresses ‘the birth of the world in the very
movement of existence,’ the matutine, still-obscure region from which vertical-tragic
expression issues is both site and source of freedom. And as in History of Madness, the
experience of this irreducible virtual dimension, deprived an adequate system of supports,
is consigned to madness.
In a manner still to be elaborated, the limit-experiences of literature and unreason
thus bleed together as expression and content of a common vertical experiential form.
This relation between unreason and literature receives perhaps its fullest articulation in
“Madness, the Absence of an Œuvre,” an essay from 1964 which Foucault appended
eight years later to the second edition of History of Madness at the behest of Deleuze.283
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Taking up again the theme of the divergence, within the experience of madness, of its
horizontal and vertical trajectories, Foucault locates in his historical present the near
completion of their disassociation:
We are at that point, that fold [repli] in time, where a certain technical control of
sickness hides rather than designates the movement that closes the experience of
madness in on itself. But it is precisely that fold [pli] that allows us to unfurl
[déployer] that which has been curled up [impliqué] for centuries: mental illness
and madness – two different configurations, which came together and became
confused from the seventeenth century onwards, and which are now moving apart
before our eyes, or rather inside our language. … To say that madness is
disappearing today is to say that the implication that included it in both psychiatric
knowledge and a kind of anthropological reflection is coming undone. But it is not
to say that the general form of transgression of which madness has been the visible
face for centuries is disappearing. Nor that transgression, just as we are beginning to
ask what madness is, is not in the process of giving birth to a new experience.284
The neuro-pharmacological control over mental illness, in which the positivism of
psychiatry is doubled by that of clinical medicine, naturalizes madness as sickness so
thoroughly that it, in fact, conceals the very effacement of madness itself as an essential
problematic of human being. Whether as the scandal of an animal unreason that
constitutes the degree zero of man’s nature and shows itself obscurely in the painterly
bestial forms of the Renaissance; or as the modern experience of unreason “in the
burgeoning transcendence of any act of expression [la transcendance naissante de tout
acte d’expression], from the source of language itself, in the initial and final moment
where man is suddenly [devient] exterior to himself”285; unreason had been that tragic
form of experience by means of which man posed to himself the problem of his proper
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being. In other words, if the distinguishing aspect of the being of human being (Dasein) is
to be that being which takes up its own being as a problem, then unreason, for western
culture, played a privileged existential role for over three centuries. It is this role, nearly
forgotten in the contemporary social world, whose very erasure is covered over by
positivism’s mastery of madness as mental illness.
Yet if the vertical dimension of madness has all but disappeared, ‘the general form
of transgression’ – that is, the fundamental limit-experience of the tragic, of which
unreason had merely been the most recent historical visage – remains nonetheless; and
the ‘new experience’ to which transgression is ‘in the process of giving birth’ will take
form ‘inside our language’ as an excluded and subversive kind of vertical speech. Indeed,
this is why, in a roundtable debate from the same year (1964), Foucault suggests that
“[w]e now find the reason-unreason problem – in any case, the violence of the reasonunreason problem – at the interior of language…. In the field … of language, what is
fully at stake is most likely the possibility of contestation of our culture.”286 Just as, in
History of Madness, the problem of material expression becomes the problem of
resistance, so that the expression of unreason, whose historically contingent
unsustainability derives from the very violence of constitutive division that founds
western culture, by the same token constitutes ‘a point from which all contestation
becomes possible, as well as the contestation of all things’; so, now, Foucault responds to
the political problem of material expression by situating ‘the possibility of contestation’
against the dividing practices of the modern social formation within ‘the field of
language.’
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To account for this emergent political force of language, Foucault provides a
general typology of the four forms of excluded speech proper to, and (at least in part)
constitutive of, western culture.287 The first interdiction, which, “at the border between
taboo and impossibility,” regulates the exterior limit of meaning, is provided by “the laws
that govern the linguistic code (the things that are called, so clearly, language faults
[fautes de langue])”288: that is, errors in speech, meaningless or babbling words, etc.,
which fail to meet the minimum conditions of intelligibility for a given language. Second,
from inside the established linguistic code, there are “blasphemous words” that, while
perfectly intelligible, are forbidden utterance.289 Third, there are those forms of
expression whose very signification, rather than the choice of terms, is “the object of
censorship”: that is, statements which are both intelligible and uttered using permitted
words, “but whose meaning is intolerable for the culture in question at a given
moment.”290 The expression of any of these three forms of speech is, in a sense,
transgressive, since they are all prohibited from being spoken in their different ways.
However, Foucault’s chief interest lies elsewhere, in a mode of expression
possessed, as he puts it in “Language to Infinity,” of a ‘secret verticality’ that will
ultimately conjoin unreason’s vision and literature’s language:
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Finally, there is a fourth form of excluded language: this consists of submitting
speech that apparently conforms to the recognized code to a different code, whose
key is contained within that speech itself, so that the speech is doubled inside itself;
it says what it says, but it adds a mute surplus that silently states [énonce] what it
says and the code according to which it is said. This is not a question of coded
language, but of a language that is structurally esoteric. Which is to say that it does
not communicate, while hiding it, a forbidden meaning: it sets itself up from the
very first instant in an essential fold of speech. A fold that mines it from the inside,
perhaps to infinity. What is said in such a language is of little importance, as are the
meanings that are delivered there. It is this obscure and central liberation of speech
at the heart of itself, its uncontrollable flight to a region that is always dark
[toujours sans lumière], which no culture can accept immediately. Such speech is
transgressive, not in its meaning, not in its verbal matter, but in its play.291
Rather than either falling dumbly outside the governing conditions of a language or
scandalizing from within these conditions (whether by force of diction or sense),
‘structurally esoteric’ forms of expression act upon the conditions themselves,
transforming the very code that regulates a given language by ‘submitting speech to a
different code.’ That is – and here we perhaps glimpse an aspect of Deleuze’s interest in
this essay –, the ‘fourth form of excluded language’ produces a decoded flow of speech, a
line of ‘uncontrollable flight’ within language that constitutes the ‘obscure and central
liberation of speech at the heart of itself.’ In this region at once matutine and nocturnal,
which is toujours sans lumière (‘still without light’), language, returning to and
developing from out of itself, finds its freedom by escaping its codification within the
representational dynasty of discourse; and it does so through an auto-implicative function
by which ‘speech is doubled inside itself,’ containing within itself the key to the different
code that governs it. Like the ‘duplication’ of the auto-mirroring self-relation of literary
language depicted in “Language to Infinity,” in which the ‘possibility of a work of
language finds its original fold,’ structurally esoteric speech generates, from out of its
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own intrinsic excess, the ‘mute surplus’ that stealthily announces the secret of its brute,
abyssal being as language: that is, the secret, as in “The Thought of the Outside,” of ‘the
void that language takes as its space,’ only here described as that ‘essential fold of speech’
which hollows language ‘from the inside, perhaps to infinity,’ and which consummates
the double death of God and man in the dispersal of the speaking subject. In other words,
a structurally esoteric language is one which, mined from within, opens thought to
without.
By virtue, then, of an infinitely recursive auto-doubling function precisely akin to
that of vertical writing, structural esotericism decodes what appears to be given as
horizontal discourse, which is to say, what appears to conform to the established
epistemic conditions of a discursive formation. Accordingly, Foucault privileges this
mode of excluded speech, for its force as a form of transgression issues neither from its
‘meaning’ (as with censorship), nor from its ‘verbal matter’ (as with language errors and
blasphemy), but from its ‘play,’ that is, from the line of flight or creative mutation that it
produces in the field of language. The secret verticality of such a language, like the tragic
expression of unreason, is thus intolerable to the culture whose codes it threatens and
whose conditions of thought it undermines.
Now, having posited this general typology of excluded forms of speech, Foucault is
able to rearticulate the project of History of Madness in terms of expression. Beginning
with the Great Confinement of the classical period, madness enters into
…the universe of language prohibitions; with madness, classical confinement
encloses libertinage of thought and speech, obstinacy in impiety or heterodoxy,
blasphemy, witchcraft, alchemy – everything in short that characterizes the spoken
and forbidden world of unreason: madness is the excluded language – the one
which against the code of language pronounces words without meaning (the
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‘insane’, the ‘imbeciles,’ the ‘demented’), or the one which pronounces sacred
words (the ‘violent’, the ‘frenzied’), or the one which puts forbidden meanings into
circulation (‘libertines,’ the ‘obstinate’).292
From the perspective of classical reason, as articulated by psychiatric discourse and
reflected in institutional practice, the interdicted ‘world of unreason’ is organized
according to the first three forms of excluded language and the species of mental illness
that correspond to them.293 Indeed, the function of ‘classical confinement,’ which is later
only intensified through the birth of the modern asylum, is precisely to structure and
enforce this set of exclusions, to impose the silence of which Foucault will write the
archaeology.
The modern experience of madness, in turn, passes over into the fourth region of
excluded speech. From reason’s horizontal point of view (and thus still in terms of mental
illness), it is Freud who discovers in madness an esoteric language. Madness, no longer
construed as “a language fault, a blasphemy spoken out loud, or an intolerable meaning,”
appears “as speech wrapped up in itself, saying, below everything that it says, something
else, for which it is at the same time the only possible code: an esoteric language perhaps,
since its language is contained inside a speech that ultimately says nothing other than this
implication.”294 As apprehended by psychoanalysis, madness is esoterically structured
because it belongs to “the still transgressive region … of languages that imply
themselves”295: folding its speech back upon itself, madness doubles what it says with an
announcement of the language in which it says it, an announcement which is the secret
292
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key to what is said – indeed, an announcement which, strictly speaking, is all that is said.
For far from liberating madness to speak in its own name, Freud essentially disqualifies it
from saying anything other than that it is mad, all the while compelling it to speak. All
madness can now state is the language in which it speaks, namely, madness, i.e., that it is
mad.
The expression of the mad is debarred any possible positive content other than
implicating the mad in their own madness, thereby constituting an ever more repressive
form of subjection:
Since Freud, Western madness has become a non-language because it has become a
double language (a language which only exists in this speech, a speech that says
nothing but its language) – i.e., a matrix of the language which, strictly speaking,
says nothing. A fold of the spoken which is an absence of work. …[W]hat [Freud]
did was silence the unreasonable Logos; he dried it out, he forced its words back to
their source, all the way back to that blank region of auto-implication where nothing
is said.296
Here we see in what sense madness is the ‘absence of work’: namely, as the desiccation
of a flow of speech, the silencing of a language which, divested of content and blocked
from transitivity, becomes a useless and hollow ‘fold of the spoken.’ All such speech can
communicate is that madness is its subject, that which speaks in it and that about which it
speaks. And by saying the only thing it is authorized to state, madness undermines the
very authority of the subject who speaks, who is indicted as mad and thus incapable of an
œuvre – which is also to say, of producing a statement, of conveying an established
meaning, of forming a work of expression that would take as its field of reference a
shared world of objects. Thus, the ‘blank region of auto-implication’ to which the
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esoteric language of madness is forced back designates less the liberation of speech in its
transgressive play than the rigorous exclusion of madness.
Yet it is precisely here that Foucault will stage a reversal, for it is this autoimplicative folding function of madness that enables it to make common cause with
literature: “Literature (and this probably since Mallarmé), in its turn, is slowly becoming
a language [un langage] whose speech states, at the same time as what it says and as part
of the same movement, the language [la langue] that makes it decipherable as speech.”297
Indeed, by virtue of its structural esotericism – that secret verticality through which
literary language doubles itself endlessly –, writing, in the modern period, became “a
speech that inscribed inside itself the principle of its own decoding; or in any case, it
supposed, beneath each of its sentences, each of its words, the sovereign power to modify
the values and meanings of the language to which despite everything (and in fact) it
belonged; it suspended the reign of language in the present of a gesture of writing [dans
un geste actuel d’écriture].”298 The transgressive force of literature thus issues from its
power as an esoteric language to act upon and transform the conditions of language itself,
that is, the code governing the ‘values and meanings’ of any given speech. By submitting
the language that makes up the materiality of its being to a different code than the one
governing the horizontal conveyance of received meaning, literature ‘suspends the reign
of language,’ which is to say, disrupts that dynasty of discourse which grounds the
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epistemic formation of positivism, opening, in the very experience of vertical writing, a
space in which it may once again become possible to think.
It will be the space of literature, then, that comes to house the general form of
transgression which had been the expressive charge of unreason. In other words, for
Foucault, writing in the 1960s, the limit-experience of the tragic, delivered from its last
remaining ties to mental illness, has become l’expérience littéraire. If madness qua
mental illness is the absence of a work – “a language silencing itself in its
superimposition on itself”299; a form of speech so radically excluded that those who
would speak it collapse into catatonia or suicide –, then, inversely, unreason expressed
through literature will constitute the language-work as such, relaying speech in its
freedom to the original fold of its being as literary language. For this “being of literature,”
which is “related to auto-implication, to the double and the void that is hollowed out
within it,”300 provides the conditions of material expression for the vertical-tragic mode
of experience that western culture violently divides from itself.

3.4.4 Foucault’s Literary Politics and Its Failure: Enter the Problem of Capitalism
“Madness, the Absence of an Œuvre” thus allows us to take the full measure of the
‘ruse and new triumph of madness’ that completes Foucault’s work on unreason and
orients his theorization of literature. At the very moment that reason appears to have
confined madness in mental illness so completely that all that remains is a clinically
masterable pathology, “madness releases itself from its kinship … with mental illness,”
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entering the “region of excluded language … that is circumscribed, held sacred, feared,
erected vertically above itself [dressé à la verticale au-dessus de lui-même], reflecting
itself [se rapportant à soi] in a useless and transgressive Fold, and is known as
literature….”301
Escaping the medical gaze of psychiatry, madness is freed, through the formal
esoteric structure of literature, to reconstitute a vertical line of force, just as speech is
liberated at the heart of itself through the line of flight by which it is transported outside
dominant discursive conditions. The ‘test, l’épreuve, of Unreason,’ which it had been the
‘essence of the modern world’ to ‘petrify’ and ‘deprive of language,’ finds its support
now in the literary experience of transgression, in the vertical space of literature where
the “anthropological unity” of man as founding subject of positivism is “disappearing”
like “a passing postulate”: “an experience is coming into being where our thinking is at
stake….”302
Indeed, the very traits that, from the horizontal perspective of reason, justify the
silencing of madness, become transvalued when reinterpreted in a vertical dimension.
The History of Madness had already performed one such reversal when the negative
formulation by which classical reason defines unreason – namely, as reason dazzled, a
thought which cannot see in the clear and distinct light of day – is transvalued by tragic
works as the power of the ‘abyss-deep thought’ that can see the nothing bleeding through
reason’s pale diurnal forms. Just so, now, the privative characteristics that since Freud
have been ascribed to madness as an esoteric language become transfigured as
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affirmative features of unreason’s subversive expression qua literature. That literature is a
double or auto-implicative language does not mean that it says nothing other than the fact
of its raving, but that it develops from out of itself a decoded flow of speech which breaks
with the horizontal reign of discourse and calls into question the latter’s conditions of
intelligibility and enunciability. That literature’s auto-mirroring self-relation constitutes
‘a useless and transgressive Fold’ does not indicate its sterility but its resistance to being
consumed as communication. That literature is intransitive does not reduce it to the
poverty of a fold of speech that refers nowhere, but opens language to the infinite
resourcefulness immanent to its own image, to the ‘vertical system of mirrors’ that gives
form to the irreducible virtual space of its abyssal being. That literature undermines the
authority of the speaking subject does not disqualify its right to speak, but displaces any
such subject-position through the thought of the outside that exceeds and undoes it,
thereby preparing a form of radical contestation.
In short: by way of response to the double problem of resistance and material
expression, Foucault will advocate a literary politics of transgression; and the conceptual
key to this politics – which also accounts for the strange proximity of madness and
literature, as well as the passage of Foucault’s thought from the former to the latter – is
the expressive form of verticality, that auto-superposition of a language ‘erected
vertically above itself.’ For, as Foucault will remark six years later, it is the “vertical and
nearly untransmissible activity of writing” that accounts for literature’s isomorphism with
madness, with that excluded “language that takes up a vertical position [se tient à la
verticale] and is no longer transmissible speech, having lost all value as currency of
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exchange.”303 And it is by virtue of this vertical remove at the ‘outer limit of speech’ that
literature can contest the coding of language that circulates throughout the social field
and conditions what it is possible to think and say within the horizon of a given episteme.
The political force of literary verticality, then, is twofold. First, literature expresses
and sustains a form of thought, made possible philosophically by a minor strain of
Kantian thought, that breaks with the epistemic formation of man – a break that is
political precisely “to the extent that all the regimes of the East or the West peddle their
defective wares under the banner of humanism.”304 Second, vertical writing, as “an act
placed outside the socio-economic system,” remains exterior to the horizontal circuits of
social production and exchange, existing “manifestly for itself and … independently of
all consumption, all readership, all pleasure and all utility.”305 That is, literature’s
“function of transgression” derives from “the intransitive character of writing,” which, by
opposing the mode of value production proper to social circulation, constitutes “a force of
contestation in relation to society.”306 As Deleuze puts it, “the thought of the outside is a
thought of resistance”307; and the subversive political charge of literary verticality issues
from its irreducible exteriority to the modern social formation.
If Foucault’s politics of literary transgression has received little scholarly attention,
however, this may be because he himself largely abandoned it just before undertaking
what is considered to be his more properly political work: namely, his critical analytic of
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power throughout the 1970s. For Foucault, the worldwide “revolutionary movements”308
of the late 1960s – including the Cultural Revolution in China; the student struggles of
May 1968 in Paris; and the student revolts of March 1968 in Tunisia, in which he directly
participated309 – called into question the potency of writing, whether literary or otherwise,
as a transformative political tactic. Signaling a turning point if not a crisis in his thought,
Foucault confronts this problem in an interview conducted in Japan between September
and October of 1970:
Does the subversive function of writing still remain? Hasn’t the time already past
when the sole act of writing … sufficed for expressing a form of contestation
against modern society? Hasn’t the time now come to move on to truly
revolutionary actions? Now that the bourgeoisie and capitalist society have totally
dispossessed writing of these actions, doesn’t the fact of writing serve only to reenforce the repressive system of the bourgeoisie? Mustn’t we cease writing? Please
understand that I am not kidding when I say all this. It is someone who continues to
write who is speaking to you.310
The issue, in short, is the problem of capitalism: whereas the activity of literary writing
could be said to have subversive force in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
becoming-commodity of art has defused and re-appropriated this force.
Indeed, Foucault sketches the historical trajectory of literature’s transgressive
function in terms of the modern emergence and contemporary collapse of the vertical
(virtual, infinite) space proper to literary language. Until the end of the seventeenth
century, the practice of writing had implied writing for an audience, communicating
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Foucault, “Folie, littérature, société,” 983, my translation.
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something (whether to teach, to inform, to entertain, etc.) by “circulating” a meaning
“inside of a social group.”311 As we saw in Foucault’s “Introduction to Rousseau’s
Dialogues,” such is the communicative function of linear or horizontal writing. By
contrast (as we have also seen), modern literature “is oriented in another direction”
insofar as it constitutes a ‘vertical and nearly untransmissible activity of writing’; and it is
by virtue of its verticality or structural esotericism that literary language occupies a
position of exteriority in relation to “the socio-economic system, such as the circulation
and formation of values.”312 At least, that is how literature “has functioned until now,”313
“until recently.”314
The problem is precisely that literature’s vertical “exteriority”315 has been captured,
absorbed, and reduced by the bourgeoisie’s “great force of assimilation”: literary writing
has been divested of its subversive charge, reintegrated “inside of the social system” and
repossessing the kind of “normal social function” it had performed before the modern
period.316 That is, literary works have become horizontal once again, now as so many
readily consumed commodities re-inscribed into the circuits of social circulation as
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Ibid, 981-2, my translation.
Ibid, 982, my translation. Cf.: “I believe that in Europe, until the 19th century, literature was still a
deeply institutionalized form of discourse. To write a play essentially meant wanting to please a welldefined group of people; to write a book or novel meant wanting to please a certain category of individuals,
or wanting to edify, or wanting to impart a lesson in morality. On the other hand, beginning in the 19th
century, literature in Europe was in a way de-institutionalized, freed from its institutional status, and in in
its most elevated formulations, which alone can be considered valid, tended to become absolutely anarchic
speech, institutionless speech, profoundly marginal speech that crosses and mines all the other forms of
discourse” (Foucault, “La folie et la société,” Dits et écrits II, 1976—1988, 489-490, my translation).
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Foucault, “Folie, littérature, société,” 982, my translation.
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Ibid, 995, my translation.
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Ibid, my translation.
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Ibid, 987, my translation.
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products of “our ‘system of writing,’” “a system that is absolutely characteristic of
capitalist bourgeois society.”317
Foucault thus concludes that “the bourgeoisie has succeeded in defeating
literature,”318 a conclusion that will compel him to rethink his conception of political
contestation; for the failure of the literary politics of transgression indicates “the strength
of the enemy that we must combat and the weakness of the weapon that is literature.”319
The problem is once again that of material expression: indeed, the precise deficiency of
literary politics is that capitalism has neutralized its power to realize and sustain a vertical
form of experience. L’expérience littéraire thereby goes the way of the tragic experience
of madness, and in its wake, the problem must be posed anew of how to give expression
to that which, at an irreducible remove from the contemporary social formation, would
radically resist or transform it.320 This, in turn, will entail rethinking the irreducibility
proper to the vertical.
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Ibid, 994, my translation. Foucault gives as an example the contrast between Flaubert’s Madame Bovary
(1857) – “a story of adulterers and suicide,” which caused a scandal simply by “reproducing in a work the
everyday reality of a bourgeois family” – and Pierre Guyotat’s Éden, Éden, Éden (1970), which was
socially accepted as a work despite depicting homosexual practices that in actual fact went legally punished:
“The transgressive force of literature has at this point been lost” (ibid, 985-6, my translation).
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Ibid, 987, my translation.
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Ibid, 988., my translation
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In a lecture given during the same trip to Japan, Foucault is explicit in linking the modern form of
madness as mental illness to capitalism: “It is said that Pinel liberated the madmen in 1793, but those he
liberated were only sick people, old people, idlers, prostitutes; he left the madmen in the institutions. This
took place when it did because, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the speed of industrial
development accelerated, and, in accordance with the first principle of capitalism, the hordes of
unemployed proletarians were regarded as a reserve army of labor power. For that reason, those who did
not work but were able to work were let out of the establishments. But there, too, a second process of
selection took effect: not only those who were unwilling to work, but those who did not have the ability to
work, namely the mad, were left in the establishments and regarded as patients whose troubles had
characterological or psychological causes. … [I]f this medicalization [of the madman] occurred, it was …
essentially for economic and social reasons: that was how the madman was made identical to the mentally
ill individual and an entity called ‘mental illness’ was discovered and developed. … It could be said that the
madman is an avatar of our capitalist societies” (Foucault, “Madness and Society,” Aesthetics, Method, and
Epistemology, 341-2). In this way, whether with respect to unreason or to literature, the political problem of
material expression is also the problem of capitalism.
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There are two directions that Foucault’s thought will take in response to this new
formulation of the problem of material expression as the problem of capitalism. One of
these directions, oriented by an engagement with Deleuze’s metaphysics of intensive
difference and Nietzsche’s genealogical critique of historical force relations, will subtly
reformulate the concept of the vertical, preparing its subsequent reappearance at the end
of the 1970s in Foucault’s writings on revolt as ‘l’expérience politique.’ Thus, though
Foucault ultimately leaves behind the literary politics that had guided his work over the
prior decade, he does not jettison its conceptual key. Yet while verticality will remain in a
way irreducible to the horizontality of historical causation, it will no longer be posited as
a spatial concept of exteriority321, but will instead be rearticulated in the language of
intensities, events, and forces. Although this conceptual development begins
contemporaneously with Foucault’s rejection of literary politics, we will be better
situated to give a full interpretation of it in Chapter 5, after having elaborated in detail
Foucault’s philosophical relationship or ‘block of becoming’ with Deleuze.
The other direction Foucault’s thought will take, emerging precisely over the course
of his relation to Deleuze, proposes the concept of ‘transversality’ as the basis for a new
theory of political struggle – one that would better respond to the problem of material
expression proper to capitalist society. It is this trajectory that we will explore at length in
the following two chapters.
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Foucault and Deleuze will both later provide a non-spatial conception of the thought of the outside,
namely, as the ‘line of flight,’ a term which we have already seen Foucault use in “Distance, aspect, origine”
with respect to the verticality of literary language. Deleuze, in reference to Foucault, will also call this the
‘line of the outside.’ In this case, the ‘outside’ will refer not to an Exterior, but to an intensive vector that
describes the centrifugal movement of force. We will return to this point at length below in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 4. THE CONCEPT OF TRANSVERSAL CONNECTION: CAPITALISM,
POWER, AND RESISTANCE

“A line of becoming is not defined by points that it connects, or by points that compose it;
on the contrary, it passes between points, it comes up through the middle, it runs
perpendicular to the points first perceived, transversally to the localizable relation of
distant or contiguous points. … If becoming is a block (a line-block), it is because it
constitutes a zone of proximity and indiscernibility, a no-man’s-land, a nonlocalizable
relation sweeping up the two distant or contiguous points….”
— Deleuze and Guattari322
Between Foucault and Deleuze, cutting across three decades, there runs a
transversal line whose trajectory impels both thinkers in a reciprocal process or block of
becoming. This line, shaping the contours of an exceedingly rich philosophical friendship,
charts a common project of transversal resistance, which, I will argue, is indispensable
for understanding the political thought of both Deleuze and Foucault. Indeed, it is the
concept of transversality that allows Foucault to escape the impasse of his literary politics,
develop an analytic of power in response to the problem of capitalism, and, together with
Deleuze, formulate a more compelling solution to the problem of material expression.
Over the following two chapters, this ‘line-block’ of becoming will be mapped
according to four segments: the first, running from Foucault’s History of Madness (1961)
to Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus (1972), posits in incipient form the political
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Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, translated by Brian Massumi, 293-4,
translation slightly modified.
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project of transversal resistance as a response to the problem of capitalism323; the second,
running from Anti-Oedipus to Foucault’s analytic of power (1970s)324, prepares the
critical ground necessary for the positive elaboration of such a political project; and the
third and fourth, running from the analytic of power through Deleuze and Guattari’s A
Thousand Plateaus (1980) to Foucault’s late ethico-politics (1981-1984)325, undertake
this positive elaboration.
More specifically, the first segment concerns unreason and schizophrenia as
absolute exterior limits of the social formation, intensive forms of experience and
expression that scramble the dominant codifications of social order. Freeing and
323

In truth, this first segment could begin before History of Madness, with an article by Deleuze in 1959 on
Nietzsche and tragedy, “Sens et valeurs” (which would become a chapter in Deleuze’s Nietzsche and
Philosophy three years later). Warren Montag makes a convincing case for situating this article in
proximity to Foucault’s original preface to History of Madness, especially with regard to the ideas of
constitutive division (originary difference, difference in itself) and tragic affirmation: “The placing of ‘the
refusal, forgetting and silent disappearance of tragedy’ at the center and origin of the Occidental world,
together with the opposition of ‘the immobile structures of the tragic’ to a ‘dialectics of history,’ suggests
that Foucault’s reading of The Birth of Tragedy, in its themes and concerns, not to mention the particulars
of its interpretation of this notoriously obscure text, coincides with, even if it is not derived from, that of
Deleuze. … For Deleuze, the ‘real opposition’ in The Birth of Tragedy is not the ‘wholly dialectical
opposition of Dionysos and Apollo, but the more profound opposition of Dionysos and Socrates’ (Deleuze
1959: 15). Moreover, Deleuze’s hostility to any notion of the dialectic compels him to argue that in fact
Nietzsche has advanced a thoroughly non-dialectical account of the Dionysian-Apollonian relation, that is,
the ‘original’ (Deleuze places the term in quotation marks) contradiction between a ‘primitive’ unity and
individuation. We can already see the paradox at the heart of Deleuze’s reading (which, further begins to
suggest its relevance for Foucault): the contradiction between these terms is original and thus there can be
no inquiring back before, even as one of the terms is said to be primitive or primary in relation to the other.
Deleuze suspends the possibility of a unity that would precede its division into two parts.… Diversity and
difference are original: unity is always secondary and derivative…. The Nietzschean tragic for Deleuze is
‘affirmative’: not only the affirmation of original difference, but even the affirmation of the difference
between the same and the different, the multiple and the one. The tragic affirms the essential diversity of
being and becoming” (Montag, “‘Foucault and the Problematic of Origins’: Althusser’s Reading of Folie et
déraison,” §20).
324
In particular, I have in mind Foucault’s two major books from this period, Discipline and Punish (1975)
and History of Sexuality Volume 1 (1976), as well as his lecture courses at the Collège de France (especially
those running from Psychiatric Power in 1974 through The Birth of Biopolitics in 1979) and numerous
other essays and interviews (in Dits et écrits, 1954-1988, some of which are translated in Power: Essential
Works of Foucault Volume 3), extending until “The Subject and Power” (1982).
325
See Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth. In particular, I will focus on “Friendship as a Way of Life”
(1981), “The Social Triumph of the Sexual Will” (1981), “Sex, Power, and the Politics of Identity” (1982),
“On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Works in Progress” (1983), and “Polemics, Politics, and
Problematizations” (1984).
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transversally connecting these lines of flight becomes the project of ‘schizo-political’
struggle: if History of Madness had politicized the problem of material expression, AntiOedipus, in turn, develops a general theory of society and transformative politics based
upon this problem. The second segment, in turn, provides a micro-political theory that
poses the problem of power and resistance in capitalist society in terms of the production
of two different kinds of multiplicity: one that is denumerable and controllable, and
another that is non-denumerable and unruly. While the second segment prepares and
begins the positive articulation of transversal resistance, the third treats of it
systematically through the concept of minoritarian becoming, understood as the
collective creation of a transverse multiplicity and instructively exemplified through the
prison movement. Finally, the fourth segment singularizes this concept by developing a
particular example through which the operation of power would be thwarted: namely, the
Foucauldian project of becoming-queer.
Taken in its full trajectory, what emerges over the course of this Foucault-Deleuze
block of becoming is a theory of transversal political struggle. Whereas Foucault’s
literary politics of transgression had posited a form of exteriority since collapsed by
capitalism, transversal resistance will propose a different response to the problem of
realizing and sustaining a collective mode of political agency capable of transforming the
conditions of the social formation. Ultimately, in the account of political agency that I
will propose, the necessary condition of realization for such agency is articulated through
the concept of transversal connection.
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4.1

Schizo-Politics: A Transversal Response to the Political Problem of the Two
Regimes of Madness

Anti-Oedipus can be understood as the development and sophistication of the core
project given in History of Madness, for both works pose and respond to a common
problem as the key for a general social theory and political strategy of contestation:
namely, the problem of the two regimes of madness.326 The distinction between these two
regimes is drawn as follows: the first – the ‘breakthrough’ – is characterized as a kind of
radical limit-experience, expressed through works of art, that ruptures or calls into
question the order of social reality; the second – the ‘breakdown’ – is characterized as a
catatonic collapse that follows the initial breakthrough.327 The problem, then, is the
seemingly inexorable slippage from the first regime to the second: why and how is it that
the ‘authentically insane,’ as Artaud puts it – those schizophrenic artists who (as Deleuze
says) “live in an almost unbearable proximity to the real”328 – are deprived the support
necessary to sustain their intensive mode of becoming, falling instead into the ravages of
madness and suicide?329
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In this regard, both thinkers are profoundly Artaudian – and indeed, Artaud is a common early reference
point for both. On Artaud’s thesis regarding Van Gogh and the ‘authentically insane,’ see our discussion of
Foucault’s History of Madness above in Chapter 3.
327
Deleuze borrows the terminology of ‘breakthrough’ and ‘breakdown’ from R.D. Laing’s The Politics of
Experience; he also notes the close connection with Foucault’s account in History of Madness of the
historical separation of madness as unreason (breakthrough) from madness as mental illness (breakdown).
See Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, translated by Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane, 1312.
328
Deleuze, “Schizophrenia and Society,” in Two Regimes of Madness, edited by David Lapoujade,
translated by Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina, 27.
329
That is, why and how does the schizophrenic ‘visionary’ (Artaud) become consigned to break down into
“the autistic schizophrenic, who no longer moves, and who can remain motionless for years” (Deleuze,
“Capitalism and Schizophrenia,” in Desert Islands and Other Texts, 1953-1975, edited by Lapoujade, 240).
As Deleuze puts it, “What can we do so the break-through does not become a break-down?” (Deleuze,
“Schizophrenia and Society,” 28).
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For both Foucault and Deleuze, this question speaks to something fundamental
about the way society functions. Indeed, the problem of the two regimes of madness has
significant political stakes because the practices that reduce the first form of madness to
the second are the very constitutive processes by which the social formation is organized
and reproduced; that is, something about the intensive experience of the schizophrenic
breakthrough poses a grave danger to the social order, and the expulsion of this threat is
formative for the foundation and development of society. I will refer to this claim, which
bears the unmistakable stamp of Artaud’s essay on Van Gogh, as the Artaud thesis. The
problem of the two regimes of madness thus opens onto a more general theory of the
constitutive exclusions by which the socius is formed, and it suggests a possible strategy
of resistance that would privilege the schizoid ‘line of the outside’ as a site for political
contestation.
In the last chapter, we saw how Foucault poses the problem of the two regimes of
madness in terms of an opposition between unreason and mental illness. The political
task that follows from this initial formulation of the problematic is to provide the
conditions of material expression that would support and sustain the limit-experience of
unreason. However, as we have also seen, the resultant literary politics of transgression
runs aground of the problem of capitalism, leading Foucault to direct his conception of
political resistance away from unreason and literature toward an analytic of power.
Foucault’s analytic of power, however, is first made possible by the work of
Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus. On the one hand, Anti-Oedipus is profoundly
continuous with History of Madness, for unreason and schizophrenia are analogous in at
least three ways: limit-experientially, as modes of intensive becoming, which stand in
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direct relation to the outside,330 breakthroughs always in danger of breaking down into
mental illness;331 historically, as absolute exterior limits of the socius, the exclusion of
which is constitutive to the functioning of society; and politically, as the basis for
conceiving a strategy of resistance to the violence of this social production. However,
what Deleuze and Guattari add is an analysis of schizophrenia conducted specifically in
relation to capitalism, which allows them to go beyond Foucault’s transgressive politics
toward a transversal politics of connection.
Anti-Oedipus articulates the two regimes of madness as two forms of schizophrenia:
(1) “the schizo-as-entity,” the broken down or catatonic schizophrenic subject
corresponding to mental illness; and (2) schizophrenia as process, that is, the pure,
universal process of production, or decoded flows of desire. In turn, Deleuze and Guattari
formulate their version of the Artaud thesis: these decoded flows or lines of flight of the
schizophrenic process threaten to scramble the social codes and thus subvert the
functioning of the socius, since social formations organize and reproduce themselves on
the basis of ordering, coding, or re-territorializing flows of desire.332 Thus, schizophrenia
– as a pure process of desiring-production – is exorcised from the socius, forming its
330

“There is a schizophrenic experience of intensive quantities in their pure state, to a point that is almost
unbearable – a celibate misery and glory experienced to the fullest, like a cry suspended between life and
death, an intense feeling of transition, states of pure, naked intensity stripped of all shape and form. … A
harrowing, emotionally overwhelming experience, which brings the schizo as close as possible to matter, to
a burning, living center of matter” (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 19).
331
Echoing Foucault’s questions in History of Madness concerning why those who attempted the test of
unreason are consigned to fall into madness or suicide, Deleuze and Guattari write: “How is it possible that
the schizo was conceived of as the autistic rag – separated from the real and cut off from life – that he is so
often thought to be? Worse still: how can psychiatric practice have made him this sort of rag, how can it
have reduced him to this state of a body without organs that has become a dead thing – this schizo who
sought to remain at that unbearable point where the mind touches matter and lives every intensity,
consumes it?” (ibid, 19-20).
332
“The prime function incumbent upon the socius, has always been to codify the flows of desire, to
inscribe them, to record them, to see to it that no flow exists that is not properly dammed up, channeled,
regulated” (ibid, 33).
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absolute exterior limit. This movement of exclusion is integral to the very formation of
society.
Like Foucault then, Deleuze and Guattari offer a general social theory and history
of limits based on the Artaud thesis. Further, they distinguish three social formations on
the basis of how they order decoded flows of desire. ‘Primitive’ societies ward off the
threat of schizoid deterritorialization by coding their flows, operating on the basis of
mobile and finite blocks of debt that weave together an open system of alliances and
filiations. ‘Imperial’ societies, in turn, over-code these flows, raising them into a new
alliance and direct filiation with an eminent transcendent unity (the despotic State).
‘Capitalist’ societies, however, have a fundamentally different relation to the threat
of schizoid decoding, for like the process of schizophrenia, capitalism operates on the
basis of decoded flows (e.g., decoded flows of money and decoded flows of labor).333
The crucial difference between capitalism and schizophrenia is that the former
axiomatizes the flows it decodes and thus subjects desiring-production to an ever more
rigorous form of control. The deterritorializing “process is continually interrupted, or the
tendency counteracted, or the limit displaced.”334 Rather than expelling the schizoid
decoded flows as an exterior limit in the manner of primitive and imperial societies,
capitalism displaces them by interiorizing them at the heart of social production,
harnessing their force by converting them into capital. And this is just how the capitalist
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In this way, capitalism and schizophrenia are “one and the same economy, one and the same production
process,” (ibid, 245) for “the decoding and the deterritorialization of flows define the very process of
capitalism” (ibid, 320).
334
Ibid. Thus, capitalism is the relative limit of all pre-capitalist societies – “it effects relative breaks,
because it substitutes for the codes an extremely rigorous axiomatic that maintains the energy of the flows
in a bound state on the body of capital” – whereas schizophrenia is the absolute limit of every social
formation, capitalism included (ibid, 246).
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machine operates, by “directly apprehending” decoded flows “in a codeless axiomatic”335:
for any deterritorialized flow, such as that produced by a tragic work of unreason, an
axiom can be added that absorbs it into a flow of capital.336 Indeed, this is precisely why
Foucault’s literary politics of transgression failed.
This function of capitalism, in turn, is how Deleuze and Guattari account for the
problem of the two regimes of madness.337 The sick schizo is an effect of the double
process of production by which capitalism “axiomatizes with the one hand what it
decodes with the other.”338 It is through this process that capitalism re-territorializes the
flows it decodes so as to keep them from “escaping the system.”339 As a result, it falls to
the lot of schizophrenic subjects alone to express the force of an absolute deterritorialization, and “a flow of madness … is defined thus because it is charged with
representing whatever escapes the axiomatic and the applications of reterritorialization in
other flows.”340 Because this charge is too great to sustain, lacking the conditions of
material expression that would support it, the schizoid breakthrough is consigned to a
catatonic breakdown.
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Ibid, 337.
“Then what becomes of the ‘truly’ schizophrenic language and the ‘truly’ decoded and unbound flows
that manage to break through the wall or absolute limit? The capitalist axiomatic is so rich that one more
axiom is added – for the books of a great writer whose lexical and stylistic characteristics can always be
computed by means of an electronic machine, or for the discourse of madmen that can always be heard
within the framework of a hospital, administrative, and psychiatric axiomatic” (ibid, 246).
337
Deleuze and Guattari pose this problem in strikingly Foucauldian terms: “Why does [capitalist
production] confine its madmen and madwomen instead of seeing in them its own heroes and heroines, its
own fulfillment? And where it can no longer recognize the figure of a simple illness, why does it keep its
artists and even its scientists under such close surveillance – as though they risked unleashing flows that
would be dangerous for capitalist production and charged with a revolutionary potential, so long as these
flows are not co-opted or absorbed by the laws of the market?” (ibid, 245).
338
Ibid, 246.
339
Thus, for example, the decoded flow of labor is maintained “in the axiomatic framework of property,”
and decoded libidinal flows are maintained “in the applied framework of the family” (ibid, 320).
340
Ibid, 320.
336

145
The schizo-political strategy of resistance that follows from this theory of society
has two objectives. The first extends Foucault’s project in History of Madness: namely,
“undoing all the reterritorializations that transform madness into mental illness,”341 and
thus contesting the normalizing techniques of subjection and division that organize social
reality. It is the second objective, however, that opens for the first time onto the thought
of transversal resistance, namely, “liberating the schizoid movement of
deterritorialization in all the flows, in such a way that this characteristic can no longer
qualify a particular residue as a flow of madness, but affects just as well the flows of
labor and desire, of production, knowledge, and creation in their most profound
tendency.”342
Given that the capitalist social formation produces a multiplicity of social flows and
functions on the basis of their decoding and axiomatization, schizo-political resistance
aims to undo the re-territorialization of these flows by freeing the de-territorializing
tendency proper to each. Here it is essential that these lines of de-territorialization be
interconnected, such that they “become parts and cogs of one another in the flow that
feeds one and the same desiring-machine, so many local fires patiently kindled for a
generalized explosion.”343 In other words, the transversal connections between deterritorialized flows are what produce revolutionary force, since desire becomes
productive (a desiring-machine) through the connection of decoded flows.344
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See ibid, 224. Cf.: “Desire is revolutionary because it always wants more connections and assemblages”
(Deleuze, Dialogues, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, 79).
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Thus, to the capitalist, axiomatic conjugation of decoded flows, schizo-politics
would oppose a transversal connection of decoded flows, one that propels their collective
becoming-revolutionary.345 Through this transversal weave of lines of flight, the form of
intensive limit-experience proper to the schizoid breakthrough would receive its
conditions of material expression:
Here, madness would no longer exist as madness, not because it would have been
transformed into ‘mental illness,’ but on the contrary because it would receive the
support of all the other flows, including science and art – once it is said that
madness is called madness and appears as such only because it is deprived of this
support, and finds itself reduced to testifying all alone for deterritorialization as a
universal process. It is merely its unwarranted privilege, a privilege beyond its
capacities, that renders it mad.346

4.2

Foucault’s Debt to Deleuze: The Question of Transversal Resistance and the
Micropolitical Problem of Power

The schizo-political concept of resistance as the de-territorialization and transversal
connection of flows therefore provides a response to both the problem of the two regimes
of madness and the challenges of contesting capitalist social production more generally.
If the re-territorializing and integrative operations of capitalism function on the basis of
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Deleuze and Guattari elaborate on the distinction between connection and conjugation in A Thousand
Plateaus: “At this point, we must introduce a distinction between the two notions of connection and
conjugation of flows. ‘Connection’ indicates the way in which decoded and deterritorialized flows boost
one another, accelerate their shared escape, and augment or stoke their quanta; the ‘conjugation’ of these
same flows, on the other hand, indicates their relative stoppage, like a point of accumulation that plugs or
seals the lines of flight, performs a general reterritorialization, and brings the flows under the dominance of
a single flow capable of overcoding them.” (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 220) I would
emphasize that while this distinction between connection and conjugation is sharpened in A Thousand
Plateaus, the concept of ‘transversal connection’ is already operative in Anti-Oedipus, particularly in regard
to ‘subject-groups’ constructed as ‘transverse multiplicities’: see, e.g., Anti-Oedipus, 280, 287, 309, 319,
and 349.
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Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 321, my emphasis.
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totalizing axiomatization,347 then the appropriate form for contestation to take will be a
de-territorializing and de-totalizing revolutionary movement, the force of which is
generated through proliferating and connecting lateral lines of alliance.
However, the key problem remains how exactly to conceive and create this kind of
transversal political project. This is precisely how Deleuze poses the question to Foucault
in their exchange, “Intellectuals and Power,” from 1972:
We must set up lateral affiliations and an entire system of networks and popular
bases; and this is especially difficult. …[T]he present revolutionary movement has
created multiple centers, and not as the result of weakness or insufficiency, since a
certain kind of totalization pertains to power and the forces of reaction. … But how
are we to define the networks, the transversal links between these active and
discontinuous points, from one country to another or within a single country?348
Foucault’s response to Deleuze indicates to what extent his analytic of power is made
possible by Anti-Oedipus, for the question of how to connect lateral lines of struggle
bespeaks a more basic problem of how to understand the nature and operations of power:
Isn’t this difficulty in finding adequate forms of struggle a result of the fact that we
continue to ignore the problem of power? … If the reading of your books (from
Nietzsche to what I anticipate in Capitalism and Schizophrenia) has been essential
for me, it is because they seem to go very far in exploring this problem: under the
ancient theme of meaning, of the signifier and the signified, etc., you have
developed the question of power, of the inequality of powers and their struggles.349
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On the “co-opting power of capitalism” that derives from the totalizing function of the capitalist
axiomatic, see ibid, 236.
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Deleuze, “Intellectuals and Power,” in Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, 212-6, my
emphasis.
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Foucault, ibid, 212-4. It is notable that in crediting Deleuze with developing the problematic of power,
Foucault refers to Nietzsche and Philosophy and Anti-Oedipus, for both works articulate a view of
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Most fundamentally then, what Anti-Oedipus enables for Foucault is the
development of a micro-political conception of power, anticipating his subsequent
formulation, in History of Sexuality, Volume 1, of power “as the multiplicity of force
relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own
organization….”350 Indeed, Foucault credits Deleuze with casting the problem of power
(and thus of resistance) in terms of the thousand tiny points of its exercise.351 That is,
rather than deriving from a central, unitary position, such as the State or ruling class,
power must be grasped as an immanent multiplicity: one which constitutes the material
basis for the ‘molar’ organization of a society’s institutional arrangements, but which
functions by directly investing bodies and acting upon their forces, operating at what
Deleuze and Guattari refer to as the ‘molecular’ level.352
Thus, for instance, Anti-Oedipus poses the question of power in terms of the
political problem of desire and its direct investment of the socio-historical field, which
requires a functionalist, microphysical analysis of ‘desiring-machines’ and their

350

Foucault, History of Sexuality, Volume 1, 92.
“Each struggle develops around a particular source of power (any of the countless, tiny sources…)”
(Foucault, “Intellectuals and Power,” 214).
352
See, for example, Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of paranoia and schizophrenia as the two poles of
social libidinal investment: “It might be said that, of the two directions in physics – the molar direction that
goes toward the large numbers and the mass phenomena, and the molecular direction that on the contrary
penetrates into singularities, their interactions and connections at a distance or between different orders –
the paranoiac has chosen the first: he practices macrophysics. And it could be said that by contrast the
schizo goes in the other direction, that of microphysics, of molecules insofar as they no longer obey the
statistical laws: waves and corpuscles, flows and partial objects that are no longer dependent upon the large
numbers; infinitesimal lines of escape [fuite], instead of the perspectives of the large aggregates” (Deleuze
and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 280). In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari will explicitly draw the
connection between their notion of the molecular and Foucault’s notion of discipline: “It requires a whole
organization articulating formations of power and regimes of signs, and operating on the molecular level
(societies characterized by what Foucault calls disciplinary power)” (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand
Plateaus, 67).
351

149
constitutive role in social production.353 In this way, Deleuze displaces a transcendent,
hierarchical or representational conception of power in favor of one that is immanent,
decentralized, and direct.
This micro-political theory of bodies and forces in turn enables a properly
transversal conception of resistance in terms of a multiply-centered revolutionary354
movement. The key to answering Deleuze’s question about how to define the lateral
alliances between various political struggles is to first develop an adequate understanding
of the common mode of power they are allied against, for the “generality of the struggle
specifically derives from the system of power itself, from all the forms in which power is
353
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exercised and applied.”355 If this mode of power is grasped as an immanent multiplicity,
then different resistance struggles will be both singular, with respect to the immediate
conditions in which power is exercised over them, and connectable, insofar as they stand
in immanent relation to one another by virtue of suffering the same regime of power.
Speaking of all those who are subjected to the exercise of a power they find intolerable,
and still by way of response to Deleuze, Foucault writes:
In engaging in a struggle that is properly their own, whose objectives they clearly
understand and whose methods only they can determine, they enter into a
revolutionary process. They naturally act as allies of the proletariat, because power
is exercised the way it is in order to maintain capitalist exploitation. They
genuinely serve the cause of the proletariat by fighting in those places where they
find themselves oppressed. Women, prisoners, conscripted soldiers, hospital
patients, and homosexuals have now begun a specific struggle against the
particularized power, the constraints and controls, that are exerted over them. …
And these movements are linked to the revolutionary movement of the proletariat to
the extent that they fight against the controls and constraints which serve the same
system of power.356
It is often thought that unlike that of Deleuze and Guattari, Foucault’s political
philosophy does not deal with the problem of capitalism per se. Yet seen in light of this
dialogue with Deleuze, all of Foucault’s critical histories – from History of Madness and
Birth of the Clinic to Discipline and Punish and History of Sexuality, Volume 1 – take as
their object a common system of power the strategic function of which, in Foucault’s
view, is to ‘maintain capitalist exploitation.’ Thus, the localized forms of resistance that
Foucault supports, and for which his intellectual work is intended to provide arms, are
transversally connectable precisely insofar as they find common cause against the
functioning of the capitalist formation. To the extent that these oppositional movements
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singularize their proper modes of struggle, they ‘enter into a revolutionary process’ or, to
use Deleuze’s later terminology, effect their own becoming-revolutionary; and to the
extent that they form a lateral network ‘linked to the revolutionary movement of the
proletariat,’ these struggles constitute a collective becoming-revolutionary that traverses
the socius and contests the relations of power that reproduce capitalist social production.
It is likely in terms of this shared view on minoritarian political resistance, then,
that Deleuze will later speak of the “common cause,”357 more profound than any
methodological difference, that connects his work with Foucault’s. Perhaps we can also
begin to see why Foucault, in a footnote at the beginning of Discipline and Punish, writes
that he “could give no notion by reference or quotations what this book owes to Gilles
Deleuze and the work he is undertaking with Félix Guattari.”358 Though Foucault does
not detail this debt, to which he had already alluded in “Intellectuals and Power,” another
indication of its import can be gleaned from a passage in Psychiatric Power, where
Foucault distinguishes between “two absolutely distinct types of power corresponding to
two systems, two different ways of functioning: the macrophysics of sovereignty, the
power that could be put to work in a post-feudal, pre-industrial government, and then the
microphysics of disciplinary power….”359
Foucault here combines two sets of distinctions established by Anti-Oedipus: that
between a macro- and microphysics of power, on the one hand, and the despotic and
capitalist social formations, on the other. Historically, sovereign power is exercised in the
societies that precede industrial capitalism – those which Deleuze and Guattari term
357
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“barbarian” and analyze in terms of “the ‘megamachine’ of the State,” which over-codes
primitive social flows and extracts surplus value from them360 –, and this form of power
functions by imposing levies, whether on the products, stores or services of its
subjects.361 By contrast, disciplinary power, which emerges alongside early industrial
capitalism, more insidiously invests the social field, for it functions through the
“exhaustive capture of the individual’s body, actions, time, and behavior. It is a seizure of
the body, and not of the product....”362 Disciplinary institutions, such as prisons, schools,
factories, and asylums, are thus so many apparatuses of capture,363 by which power
apprehends “bodies themselves with their materiality and their forces.”364
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In other words, to borrow from Deleuze’s later terminology, sovereign power is the
diagram of force relations that corresponds to the despotic social formation; and insofar
as these relations are juridically organized and centralized through the State, sovereign
power is macro-physical in its functioning. By contrast, disciplinary power is the diagram
proper to the industrial capitalist social formation; and it constitutes “a micro-physics of
power” insofar as it does not merely impose a system of levies upon the products of a
populace, but takes hold directly as an “infinitesimal power over the active body”365 and
thus as “a specific mode of subjection … in which the body itself is invested by power
relations.”366 Therefore, if the global thesis of Discipline and Punish is that the
widespread changes in the techniques, apparatuses, and legal coding of punishment,
contemporary with the historical shift from the classical to the modern period, reflect a
more fundamental transformation in the regime of power by which Western societies are
organized and governed; then it will be Deleuze and Guattari’s micro-political conception
of power and analysis of social formations that enable Foucault to map this mutation
from sovereign to disciplinary power.
Moreover, the debt can be specified further, for between Deleuze and Foucault
there emerges a concept of power as productive, operating through the double technique
of (1) individualizing subjection and (2) the denumeration of human multiplicities. In
contradistinction to sovereign power, the “chief function of the disciplinary power is to
‘train’, rather than to select and to levy…. It ‘trains’ the moving, confused, useless
multitudes of bodies and forces into a multiplicity of individual elements …. Discipline
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‘makes’ individuals, it is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals both
as objects and as instruments of its exercise.”367 By shaping a disorderly mass into a
multiplicity of “necessary and sufficient single units,”368 discipline produces the very
form of the modern individual; and by directly investing the body to capture and control
its forces, discipline fabricates this individual as “the obedient subject, the individual
subjected to habits, rules, orders, an authority that is exercised continually around him
and upon him, and which he must allow to function automatically in him.”369 Insofar as it
thus “allows both the characterization of the individual as individual and the ordering of a
given multiplicity,”370 disciplinary power performs a simultaneously individualizing and
totalizing productive function: it constitutes a “political technology of the body”,371 by
which the movements, activities, and forces of bodies are controlled and developed, and
by which an unruly, unproductive or dangerous multitude is transformed into an
organized, useful, governable multiplicity.
The relational arrangements by which the modern social formation is hierarchically
segmented and the mode of self-relation by which the obedient subject is constituted, thus
result from and reproduce the same regime of power. Indeed, Foucault credits Deleuze
with the general form of this fundamental insight in the preface to the English translation
of Anti-Oedipus, framing that work as an ethico-political project contesting the
individualizing and totalizing effects of power through the creation of new kinds of
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multiplicity and practices of subjectivation.372 Anticipating his own declaration five years
later in “The Subject and Power” that “the political, ethical, social, philosophical problem
of our days” is “to promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of
individuality that has been imposed on us for several centuries,”373 Foucault lists as one
of Anti-Oedipus’s “essential principles” that “[t]he individual is the product of power.
What is needed is to ‘de-individualize’ by means of multiplication and displacement,
diverse combinations. The group must not be the organic bond uniting hierarchized
individuals, but a constant generator of de-individualization.”374
If Discipline and Punish is so indebted to Deleuze, then it is because Anti-Oedipus
enables the problem of power to be posed in terms of an immanent microphysics of
bodies and forces: one which emerges historically with industrial capitalism and
ultimately functions to maintain capitalist exploitation by producing individuals as
normalized subjects within hierarchically ordered multiplicities, thereby investing,
capturing, and controlling bodies’ powers of activity. Further, we have seen that such an
analytic of power is necessary to address the question of transversal resistance insofar as
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the connectivity of struggles against power is derived from the commonality of the
system they contest. Whence the double task of Discipline and Punish: (1) to analyze the
historical exercise of disciplinary power as a political technology for the production and
administration of denumerable and controllable human multiplicities; and (2) to diagram
the reciprocally conditioning relations between this micro-political regime of power and
capitalism. Such a genealogical project will provide the critical propaedeutics for
conceiving and creating a transversal form of struggle better suited than Foucault’s earlier
politics of literary transgression to resist the exercise of power in capitalist society.

4.3

Assembling Denumerable Multiplicities: The Anti-Transversal Function of
Disciplinary Power

Foucault’s first task, the analysis of disciplinary practices, illuminates the tactical
importance of transversality from the sides of both power and resistance. In order to
minimize the economic inefficiencies and political dangers of mass phenomena,
discipline operates as “an anti-nomadic technique”375 that fixes and distributes somatic
singularities, “arrests or regulates movements.”376 In turn, in order to further defuse the
threats of resistance intrinsic to any collection of bodies and forces – “agitations, revolts,
spontaneous organizations, coalitions[,] anything that may establish horizontal
conjunctions”377 – discipline constructs a striated space, one arranged according to
“hierarchical networks” and structured by inserting “as solid separations as possible …
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between the different elements at the same level.”378 This double operation of discipline
as anti-nomadic and striating is achieved through the technique of “partitioning,” which
functions according to the “principle of elementary location” to “break up collective
dispositions” and “analyse confused, massive or transient pluralities”: “Each individual
has his own place, and each place, its individual.”379
It is thus by means of the partitioning of space that discipline is exercised as a
“cellular” power, satisfying “the first condition for the control and use of an ensemble of
distinct elements”:380 namely, the individualizing and totalizing distribution of bodies
into a grid of separated cells that abolishes all collective effects of transversal group
interaction. Within such an arrangement, which terminates “any relation that is not
supervised by authority,”381 individuals are both isolated and assembled “in a strict
hierarchical framework, with no lateral relation, communication being possible only in a
vertical direction.”382 Whether the disciplinary apparatus of capture be a school,
factory383, hospital, or prison, each individual (the student, worker, patient, or prisoner) is
only ever set into relation with a centralized source of power, be it a teacher, overseer,
doctor, or warden.384
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Indeed, it is precisely the blockage of transversal relations between the distinct
elements of a disciplinary multiplicity that secures both the individualization of the
former and the denumerability of the latter. Nowhere is this as clear as in Foucault’s
discussion of Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon, which, as “the diagram of a mechanism of
power reduced to its ideal form,” provides the “generalizable model of functioning” for
the mode of power exercised in disciplinary society.385 Within a panoptic arrangement,
which consists architecturally of a central watchtower surrounded by rings of partitioned
cells, each individual is confined and isolated in his own cell, the front of which is subject
to continual surveillance from without, and the side walls of which prevent the individual
“from coming into contact with his companions. He is seen, but he does not see; he is the
object of information, never a subject in communication. The arrangement of his room,
opposite the central tower, imposes on him an axial visibility; but the divisions of the ring,
those separated cells, imply a lateral invisibility. And this invisibility is a guarantee of
order.”386
While the political effect by which individuals, as objects of a constant ‘axial
visibility,’ internalize and reproduce the operation of power may be what is best known
in Foucault’s analysis of panopticism, it is in fact the structure of ‘lateral invisibility’ that
makes this system of subjection possible. If discipline is a technique for producing a
certain order and functioning of human collectivities, then what ‘guarantees’ this order –
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that is, what secures the use and control of a disciplinary multiplicity – will be the series
of lateral blockages between subjected individuals:
The crowd, a compact mass, a locus of multiple exchanges, individualities merging
together, a collective effect, is abolished and replaced by a collection of separated
individualities. From the point of view of the guardian, it is replaced by a
multiplicity that can be numbered and supervised [une multiplicité dénombrable et
contrôlable]; from the point of view of the inmates, by a sequestered and observed
solitude. Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of
conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of
power.387
A primary operation of panoptic arrangements, and thus a first condition for the
exercise of power, is to block transversal connections and thereby defuse the economic
and political dangers of inefficiency and revolt. This basic diagrammatic feature of
panopticism is the key to the smooth functioning of any disciplinary apparatus: in
factories, the severance of transversal ties prevents worker theft, coalitions, distractions,
and accidents; in schools, cheating, talking, and time-wasting amongst students; in
asylums, the danger of madmen harming each other or creating collective disturbances; in
hospitals, the risk of contagion among patients; and in prisons, the threat of complots to
escape or hatch future crimes.388
Foucault’s micro-analytic of power thus allows the political problem of
transversality to be framed in terms of two different forms of multiplicity. We have seen
387
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that by Foucault’s own lights, Anti-Oedipus had already posited a basic theoretical
opposition between the group as ‘a constant generator of de-individualization’ and the
group as ‘the organic bond uniting hierarchized individuals.’389 The relation between
these two modes of collectivity is now given historical precision: the essential operation
of disciplinary power is to transform a non-denumerable multiplicity, a plexus of
‘multiple exchanges’ where ‘individualities merge together,’ into ‘a denumerable and
controllable multiplicity.’ In other words, in order for panoptic processes of
individualizing subjection to achieve ‘the automatic functioning of power,’ a transient
multitude that generates effects of de-individualization through the multiplication of
lateral relations must be reassembled into a hierarchically segmented ‘collection of
separated individualities.’ And this is achieved in the first instance by debarring
transversal connections through the partitioning of disciplinary space.
It is therefore through the concept of the transversal, its blockage or proliferating
connections, that power and resistance in disciplinary society can be grasped in their most
fundamental operations. In both cases, what is at issue is the construction of multiplicities:
on the side of power and the segmented space of its apparatuses of capture, the formation
of denumerable multiplicities that individualize obedient subjects; and on the side of
resistance, the creation of transverse or non-denumerable multiplicities that give rise to
de-individualizing processes of collective subjectivation.
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4.4

Foucault’s Economico-Political Thesis: Capitalism, Modern Power, and the
Divided Plebe

In order to understand how this incipient transversal politics of connection would
respond specifically to the problem of capitalism, we must consider the second task of
Discipline and Punish, the analysis of the relations between power and the capitalist
social formation. We have seen that disciplinary power arises concurrently with the
industrialization of economic production and includes the factory among its set of
institutions. Far from being merely historically overlapping processes, however, a
biconditional relation obtains between (1) the development of capitalism and (2) the great
mutation in the technology of power through which the ‘macrophysics of sovereignty’
was supplanted by the ‘microphysics of disciplinary power.’
The very development of discipline as a set of individualizing techniques for
organizing and controlling human multiplicities must be grasped in relation to “the wellknown historical conjuncture” at the origins of industrial capitalism. This would be the
conjuncture between, on the one hand, the “increase in the floating population” resulting
from “the large demographic thrust of the eighteenth century,” and on the other, “the
growth in the apparatus of production,” the increasing extension and complexity of which
had driven up costs and required greater profitability.390 The administrative methods over
the first process, the accumulation of displaced human populations, “made possible a
political take-off” of “a subtle, calculated technology of subjection” that superseded
traditional forms of sovereign power.391 The techniques for developing the second
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process, capital accumulation,392 precipitated “the economic take-off of the West.”393
Between these two processes, in turn, there obtained a relation of historical
interdependency and reciprocal determination: “it would not have been possible to solve
the problem of the accumulation of men without the growth of an apparatus of production
capable of both sustaining them and using them; conversely, the techniques that made the
cumulative multiplicity of men useful accelerated the accumulation of capital.”394
However inseparable these processes turned out to be, the double accumulation of
human beings and capital still had to be actively brought into conjunction. Hence the
importance of discipline: the “primary, massive, overall function” of “the disciplinary
systems,” arising in the 18th century, was “to adjust the multiplicity of individuals to the
apparatuses of production, or to the State apparatuses which control them, or again, to
adjust the combination of men to the accumulation of capital.”395 That is, as an emergent
‘technology of subjection,’ disciplinary power was necessary to help bring about the
‘well-known historical conjuncture’ that made the development of capitalism possible,
operating, in the language of Deleuze and Guattari, a “conjunction of deterritorialized
flows”396 (population flows and flows of capital) and thereby playing a constitutive role
in the capitalist formation.
We can begin then, to better understand Foucault’s perhaps surprising claim in
“Intellectuals and Power” that ‘power is exercised the way it is in order to maintain
capitalist exploitation.’ Indeed, it is important to stress just how central this claim is to
392
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Foucault’s analytic of power, which advances what I will term the economico-political
thesis. We encountered this thesis in the Introduction: if, in capitalist society, the political
refers to the problem of the accumulation of human beings and the economic refers to the
problem of capital accumulation, then the fundamental operation of modern power will
be economico-political insofar as its ‘primary function’ is to adjust the ‘accumulation of
men’ to the ‘accumulation of capital.’397
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The economico-political function of disciplinary power operates at the
microphysical level of bodies and their forces. In order to assemble the floating
population into a well-organized workforce, individuals must be transformed into useful
laborers and fitted to the apparatus of production, which in turn requires that they first be
rendered controllable. As “the unitary technique by which the body is reduced as a
‘political’ force at the least cost and maximized as a useful force,”398 discipline thus
produces and trains individuals as politically docile, but economically productive
agents.399 Through the chronometric control of bodies’ actions and forces, which makes
possible the “maximal extraction of time” and maximal development of aptitudes,
discipline transforms the time of human existence into labor time and the somatic force of
individuals into labor power,400 integrating the two in production and thereby satisfying
“a condition of possibility of hyperprofit”401: “in order for there to be hyperprofit, …[a]
web of microscopic, capillary political power had to be established at the level of man’s
very existence, attaching men to the production apparatus, while making them into agents
of production, into workers.”402
Thus, through this micro-politics of disciplinary power, which realizes the
becoming-commodity of the time and corporeality of human life, capitalism penetrates
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ever “more deeply into our existence”403; and this process is necessary for the accelerated
accumulation of capital and its attendant forms of exploitation. Conversely, the
expanding scale of capital accumulation provided the impetus for the multiplication of
disciplinary forms of subjection. If the requirements of industrial capitalism had
determined the emergence of factory discipline historically, this particular disciplinary
form, once established as a technique for producing, controlling, and using denumerable
human multiplicities, could then be abstracted as a general technology of power and
applied to any number of domains: “The growth of a capitalist economy gave rise to the
specific modality of disciplinary power, whose general formulas, techniques of
submitting forces and bodies, in short, ‘political anatomy,’ could be operated in the most
diverse political regimes, apparatuses or institutions.”404
Thus, in effect, the process of capitalist economic production enabled the
individualizing techniques of disciplinary power to proliferate throughout the social field,
constituting a general mechanism of continuous political control and operating in a
variety of governmental regimes (e.g., liberalism, communism) and extra-economic
institutions (e.g., schools, hospitals, prisons, asylums, families). Moreover, the dispersal
of disciplinary techniques outside workhouses and factories not only enabled an
403
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intensification of social controls, but also in turn re-enforced the capitalist system of
economic production.
A particularly pertinent example of this is the modern police. According to Foucault,
what distinguished industrial capitalism from other economic forms (e.g., feudalism and
mercantilism) was the emergence of a new kind of wealth, one which was no longer
chiefly monetary, but rather invested in the industrial apparatus of production itself.405
However, since this widespread investment of wealth in constant capital came into daily
contact with the increasingly pauperized masses, it became more vulnerable, continually
subject to the threats of theft and sabotage. Thus, as the potential for economicopolitically subversive action increased, so did the need for more sophisticated
mechanisms of subjection, which is to say, for the development of a “continuous,
atomistic and individualizing power” that would function more effectively than the
“lacunary, global power” of sovereignty.406 The various popular illegalisms to which
sovereign power had turned a blind eye had to be brought under closer scrutiny: whence
the emergence of the police as an organ for the exercise of power, as in the case of the
London police, which “was born of the need to protect the docks, wharves, warehouses,
and stocks.”407
In this way, the economic exigency to safeguard the productive apparatus gave rise
to the development of an entire system of political power: namely, “panopticism,” which
placed the “plebeian, popular, working, peasant population” under “general, continuous
405
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surveillance,”408 and which was therefore crucial for protecting and strengthening not
only the wealth but the “social hegemony”409 of the bourgeoisie. Such hegemony
required, as a means of controlling the potentially dangerous underclasses, a socioeconomic, political and cultural partition to be instituted between: (1) the proletariat; and
(2) what Foucault variously refers to as “the non-integrated part of the marginal
population,”410 the “marginal plebeian,”411 and “the non-proletarianized plebe.”412 In
effect, this diction stresses that proletarianization – as a process – is both productive and
exclusionary, generating and exacerbating a division within the greater plebeian
population that is necessary for the functioning of capitalism: “there is within the global
mass of the plebe a divide between the proletariat and the non-proletarianized plebe, and
I believe institutions like the police, the justice system, and the penal system, are one of
the means used for endlessly deepening this divide, which capitalism requires.”413

408

Foucault, “À propos de l’enfermement pénitentiaire,” in Dits et écrits I, 1305, my translation.
Foucault, “The Eye of Power,” in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 19721977, edited by Colin Gordon, translated by Gordon et al, 156. For Foucault, it is, indeed, the
micropolitical technology of disciplinary power that enabled the bourgeoisie to remain the socially (and
economically) dominant class following the French Revolution: “The bourgeoisie is perfectly well aware
that a new constitution or legislature will not suffice to assure its hegemony; it realises that it has to invent
a new technology ensuring the irrigation by effects of power of the whole social body down to its smallest
particles. And it was by such means that the bourgeoisie not only made a revolution but succeeded in
establishing a social hegemony which it has never relinquished” (ibid).
410
Foucault, “Le grande enfermement,” in Dits et écrits I, 1171, my translation.
411
Ibid, 1174, my translation.
412
Foucault, “Table ronde,” in Dits et écrits I, 1202, my translation. Cf. Foucault, “Sur la justice populaire:
Débat avec les maos,” Dits et écrits I, 1219, 1220; the phrase is rendered by its English translator, John
Mepham, as “non-proletarianised common people” and “non-proletarianised people” in “On Popular
Justice: A Discussion with Maoists,” Power/Knowledge, 14, 16.
413
Foucault, “Table ronde,” 1202, my translation. Foucault continues: “Because, at bottom, what capitalism
is afraid of, rightly or wrongly, since 1789, since 1848, since 1870, is sedition, insurrection.” This claim
about sedition, which also appears in “On Popular Justice,” will be attenuated one year later, when Foucault
comes to the view that protecting the wealth invested in industrial production was a more fundamental
concern than sedition for the bourgeoisie in maintaining the divide between the proletarianized and nonproletarianized plebe. See “À propos de l’enfermement pénitentiaire,” Dits et écrits I, 1303-5. Nevertheless,
the danger of seditious force will remain for Foucault an important strategic determinant in the
development of panopticism. See, e.g., “The Birth of Social Medicine,” in Power, 143-4, 152; see also the
discussion of the ‘disturbances around the scaffold’ in Discipline and Punish, 59-65.
409

168
In addition to protecting the extensive investment of wealth in industrial capital, the
triple panoptic system of “courts-police-prison”414 performs three political functions in
service of bourgeois social hegemony. First, “it is a factor in ‘proletarianisation’: its role
is to force the people to accept their status as proletarians and the conditions for the
exploitation of the proletariat.”415 Thus, for example, the criminalization, policing, and
confinement of those parts of the population who remain unproductive (e.g., the
unemployed, vagabonds, mendicants) enforced and normalized the general moral and
economic imperative to work. In turn, by granting to workers a limited set of political
rights, “the bourgeoisie obtained from the proletariat the promise of good political
conduct and the renunciation of open rebellion.”416 In this way, panopticism facilitated
the process of proletarianization, by which a docile and useful labor force was constituted
and attached to the apparatus of economic production.
Second, the reverse side of this process, the criminalization of the unproductive,
produces marginalized or non-proletarianized groups, some of which can themselves be
formed by means of the courts-police-prison system into artificial populations of use to
capitalism. The panoptic exercise of political controls enables the isolation of the ‘violent’
and ‘dangerous’ elements of the plebeian population,417 those who pose a threat similar to
that of an unruly crowd or non-denumerable multitude, that is, “widespread plotting, a
whole network of communications, within which individuals exchanged different
414
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roles.”418 Historically, the three major ways of excluding the non-proletarianized plebe,
all of which support the dominant economico-political system, were expulsion through
colonization, conscription into the army, or confinement in prison. The prison, in
particular, serves as an effective method of marginalization, insofar as it manufactures a
delinquent population, which can then be “mobilize[d]” by the bourgeoisie “as soldiers,
policemen, racketeers and thugs, and use[d] … for the surveillance and repression of the
proletariat.”419 Further, this delinquent segment of the non-proletarianized plebe can be
employed as scabs or temporary workers in the event of strikes or fluctuating economic
demands, forming a particularly manipulable component of the ‘reserve army of labor’
required by capitalism.420 Thus, with regard to the new penal system at the beginning of
the nineteenth century, “the real aim was to create a specific criminalized sphere, a sector
that must be isolated from the rest of the population. … [T]he capitalist system claims to
combat criminality …by means of this carceral system that precisely produces criminality.
… [T]he criminal produced by the prison is a useful criminal, useful for the system.”421
Third, and consequently, by deploying these various “means for setting into
opposition the plebe which is proletarianized and that which is not,”422 the courts-policeprison system cleaves the common masses and defuses any potentially subversive forces
of popular resistance: “Thus, the divide is ceaselessly reproduced and reintroduced
between the proletariat and the non-proletarianized world because contact between the
418
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two was thought to be a dangerous ferment of insurrection.”423 The plebeian population,
taken in its rent entirety, “find[s] itself disarmed,” no longer “dangerous as ferment, as
hotbed of insurrection and possible sedition for the bourgeoisie.”424 In such a manner –
the popular masses partitioned and the accumulation of human beings, controlled – the
dividing practices instituted through the panoptic system of political power secure the
social hegemony of the bourgeoisie.

4.5

Connecting the Non/Proletarianized Plebe: Transversal Struggle and the Prison
Movement
We can therefore see the battle lines drawn for the earliest formulation of

transversal resistance: since the opposition between the non-proletarianized and
proletarianized plebe is fundamental to the economico-political operation of power in
capitalist society, a transformative politics will seek to undermine this division by
crossing over it, creating points of contact as so many bonds of potentially
insurrectionary ferment between the marginalized and proletarianized segments of the
underclasses. Such is already the project suggested in “Intellectuals and Power,” where
the problem is one of constructing lateral lines of alliance, and where the aim is for the
non-proletarianized (‘women, prisoners, conscripted soldiers, hospital patients, and
homosexuals’) to ‘enter into a revolutionary process’ that can be ‘linked to the
revolutionary movement of the proletariat’ insofar as the controls they resist ‘serve the
same system of power.’
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Such, in turn, will be the project of the Prison Information Group, an activist group
organized by Foucault and joined by Deleuze, which took as its “prime objective” the
“reintegration into political struggles” of “that fringe of the lower class,” thereby seeking
to connect the revolts of the non-proletarianized plebe to a greater strategy of popular
resistance so as to help enable “different strata of the people … to overcome conflicts and
oppositions that had been established and maintained between them by the capitalist
system.”425 If, at least for a time, Foucault places particular emphasis on prison revolts
around the world as a form of minoritarian struggle – such revolts orienting both his
political activism in the early 1970s and his genealogy of disciplinary power426 –, this
will be precisely to the extent that the prison is the chief remaining mechanism for
marginalizing and making use of the non-proletarianized population.427 Thus, what the
prison revolts “call into question” is “the status of the marginal plebeian in capitalist
society.”428 And therefore, in turn, the historico-critical function of Foucault’s analytic of
power, aiming to “give direction to this incipient political struggle,” will be to map out
the contingent political operations by which the marginal plebe has been produced,
offering “a critique of the system that explains the process by which contemporary
society marginalizes a part of the population.”429
In sum: the strategy of this early transversal politics, informed by a genealogical
critique of the economico-political operation of power by which the popular masses are
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set against each other, will be to resist these dividing practices by allying different
minoritarian struggles and the workers’ movement, establishing the basis of solidarity for
creating such lateral linkages through the critical diagnosis of the common system of
power they all struggle against. Thus, insofar as the individualizing and normalizing
techniques of subjection proper to the modern microphysics of power – which irrigate
“the whole social body down to its smallest particles,”430 and which deepen the division
between the marginalized and proletarianized – function to adjust the double
accumulation of human beings and capital, the myriad forms of resistance to the thousand
tiny points of power’s exercise will be aligned with the proletarianized plebe. As Deleuze
puts it to Foucault, “Every revolutionary attack or defense, however partial, is linked in
this way to the workers’ struggle.”431
However, to see what is specifically transversal about these connective relations
among and between the minoritarian and proletarianized plebe, we must distinguish this
political strategy from the traditional form of class struggle posed in terms of
‘exploitation’: “as soon as we struggle against exploitation, the proletariat not only leads
the struggle but also defines its targets, its methods, and the places and instruments for
confrontation…. This means total identification.”432 The ‘reintegration’ of the marginal
plebe ‘into political struggles’ does therefore not mean assimilation to the proletariat. On
the contrary, insofar as proletarianization itself effectively consolidates the dominant
social order, what is needed is not the becoming-proletariat of the non-proletarianized
plebe, but rather the becoming-minor of the proletariat. To create transversal connections
430
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between the marginalized and proletarianized plebe would thus be to enable the
radicalization of the latter, for the “truly revolutionary forces” that “exist in our society
today” are “made up of just those strata who are poorly integrated into society, those
strata who are perpetually rejected, and who, in turn, reject the bourgeois moral
system.”433
Indeed, as Foucault will later point out, it was the events of May 1968 that had
demonstrated the practical and theoretical deficiencies of the assimilative tendency of
Marxist thought to re-territorialize the multitude of resistance movements within the
province of class conflict. What was singular in these events is that the exercise of power
itself was called into question on a host of fronts that fall outside the traditional political
domain, thereby problematizing the diffuse and variegated operation of power; Foucault
gives as examples “questions about women, about relations between the sexes, about
medicine, about mental illness, about the environment, about minorities, about
delinquency.”434 In other words, minoritarian struggles generate their political force
precisely from the immediacy and specificity of the relations of power they call into
question: hence Foucault’s claim that it is by singularizing their proper forms of
resistance that the marginalized ‘enter into a revolutionary process.’ The failed attempt to
re-inscribe these questions within the vocabulary of class exploitation thus demonstrated
the “manifest powerlessness on the part of Marxism to confront these problems.”435
What emerges, then, from this new kind of political problematization are precisely
the forms of struggle that Foucault will champion as modes of resistance to the
433
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techniques of subjection by which the exercise of modern power traverses the social field:
“opposition to the power of men over women, of parents over children, of psychiatry over
the mentally ill, of medicine over the population, of administration over the ways people
live.”436 Because the same immanent microphysics of power functions in ‘the most
diverse political regimes, apparatuses or institutions’ – or, to speak with Deleuze, because
these various concrete assemblages effectuate the same diagram of force relations – the
first defining trait of minoritarian forms of oppositional struggle is that they are
“‘transversal’ struggles, that is, …they are not confined to a particular political or
economic form of government”437 but, rather, find common strategic cause more
generally as “struggles against the ‘government of individualization.’”438
Since, whatever the singular conditions of its domain of exercise, this ‘government
of individualization’ operates by blocking lateral relations, the counter-tactics of political
struggle will have a double task: negatively, to “attack everything that separates the
individual, breaks his links with others, splits up community life, forces the individual
back on himself, and ties him to his own identity in a constraining way”439; and positively,
to create non-denumerable multiplicities constituted through the ‘multiplication’ and
‘diverse combinations’ of transversal connections, giving rise to new relational forms and
modes of collective subjectivation.
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Foucault’s analytic of power thus provides the critical propaedeutics necessary for
developing a transversal politics of connection. In the next chapter, we will develop the
positive elaboration of such a politics, which receives perhaps its most systematic
theoretical treatment through Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of minoritarian becoming,
and which then becomes singularized in Foucault’s ethico-political project of becomingqueer.
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CHAPTER 5. TOWARD A THEORY OF TRANSVERSAL POLITICAL AGENCY:
COLLECTIVE MINORITARIAN BECOMINGS

5.1

The Prison Movement and the Problem of Collective Subjectivation: Reconceiving
the ‘Plebe’
We have seen that the aim of Foucault’s early transversal politics is the

singularization of forms of minoritarian struggle that would contest the exercise of power
by undermining the division, maintained through the panoptic courts-police-prison
system and integral to capitalism’s functioning, between the proletariat and the nonproletarianized plebe. Indeed, it is this division among the plebe, rather than the
opposition between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, that orients transversal resistance,
for the very class identity of the proletariat is itself the effect of processes of
proletarianization that consolidate the social hegemony of the bourgeoisie. The chief
objective of transversal politics is to foster connections capable of sparking
insurrectionary ferment across the social field, not by integrating the marginal plebe into
class struggle as defined by the proletariat, but by providing the former with the resources
for articulating and developing its own forms of struggle, and in such a way that the
becoming-revolutionary of the latter is made possible.440
The strategy, in other words, is to intensify or enrich the relational fabric of the
plebeian population so as to multiply and relay the sites of popular contestation to
440
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power’s exercise, problematizing the dividing practices that support the economicopolitical function of power. I will refer to this as the connective strategy of transversal
resistance, which remains a fundamental feature of both Foucault and Deleuze’s politics
long after the prison movement.
Before charting the later developments of this strategy, however, it is worth
considering the case of the Prison Information Group (GIP) in more detail, both as
regards its stated objectives and ultimate limitations. In the last chapter’s discussion of
the anti-transversal operation of disciplinary power, we saw how a system of lateral
invisibility satisfies the first condition for the panoptic organization of a disciplinary
space, guaranteeing the productive, controlled ordering of a human multiplicity by
isolating its elements and subordinating them to a centralized authority. Such is the
cellular technique of partitioning by which a potentially unruly mass is transformed into a
denumerable and controllable set of individuals – or, as we have seen Deleuze and
Guattari put it, into a ‘subjugated group,’ a rigidly hierarchized and individualizing form
of collectivity. In the case of prisons, where inmates become the objects of a form of
knowledge (criminology, sociology, psychiatry, psychology, etc.) of which they are also
subjects (to the extent they internalize it), the prisoner “must not speak and be listened to,
but rather must reply to questions that he is posed so that his responses can then be
examined. The condemned effectively exist in the plural only by virtue of a ‘scientific’
discourse held by any given official. … Thus can it be assured that they will form nothing
other than a collection, never a collective movement itself bringing to bear its own form
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of reflection [jamais un mouvement collectif porteur lui-même de sa proper
reflexion].”441
The aim of the GIP is thus to facilitate a counter-network of transversal connections
that would cross over and thereby undermine the instituted system of lateral blockage and
normalizing individualization, a connective strategy operating on two levels: (1)
establishing lines of communication and possible alliance among prisoners themselves,
both within and between prisons; and (2) enabling the construction of such lines between
prisoners and the greater population. As Foucault puts it:
We want to break up the double isolation in which the inmates find themselves:
through our inquiry, we want for them to be able to communicate with each other,
to relay to each other what they know, and to speak with each other from prison to
prison, cell to cell. We want for them to address themselves to the population and
for the population to speak to them. These experiences, these isolated revolts must
be transformed into communal knowledge and coordinated practice.442
The means employed by the GIP may seem relatively modest, e.g., distributing
questionnaires among, and collecting and publishing the responses of, the inmate
population, so that they could have the occasion to both speak out and speak to one
another about the conditions of their own confinement. However, the objective of this
project was much farther-reaching: namely, to help enable prisoners to constitute
themselves as what Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus term a ‘subject-group,’ or what
they will later call a ‘collective assemblage of enunciation.’ In other words, the point was
to spark a process of collective subjectivation, whereby those who compose a
marginalized population would generate a political counter-force by transforming the
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Foucault, “Préface, in Livrozet (S.), De la prison à la révolte,” Dits et écrits I, 1264, my translation.
Foucault, “(Sur les prisons)”, Dits et écrits I, 1044, my translation.
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conditions of what can be said, and by whom, regarding the intolerable exercise of power
over them.
Because inmates had only ever been, as Foucault puts it in Discipline and Punish,
‘the object of information, never a subject in communication,’ the attempt to transform
the prison population into an assemblage of enunciation should be understood as an effort
to realize a new form of collective political agency by intervening in the field of
discursive practices.443 By forming a counter-discourse, a set of relays through which
‘isolated revolts’ would be connected to compose ‘communal knowledge and coordinated
practice,’ the aim was for prisoners to singularize their own mode of struggle, contesting
the mechanisms by which the panoptic structure of ‘double isolation’ had effectively
rendered them silent and invisible. In this way, a political group subject could emerge
through the construction of a shared form of expression: one bearing witness to a set of
otherwise marginalized experiences of ‘the intolerable,’444 and articulating a form of
otherwise excluded reflection proper to those over whom power is exercised intolerably.
443

As Deleuze puts it: “It’s an oversimplification, but the goal of the GIP was for the inmates themselves
and their families to be able to speak, to speak for themselves. That was not the case before. Whenever
there was a show on prisons, you had representatives of all those who dealt closely with prisons: judges,
lawyers, prison guards, volunteers, philanthropists, anyone except inmates themselves or even former
inmates. Like when you do a conference on elementary school and everyone is there except the children,
even though they have something to say. The goal of the GIP was less to make them talk than to design a
place where people would be forced to listen to them, a place that was not reduced to a riot on the prison
roof, but would ensure that what they had to say came through” (Deleuze, “Foucault and Prison,” Two
Regimes of Madness, 277).
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“Intolérable” is the title of the collection of five booklets published by the GIP between February 1971
and January 1973, the opening slogan of which reads: “Courts cops hospitals asylums school military
service the press the TV the State and first of all the prisons are intolerable” (cited and translated by
Alberto Toscano, “The Intolerable-Inquiry: The Documents of the Groupe d’information sur les prisons,”
Viewpoint Magazine, Issue 3: Workers’ Inquiry, September 25, 2013). Toscano continues: “Refusing the
horizon of ‘reformism,’ they [the GIP] declare that allowing prisoners to speak on their own behalf, and
using the group to transmit their speech and writing to other prisoners, is ‘the only means to unify in the
same struggle the inside and outside of the prison’ (16). It is not a matter of inculcating the ‘consciousness
of oppression,’ which could hardly be absent, nor knowledge of who the enemy is, a daily experience;
rather, it is a question of countering the manner in which the means of formulating, expressing, and
organizing this consciousness are systematically quashed and confiscated” (ibid).
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In other words, as it had been in History of Madness, the political problem for
Foucault is again that of providing the conditions of material expression for an intensive
form of excluded experience – that “most intense point of a life, the point where its
energy is concentrated, … where it comes up against power, struggles with it, attempts to
use its forces or evade its traps”445 –, only now that experience is collective and directly
constitutes a kind of limit-relation with power. This is the limit-experience of political
uprising, which we will examine in greater detail in Chapter 6; and the form of critical
thought that attends it is a kind of subversive minoritarian knowledge, “a thinking [pensée]
of infraction intrinsic to the infraction itself; a certain reflection on the law tied to the
active refusal of the law; a certain analysis of power and law practiced by those who daily
struggle against law and power.”446 The objective of the GIP is for such thinking, which
Foucault calls a “philosophy of the people,” to acquire, “through revolt and struggles, the
force to express itself [la force de s’exprimer].”447 In turn, insofar as this counterdiscourse would call into question the divisions sustaining the more general economicopolitical function of power in capitalist society, the prison movement could be allied to
other forms of minoritarian struggle: hence the importance of establishing lines of
communication between prisoners and the outside world.
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However, Foucault himself was disappointed by what he deemed to be the failure of
the GIP,448 ultimately concluding that the production and capitalization of a delinquent
population – which, as we saw in Chapter 3, was central to the separation instituted
between the marginal plebe and the proletariat – had so thoroughly divested criminality
of its subversive force that “[d]elinquents serve economic and political society.”449 It is
almost as though Foucault, having turned from literature to criminality as a more concrete
(thus shareable) form of transgression, in turn is compelled to call into question the very
“political value of transgression,”450 or at least of the structure of exteriority it implies.
In any event, the shortcomings of the prison movement mirror the failings of
Foucault’s literary politics to the extent that in both cases, what had previously
constituted an exterior form of contestation to society has been interiorized by the
capitalist social formation and converted into an instrument of economic or political
utility:
Until the late 18th century, it was possible for there to exist an uncertainty, a
permanent passage running from crime to political confrontation. Theft, arson,
assassination were all ways of attacking the established power. From the 19th
century, …the real aim [of the new penal system] was to create a specific
criminalized sphere, a sector that must be isolated from the rest of the population.
Therefore, this sector lost a large part of its critical political function. And this
sector, this separated minority was used by power to inspire fear in the rest of the
population, so as to control revolutionary movements and sabotage them. For
example, labor unions. … Furthermore, it was lucrative, for instance, with
448

See Deleuze, “Foucault and Prison,” Two Regimes of Madness, 277. For his part, Deleuze emphasizes
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prostitution, or the trafficking of women and arms, and now with drug trafficking.
At present, since the 19th century, criminals have lost any sort revolutionary
dynamism. I am convinced of it.451
The criminalized segment of society thus failed to generate the kind of political
movement that could enter into transversal alliances with other minoritarian struggles, or
with the worker’s struggle, and thereby counteract the divisions that neutralize and
control the plebeian population.
We may put Foucault’s conclusion more generally by saying that the early effort to
realize a transversal politics was ultimately inadequate insofar as it did not give rise to a
sufficient process of collective subjectivation, whereby a human multiplicity would form
itself in such a way as to constitute transformative political agency.452 In other words, the
Prison Information Group was unable to create the conditions for the emergence of a new
assemblage of enunciation, at least one capable of modifying the exercise of power; for
the delinquent population largely proved to have already been produced and organized as
a subjugated group by capitalist society, and, as Deleuze puts the point on a separate
occasion, “[c]ounter-information is only effective when it becomes an act of
resistance.”453
Further, without diminishing the import of the divisions that rive the social field,
and despite his critical displacement of the traditional Marxist binarism, Foucault will
also come to implicitly criticize the class-based analysis that had informed his own view
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of the divided plebe.454 In an interview with Jacques Rancière in 1977, he suggests that
the plebe itself must be reconceived, no longer as a macro-political statistical aggregate,
but as an intensive vector or micro-political movement of revolt:
No doubt the ‘plebe’ should not be conceived as the permanent ground of history,
the final goal of all forms of subjection, or the inextinguishable hotbed of all revolts.
No doubt there is no sociological reality of the ‘plebe.’ But there is certainly always
something, in the social body, in classes, in groups, in individuals themselves that in
a way escapes relations of power; something that is not a more or less docile or
resistant prime matter, but a centrifugal movement, inverse energy, or breakthrough
[l’échappée]. ‘The’ plebe no doubt does not exist, but there is something ‘of the’
plebe [il y a ‘de la’ plèbe]. There is something of the plebe in bodies and in souls; it
is there in individuals, in the proletariat, in the bourgeoisie, but with irreducibly
diverse extension, forms, and energies. This plebeian part [part de plèbe] is less the
exterior with regard to power relations than their limit, their other side, their
backlash; it is what responds to every one of power’s advances with a movement to
free itself; it is thus what drives every new development of power networks. … To
take the point of view of the plebe, which is that of the other side or limit in relation
to power, is thus indispensable for analyzing power’s apparatuses [dispotifs]; it is
from this perspective that the functioning and developments of power can be
grasped.455
If the plebe is still to be considered the source of political contestation, this will no
longer be as a molar structure or macro-sociological entity – e.g., as the set of radical
underclasses in Foucault’s earlier account of the plebe as marginalized population
segment; or as the proletarian class in Marxism’s account of the plebe as universal patient
of domination and agent of historical revolution –, but instead as a kind of molecular
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counterforce, the germ of insurrection that traverses the social field. The plebe should not
be understood as a substantive group identity, but as a processual quality referring to the
‘breakthrough’ or ‘centrifugal movement’ of that which ‘escapes relations of power,’
which is why Foucault emphasizes the term ‘of the’ plebe rather than ‘the’ plebe. In other
words, Foucault reframes the plebe as an intensive, micro-political concept rather than an
extensive, macro-political one. Indeed, we could speak here of a becoming-plebe,
designating what Foucault several years earlier had referred to as “the force of flight,”456
or what, as we will examine shortly, Deleuze and Guattari had already named ‘line of
flight’ in Anti-Oedipus.457
Moreover, in the same move, Foucault also recasts the concept of the outside,458
which had been privileged in his early vertical politics of transgression; for ‘centrifugal,’
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literally ‘center-fleeing,’ refers to a line of force whose movement is directed outward.
The thought of the outside is still a thought of resistance, but the outside is no longer a
spatial category, instead qualifying a mode of trajectory. Thus, the ‘part de plèbe’ is not
‘exterior’ to power or somewhere else beyond it, but rather is a vector of force that breaks
from and flees the exercise of power, constituting the latter’s ‘limit.’
In turn, if plebeian breakthroughs form the limit of power, or that which is
ultimately irreducible to its exercise, this is because their ‘inverse energy’ is what the
‘functioning and developments of power’ aim to – but can never fully – block, defuse, or
capture. As we have already seen in the case of discipline, power functions by organizing,
inciting, and controlling the actions and forces of individuals, which Foucault by 1977
had begun formulating generally as ‘governmentalization,’ or the set of techniques for
governing the conduct of men.459 But since power is thus, as Foucault will later put it, “a
set of actions on possible actions,”460 the possibility of acting-otherwise must remain
relatively open to those upon whom power is exercised. 461 That is, in order for a relation
of power to obtain, resistance in the form of human beings composing and conducting
459
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themselves differently must be a permanent possibility, one which explains the status
accorded these centrifugal movements as the motive force that ‘drives every new
development of power networks.’ These lines or forces of flight therefore acquire a
strategic primacy with respect to the operation of power, anticipating Foucault’s betterknown assessment five years later in “The Subject and Power” that his analytic approach
“consists in taking the forms of resistance against different forms of power as a starting
point…[,] using this resistance as a chemical catalyst so as to bring to light power
relations, locate their position, find out their point of application and the methods
used.”462
‘To take the point of view of the plebe’ is thus to adopt the perspective from the
limit or degree zero of power’s exercise – from that point which no operation of power
can fully capture or control, save by destroying it and thereby ending the relation – so as
to better disclose how relations of power have been constituted (their singular historical
contingency, rather than universal necessity), how they actually function, and how they
might be subverted. Here sounds an echo, to which we will return in Chapter 6, of the
earlier perspective of vertical critique (discussed in Chapter 3), which situated itself at the
limit or degree zero of history in order to apprehend the reactive or exclusionary founding
gesture that reveals a form of positivism as other than what it purports to be.463
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Forces of contestation, then, do not issue from a site that would be radically exterior
to the social formation, but rather course immanently throughout the ‘social body’ itself.
They cut across the lines of molar segmentarity or division, traversing individuals, groups,
and classes; and in each case these forces are singularized and therefore ‘irreducibly
diverse’ with respect to their local conditions. The connective strategy continues to
animate the project of transversal politics, but in order to more adequately respond to the
problem of collective subjectivation, the lateral lines of alliance to be created will have to
begin at the micro-political level of intensive becomings or lines of flight, rather than the
molar level where these forces have already been integrated into and rigidified as group
or class aggregates.464 In other words, the movements to be connected will be molecular
impulses to revolt that can arise ‘in individuals, in the proletariat, in the bourgeoisie,’
rather than macropolitical campaigns waged on the terrain of group identity, or in the
name of a set of class (or underclass) interests.465
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conceive of a molecular women’s politics that slips into molar confrontations, and passes under or through
them” (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 276).
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The plebe, in sum, is reconceived as so many vectors of centrifugal force: a
multiplicity of lines of flight, which constitute an immanent limit-relation to power; the
perspective of which illuminates the functioning of power; and the transversal connection
of which forms the new strategy of resistance to power. To put the point in the language
of Deleuze and Guattari from A Thousand Plateaus, published three years later in 1980,
the plebe is reconceived as a mass, rather than a class.466 And indeed, it is the second
volume of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, taking up and responding to Foucault’s
microphysics of force relations, that will provide a more fully developed theoretical
treatment of this kind of transformative transverse multiplicity.

5.2

The Line of Flight and Revolutionary Subject-Groups: The Case of George Jackson
Deleuze and Guattari’s account of transversal politics in A Thousand Plateaus can

be understood as a development of two related concepts already at work in Anti-Oedipus:
namely, (1) the line of flight and (2) the subject-group, understood in qualitative
contradistinction to the subjugated group. While we have already encountered both
concepts, let us return to them in more detail, for they contain the key to understanding
how transversality, as the principle of “connection-creation”467 by which non-
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denumerable multiplicities are formed, serves as a condition for the realization of
transformative political agency.
We initially encountered the phrase ligne de fuite in Chapter 3, with Foucault using
it somewhat obscurely to indicate the movement by which literature frees language from
its representational function.468 That is, the ‘line of flight’ first refers to the vertical mode
of speech or writing as a decoded flow of language, or as language escaping its social
codification, no longer consumable as the horizontal conveyance of meaning. Foucault’s
thesis was that this ‘secret verticality’ or ‘structural esotericism’ of literature rendered it
intolerable to the culture whose codes it threatened and whose conditions of thought it
undermined: “Such speech is transgressive … in its play,” that is, through the “obscure
and central liberation of speech at the heart of itself, its uncontrollable flight to a region
that is always dark, which no culture can accept immediately.”469 Thus, already in
Foucault’s early work, a line of flight suggests the expressive realization of that which is
irreducible to and subversive of the social formation.
In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari begin to use the concept more systematically.
Though the term does not appear as ubiquitously as it will in A Thousand Plateaus, ‘line
of flight’ refers to the radical schizophrenic line, or decoded flows of desire in their pure
state, which, as we saw in Chapter 3, are warded off by primitive and imperial societies
(through processes of coding and overcoding, respectively) and axiomatized by capitalist
societies. In other words, ‘line of flight’ describes the trajectory of the first regime of
468
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madness: what had designated an expressive ‘line of force’ in Foucault, a transgressive
vertical vector connecting unreason and literature, here becomes “the schizophrenic line
of flight or breakthrough,”470 or “the pure schizophrenic process of
deterritorialization.”471 If the problem of the two regimes of madness concerns how to
prevent the schizoid breakthrough from descending into a catatonic breakdown, then,
anticipating A Thousand Plateaus, this problem can be reposed as follows: how can the
deterritorializing force of a line of flight be sustained, without it either becoming
reterritorialized and defused in social institutions (e.g., in the asylum as an ‘apparatus of
capture,’ to use Foucault’s term from Psychiatric Power), or else collapsing into what
Deleuze and Guattari will call a ‘line of abolition’ (e.g., in suicide)?472 As we saw in the
last chapter, the key to answering this question will lie in the concept of transversal
connection.
Now, we have also seen that Anti-Oedipus poses the political problem of desire in
terms of the direct libidinal investments of the socio-historical field, offering a
microphysical analysis of how ‘desiring-production’ is constitutive of social production.
On this account, there are two qualitatively different ways in which desire invests the
social, that is, two kinds of “unconscious social investment”473: on the one hand, a

470

Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 316-7, translation slightly modified. Cf.: “In Search of Lost Time as
a great enterprise of schizoanalysis: all the planes are traversed until their molecular line of flight is reached,
their schizophrenic breakthrough” (ibid, 318, translation slightly modified).
471
Ibid, 283.
472
As will be discussed below, this problem can be more generally translated into the register of A
Thousand Plateaus as follows: how can a process of positive absolute deterritorialization (lines of flight
freed, connected, composing a transverse or non-denumerable multiplicity) be sustained, without it either
becoming a negative relative deterritorialization (lines of flight blocked, reterritorialized through rigid
segmentation), or else becoming a negative absolute deterritorialization (lines of flight deprived connection,
turning into lines of destruction)?
473
Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 277.

191
“segregative”474 kind, corresponding to the pole of “paranoiac molar investment”475; and
on the other hand, a “nomadic”476 kind, corresponding to the pole of “the molecular
schizophrenic line of flight.”477 Segregative investments capture desire in centralized
molar aggregates, such as the nuclear family and its oedipal triangle, and organize
subjugated groups, i.e., human multiplicities that are both hierarchical and
individualizing.478 By contrast, nomadic investments are of a “schizorevolutionary type”
and “follow the lines of flight of desire,” assembling “groups-in-fusion … at the
periphery,”479 which is to say, composing minoritarian subject-groups by freeing and
connecting decoded flows of desire. The project of schizo-politics, intervening at the
molecular level of the social field, will be to facilitate nomadic investments of desire and
thereby, through the transversal ‘fusion’ of lines of flight, to prepare a multiply-centered
revolutionary movement.480 Just what such a politics consists in, will be the aim of this
chapter to elucidate.
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Generally, then, we may say that the concept of the line of flight provides the
evaluative criterion for distinguishing two kinds of human multiplicity. If, as we have
seen Foucault put it, there is a qualitative difference between the group as “the organic
bond uniting hierarchized individuals” and the group as “a constant generator of deindividualization”481; and if lines of flight constitute so many vectors of
deterritorialization, which, as we saw in last chapter’s epigraph and will detail below,
impel the co-becoming and de-individualization of the points they pass transversally
between and sweep away; then how a group relates to its lines of flight will reflect the
kind of group it is.
In short, subjugated groups are organized by blocking, excluding, or capturing lines
of flight, whereas subject-groups are composed by ‘following,’ quickening, and
connecting them. This is related to why classes, as molar aggregates in which desire is
represented as ‘interest,’ cannot provide a suitable basis for revolutionary political
movements; for “the revolutionary knows that escape [la fuite] is revolutionary,”482 a
form of active resistance to power’s operations of capture, and such lines of flight are
molecular processes. That is, transformative agency is realized at the micropolitical level:
“In the subjugated groups, desire is still defined by an order of causes and aims, and itself
weaves a whole system of macroscopic relations that determine the large aggregates
under a formation of sovereignty. Subject-groups on the other hand have as their sole
cause a rupture with causality, a revolutionary line of flight….”483
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A particularly salient example of such a ‘revolutionary line of flight’ comes by way
of Deleuze’s involvement with the GIP. As Michelle Koerner has argued, Deleuze’s
development of the line of flight concept emerges, at least in part, from his ‘encounter’
with George Jackson, a radical black thinker, writer, and militant killed during a San
Quentin prison riot on August 21, 1971.484 When Deleuze and Guattari first introduce the
phrase lignes de fuite in Anti-Oedipus, speaking of the revolutionary force of ‘the lines of
flight of desire,’ they refer to Jackson in doing so: “What matters is to break through the
wall, even if one has to become black like John Brown. George Jackson. ‘I may take
flight, but all the while I am fleeing, I will be looking for a weapon!’”485
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See Koerner, “Line of Escape: Gilles Deleuze’s Encounter with George Jackson,” Genre 44.2 (2011),
157-80. The ‘assassination’ of Jackson had been the topic of the GIP’s third publication, which, though
originally authored anonymously (as all the GIP’s publications were), includes pieces by Foucault and
(likely) Deleuze. See Toscano, “The Intolerable-Inquiry”: “Intolérable 3 internationalizes the scope of the
GIP, to present a dossier on the assassination of Black Panther prison militant George Jackson and the
conditions of American prisons (this will also be the object of Michel Foucault’s later interview about his
visit to Attica). Responding to the far more explicitly political character – the ‘revolutionary function’ (154)
– of the US prison movement, the … booklet begins with a trenchantly lyrical preface by Jean Genet, with
ample quotes from Jackson’s Soledad Brother, Blood in my Eye and other texts. … This is followed by two
1971 interviews with Jackson, where he stresses the military side of his vision, but also makes allusion to
the Maoist need to inquire into order to ‘try to painstakingly determine what each one can do for the
construction of the commune’ (170), to ‘reconstruct the world of the people’ (177). The GIP follows this
with a text on the ‘war’ in the prisons…, ‘The Masked Assassination,’ which provides a summary of the
events leading up to Jackson’s death, and of the campaign of disinformation and counter-offensive. … A
further text analyses the aftermath and underlines (perhaps under Deleuze’s pen) Jackson’s ‘line of flight’
as proof that power is not a seamless moloch, that ‘everything escapes power, beginning with what it does,
what it conspires about but does not dominate. The murder of Jackson is one of these things, a line of flight,
as Jackson would have said, to which revolutionaries commit themselves’ (209). The final text in
Intolérable 3, ‘Jackson’s Place in the Prison Movement’, echoing some of Foucault’s own reflections on
the marginal plebs (let’s not forget that ‘the Lumpen’ was a key political category for the Black Panther
Party), advances Jackson’s idea of prisons as a fulcrum for the creation of revolutionaries as a positive
challenge to the incorporation of bourgeois ideologies about crime into the labour movement.”
485
Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 277. They quote this line again eight years later in A Thousand
Plateaus, still in reference to the revolutionary political force of lines of flight: “It is on lines of flight that
new weapons are invented to be turned against the heavy arms of the state. ‘I may be running, but I’m
looking for a gun as I go’ (George Jackson)” (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 204, translation
slightly modified). The actual quote from Jackson, which is slightly distorted in its retranslation back to
English from the French, reads as follows: “I may run, but all the while that I am, I’ll be looking for a stick”
(Cited in Koerner, “Line of Escape,” 160).

194
The ‘breakthrough,’ still an intensive experience or decoded flow of desire, is also a
breakout or uprising, which is to say, direct collective contestation. Indeed, on Koerner’s
reading, for Jackson, who depicted his own prison writings as “a message from the
hunted running blacks to those people of this society who profess to want to change the
conditions that destroy life,”486 ‘running’ or taking flight is a life-affirming expression
and experience of revolt. Since power in “the contemporary racist, capitalist social order”
is “essentially predatory,” operating through techniques of policing and capture to bring
about the “disproportionate criminalization of peoples of color, the poor, and workingclass populations,”487 to free or follow a line of flight is thus to actively resist what
Jackson calls “captive society.”488 As Deleuze puts it in 1977, again with reference to
Jackson, “[n]othing is more active than an escape.”489
Moreover, Jackson offers precisely the kind of ‘philosophy of the people’ of which
Foucault speaks, i.e., ‘a certain analysis of power and law practiced by those who daily
struggle against law and power’; for he “reject[s] moralizing political discourses that
separate ‘criminal mentality’ from ‘revolutionary mentality’” and instead “affirms that
aspect of criminality that expresses a desire to escape intolerable social conditions of
captivity.”490 In a manner that may well have informed Foucault’s own views on the
privileged position of the marginal plebe, “Jackson repeatedly situates the ‘lumpenproletariat’ — from the kid on the street to the convict doing life in prison — on the front
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line of the class and race war.”491 The minoritarian political project to singularize a mode
of struggle proper to the criminalized plebe would thus aim to transform the ‘criminal
mentality’ into a ‘revolutionary’ one, which was precisely a main aspiration of the
GIP.492
In turn, one way for such a project to be realized would be the collective becomingrevolutionary of blackness, or what Deleuze and Guattari term ‘becoming-black,’ since,
on Jackson’s view, the contemporary social formation “codes blackness as criminality”493
so as to maintain the “existing conditions of capture, enslavement, and incarceration.”494
The line of flight as decoded flow of insurrectionist desire – the desire to escape the
intolerable – would thus impel a radical process of subjectivation, transvaluing the
categories of blackness and criminality alike. To ‘become black like John Brown’ (AntiOedipus), a militant white anti-racist abolitionist, is to absolutely reject the dominant
social order by precipitating what Deleuze and Guattari will call “the becoming-minor of
the major”495 (in this example, the becoming-black of the white), which is to say, by
quickening “an escape from the norms of the ‘majority standard’ and a disinvestment

491
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from social arrangements that privilege whiteness: ‘Non-white: we all have to become
that, whether we are white, yellow, or black.’”496
Becoming-black and becoming-nonwhite can therefore be understood as
micropolitical processes, what A Thousand Plateaus will theorize as ‘minoritarian
becomings,’ the basis for which is not inclusion in a substantive group identity by way of
‘organic bond’ (Foucault), but solidarity against the racially coded dividing practices of
power in ‘captive society’: “Even blacks, as the Black Panthers said, must become-black.
… Becoming-minoritarian is a political affair and necessitates ... an active micropolitics.
… As Faulkner said, to avoid ending up a fascist there was no other choice but to
become-black.”497 Just as with Foucault’s intensive or micropolitical rearticulation of
becoming-plebe – where what one becomes (‘of the’ plebe, de la plebe) refers to a vector
of escape or ‘centrifugal movement’ of revolt, rather than membership in a
macrosociological aggregate –, so, too, blackness refers to the processual quality of that
which flees or breaks with an oppressive arrangement of power relations.
Minoritarian becoming is always a matter of transforming a segregative schema of
social relations through the creation of nomadic counter-practices of collective
subjectivation. The fascist mode of group subjection, paranoid about purity, organizes
race reactively in terms of exclusion, as in the historical ‘one-drop rule’ for determining
whiteness in the United States. By contrast, the processes of becoming-nonwhite or
becoming-black would actively resist the hierarchical racial segmentation of society by
breaking free from the codes governing the normalized identities of raced subjugated
496
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groups – e.g., by rejecting the value of purity in favor of the heterogeneity of ‘diverse
combinations’ (Foucault) –, creating connections that cross over and undermine the molar
lines of division segmenting the social field.
Such is the kind of subject-group formed by the collectivity of San Quentin
prisoners who spoke out in the wake of Jackson’s assassination, announcing the
compositional principle of their own alliance in terms of the ‘daily struggle’ against
intolerably predatory conditions of ‘prison-slavery,’ and seeking to construct a network
of popular supports on the outside:
We, the twenty-seven united black, brown, and white prison-slaves of the maximum
security cellblock of San Quentin penitentiary, are the victims of an assassination
conspiracy, exactly like the one which ended the life of our comrade G.L. Jackson
…. In this prison, there are black, brown, and white comrades who don’t belong to
any particular political organization. All that we are asking for is the support of the
people in our daily struggle. … What we are affirming now is this: we need
everyone’s help, whether s/he is an outlaw, a pimp, a prostitute, a priest or a doctor
of philosophy. … We are not grieving, we are not crying over the death of our
beloved comrade George Jackson. He brought courage to our hearts and spirits, and
he taught us how to pursue his ideals. He made the ultimate sacrifice, and his black
blood is the nourishment that gives us the resolution to fight against the crushing
forces of oppression.498
Jackson’s line of becoming-black, i.e., the collective micropolitical process he initiated to
revolutionize the criminal mentality, thus helped to singularize a local form of
minoritarian struggle (that of the criminalized plebe), giving rise to a racially complex,
unified prison movement allied through the shared desire to insurrect against a common
regime of power.
Indeed, on Foucault’s view, it is precisely due to Jackson’s efficacy as an agent of
political transformation that he was targeted for assassination. Both outside the prison,
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through the expressive force of his writings, which indicted the racial and economicopolitical injustice of ‘captive’ (or what Foucault would call ‘carceral’) society; and inside
the prison, where “he helped to develop” his fellow prisoners’ “political consciousness …
so that they could fight, by all means necessary, fascist methods of repression and
dehumanization”499; Jackson unleashed a nomadic investment of desire, preparing so
many schizorevolutionary lines of flight whose connection would generate subversive
political force. “He was killed specifically when the time he had announced and worked
for came, when a growing awareness among ‘the blacks, the browns, and the whites’
allowed for the identification of the deceptive traps of organized racism. This process
marked the beginning of the formation of a unified resistance front, specifically within
the prisons.”500
In sum, the case of George Jackson illustrates the concept of the line of flight as an
active-affirmative force of revolt, or of insurrectionary desire, taking form through a
collective process of minoritarian becoming that would contest the exercise of power
proper to the dominant social order (in this case, the racist, capitalist social formation).
And even though, as we have seen, the prison movement was unable to realize the
political agency to which it aspired, the basic form of transversal politics will remain: that
is, the project of constructing revolutionary subject-groups, or quickening processes of
becoming-revolutionary, by freeing and connecting lines of flight.
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5.3

The Principle of Transversal Connection: A Double Condition for Transformative
Political Agency
All the analytical pieces should now be in place to present the general project of

transversal politics in A Thousand Plateaus. The opening distinction is that drawn
between the two kinds of human multiplicity, only Deleuze and Guattari will now refer to
‘subjugated groups’ as “arborescent” or “macro-multiplicities,” and to ‘subject-groups’ as
“rhizomatic” or “micro-multiplicities.”501 The basic organizational features of
arborescent multiplicities are hierarchical centralization, totalization, and rigid
segmentation, whereas rhizomes are centrifugal, open, and mutable. Macro-multiplicities
cut off or capture their lines of flight, blocking lateral relations among their constituent
elements (everything flowing along hierarchical and centralized lines), whereas the line
of flight is the very constitutive force of micro-multiplicities. Indeed, rhizomatic
multiplicities are “defined by the outside: by the abstract line, the line of flight or
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deterritorialization according to which they change in nature and connect with other
multiplicities.”502
The first two principles of rhizomatic composition are therefore “connection” and
“heterogeneity,”503 which describe, as it were, both the endogenous and exogenous
construction of micro-multiplicities, since a rhizomatic multiplicity itself composed of
heterogeneous connections is in turn transformed by entering into new heterogeneous
connections with other rhizomes.504 This line of ‘connection-creation’ or, to use
Guattari’s term, heterogenesis – the line of flight or deterritorialization that defines a
micro-multiplicity, both its consistency and trajectory – is a line of co-becoming or
“transversal communication.”505 In short, the transversal line designates the force of
flight, or collective process of becoming, constitutive of a rhizomatic multiplicity.
Formally, the difference in kind between the two types of multiplicity can be
analyzed in terms of the different modes of relation that obtain in each case between lines
and points. “What constitutes arborescence is the submission of the line to the point,”
whereas the “line of becoming” proper to a rhizomatic multiplicity “is not defined by
points that it connects, or by points that compose it; on the contrary, it passes between
points, it comes up through the middle, it runs perpendicular to the points first perceived,
transversally to the localized relation to distant or contiguous points.”506 Arborescent
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multiplicities thus form ‘punctual’ or ‘unilinear systems,’ while rhizomes form
‘multilinear systems.’

5.3.1

Arborescence, Striation, Segmentarity

Deleuze and Guattari summarize the features of a punctual or unilinear system as
follows:
(1) Systems of this kind comprise two base lines, horizontal and vertical; they serve
as coordinates for assigned points. (2) The horizontal line can be superposed
vertically and the vertical line can be moved horizontally, in such a way that new
points are produced or reproduced…. (3) From one point to another, a line can (or
cannot) be drawn, but if it can it takes the form of a localizable connection;
diagonals thus play the role of connectors between points of different levels or
moments…. These systems are arborescent, mnemonic, molar, structural; they are
systems of territorialization or reterritorialization. The line and the diagonal remain
totally subordinated to the point because they serve as coordinates for a point or as
localizable connections for two points, running from one point to another.507
A unilinear or punctual system forms a coordinate grid, such as the Cartesian
coordinates, by which a space becomes measurable, which is to say, homogeneous.508 In
such a system, diagonal lines are subordinated to the points they conjoin, where one point
is located along the horizontal baseline and the other, along the vertical. (It should be
noted that the notion of verticality operative here is not the special Foucauldian kind
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treated in Chapter 2 above and again in Chapter 5 below, but rather designates a
hierarchical axis of power.) The form of relation proper to this conjoining, which Deleuze
and Guattari here term a ‘localizable connection,’ is precisely what, as we saw in Chapter
3, they elsewhere specify as conjugation in contradistinction to connection: that is, a form
of relation between “decoded and deterritorialized flows” that, rather than enabling them
to “boost one another [and] accelerate their shared escape,” instead institutes “their
relative stoppage, like a point of accumulation that plugs or seals the lines of flight,
performs a general reterritorialization, and brings their flows under the dominance of a
single flow capable of overcoding them.”509
We have already encountered such a system in Foucault’s analysis of the ‘antinomadic’ (Discipline and Punish) denumerating function of disciplinary multiplicities,
realized through the cellular partitioning of space that individualizes elements by
blocking their lateral connections. Take the Panoptic arrangement: on any given row
(horizontal circular ring), any single cell is isolated from every other cell along that
horizontal line, cut off through the system of lateral invisibility; but every point along the
horizontal line is also subject to a permanent axial visibility, the axis of which is defined
by the diagonal line that establishes a ‘localizable connection’ or ‘conjugation’ between
the cell and the central watchtower; and the watchtower, in turn, constitutes a point along
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the vertical baseline, the apex of the “verticon.”510 This system institutes a unidirectional
hierarchical flow running from a centralized authority to the individuals subjected to it;
and the ‘line and the diagonal remain totally subordinated to the point’ because the
diagonal line’s function is to set into fixed relation a horizontal point with a vertical
one.511
The subordination of the diagonal, which is also the stoppage of the transversal,
thus designates the subjugation of the group.512 Deleuze and Guattari refer to this
organizational principle of punctual or unilinear systems as the ‘striation’ of space: “a
system in which transversals are subordinated to diagonals, diagonals to horizontals and
verticals, and horizontals and verticals to points…, expresses the formal conditions under
which a space is striated.”513 The construction of striated space, in turn, is the technique
the State employs for its basic stratifying operation – that is, for the production of what
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disciplining of men” through the modern military, “but also the industrial production of weapons”: “But the
State apparatus, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, found a new way of appropriating the war
machine: by subjugating it before all else to the Work-model of the construction site and factory, which
were in the process of developing elsewhere, but more slowly. The war machine was perhaps the first thing
to be striated, to produce an abstract labor-time whose results could be multiplied and operations divided”
(Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 490). Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of striated space would
thus seem to come by way of Foucault’s analysis of disciplinary partitioning.
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we have seen Foucault, in a passage also cited by Deleuze and Guattari in their
“Apparatus of Capture” chapter, term ‘denumerable and controllable multiplicities’514:
The State … operates by stratification; in other words, it forms a vertical,
hierarchized aggregate that spans the horizontal lines in a dimension of depth. In
retaining given elements, it necessarily cuts off their relations with other elements,
which become exterior, it inhibits, slows down, or controls those relations…. Thus
the central power of the State is hierarchical…; the center is not in the middle (au
milieu), but on top, because the only way it can recombine what it isolates is
through subordination.515
Formally speaking, to stratify is to organize a hierarchically centralized multiplicity,
a pyramidal unilinear system of reterritorialization in which the vertical axis ‘spans’ or
extends over ‘the horizontal lines in a dimension of depth,’ that is, along the diagonal.
The diagonal is subordinated to the horizontal and vertical it conjugates; and each
‘localizable connection’ between a vertical point of authority and an isolated horizontal
point constitutes an individualizing relation of subjection. A punctual or unilinear system
is therefore a denumerable multiplicity – totalizing and individualizing, ‘recombining
what it isolates through subordination’ –, the order or governability of which is
guaranteed by striating space, ‘cutting off’ or ‘controlling’ the relations among its
constituent elements and preventing ‘any relation that is not supervised by authority’
(Foucault). In other words, the subordinated diagonal designates the exclusive relational
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modality of an arborescent multiplicity (conjugation), the defining formal feature of what
Foucault, regarding the asylum, first termed an “apparatus of capture.”516
In short, the subordination of the diagonal expresses the operation of capture,
whether the ‘apparatus of capture’ in question refers to a specific disciplinary institution
or, as for Deleuze and Guattari six years later, to the State more generally.517 Proper to
both cases is the striation of space as a technique for governing human multiplicities, that
is, for controlling the conduct of human beings as part of the economico-political
operation of power, maximizing individuals’ productive utility and political docility –
which is also to say, maximizing their force as agents of social production while
minimizing their force as agents of political transformation.
In perfect agreement with Foucault, then, and following his ‘microphysics of
power,’ Deleuze and Guattari depict this specifically modern form of power, which
emerges in close historical connection with the developments of capitalism, as one that is
“immanent and melds with the ‘real,’ operating through normalization” to organize the
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social formation according to a system of division or “rigid segmentarity.”518 There are,
in turn, three modes of rigid segmentarity, which structure the relational fabric of the
social field, including its forms of individual and collective subjection: (1) a binary mode,
corresponding to “the great major dualist oppositions” between molar aggregates, e.g.,
“social classes, but also men-women, adults-children,” whites-nonwhites, heterosexualshomosexuals, etc.; (2) a circular mode, corresponding to a kind of centralized geopolitical
segmentarity, a series of centers proceeding from the most immediate locality (“my
affairs, my neighborhood’s affairs”) to the most global (“my city’s, my country’s, the
world’s…”); and (3) a linear mode, corresponding to the imbricated series of disciplinary
institutions through which individuals pass, “in the family, in school, in the army, on the
job. School tells us, ‘You’re not at home anymore’; the army tells us, ‘You’re not in
school anymore’…” 519

5.3.2

Multiplicities of Becoming: Collective Lines of Flight and the Danger of Abolition
By contrast, then, to the punctual or unilinear systems of arborescent subordination,

the project of transversal politics will concern the construction of ‘multilinear’ systems,
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beginning with the imperative to “[f]ree the line, free the diagonal”520: “In a multilinear
system, …the line breaks free of the point as origin; the diagonal breaks free of the
vertical and the horizontal as coordinates; and the transversal breaks free of the diagonal
as a localizable connection between two points.”521 The transversal thus performs a
destratifying function522 that runs precisely counter to the denumerative function of
modern power (by which potentially unruly collectivities are transformed into
controllable collections of hierarchically ordered individuals). Take, for example, the
case of George Jackson: the transversal, the line of flight as active-affirmative force of
revolt, ‘breaks free of’ its subjection as subordinated diagonal, initiating a collective
process of minoritarian becoming that contests the relational modality of the prison, i.e.,
the unilinear system of power’s exercise.
Indeed, if the category of becoming is so important for transversal politics, this is
because “[b]ecoming is the movement by which the line frees itself from the point and
renders points indiscernable,” constituting “a nonlocalizable relation sweeping up the two
distant or contiguous points.”523 Becoming, as what Deleuze and Guattari call a ‘lineblock’ of connection, is non-localizable precisely because it ‘sweeps’ away the points it
passes between, impelling a joint process of transformative subjectivation: “Between
things does not designate a localizable relation going from one thing to the other and
back again, but a perpendicular direction, a transversal movement that sweeps one and
the other away….”524
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This ‘transversal movement,’ as the principle of non-localizable connection, thus
designates the destratifying trajectory of the line of flight as block of becoming,
deterritorializing and transporting the points it sets into relation by passing between. Such
is the compositional principle for rhizomatic or non-denumerable multiplicities, which is
to say, for the group as ‘a constant generator of de-individualization’ (Foucault): “The
diagonal frees itself, breaks or twists. The line … passes between things, between points.
It belongs to a smooth space. … [I]t constitutes … multiplicities of masses or packs, not
of classes; anomalous and nomadic multiplicities, not normal or legal ones; multiplicities
of becoming, or transformational multiplicities, not countable [dénombrable] elements
and ordered relations….”525
Indeed, the case of George Jackson may echo again here, for the subject-group of
prisoners of which Jackson was a co-founder was named ‘Wolf Pack,’526 and “the pack or
wolf-multiplicity” (with its attendant processes of “becoming-wolf”527) serves as Deleuze
and Guattari’s first example in A Thousand Plateaus of a rhizomatic multiplicity: “The
pack, even on its own turf, is constituted by a line of flight or of deterritorialization that is
a component part of it, and to which it accredits a high positive value,” by contrast to an
arborescent multiplicity that “integrates these lines in order to segment them, obstruct
them, ascribe them a negative sign.”528 The difference in kind between a micromultiplicity and a macro-multiplicity, like the contradistinction of connection and
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conjugation, can thus be understood as the difference, respectively, between ‘positive
deterritorialization’ and ‘negative deterritorialization.’
Let us take the traits of the rhizomatic multiplicity each at a time. Like the
peripheral ‘groups-in-fusion’ of the ‘schizorevolutionary type’ in Anti-Oedipus, which
assemble by ‘following the lines of flight of desire,’ such a multiplicity is ‘nomadic,’
composing itself along a freed diagonal or transversal line. This is the line of connectioncreation, by which a micro-multiplicity connects with other micro-multiplicities and
thereby changes in nature, creating something new. In this way, the rhizome is a
‘transformational’ multiplicity, a ‘multiplicity in becoming.’ For the same reason, it is
also an ‘anomalous’ multiplicity, which is to say, it is defined by its relation to the
outside, its centrifugal vector, rather than by a normalizing, hierarchical center.529 And it
is thus a pack- or mass-multiplicity, constituted by its component line of
deterritorialization, by contrast to the arborescent group structure of classes; for if a pack
has a ‘leader,’ it occupies not the center but the outermost limit, where the function of a
limit is not to divide but to connect to the outside (the George Jackson function).
However, the concept of a micro-multiplicity must be complicated further, for if the
principle of transversal connection provides the evaluative criterion for distinguishing

529

On the anomalous as “Outsider” and “phenomenon of bordering,” by contrast to the normal, see A
Thousand Plateaus: “The abnormal can be defined only in terms of characteristics, specific or generic; but
the anomalous is a position or set of positions in relation to a multiplicity. … Lovecraft applies the term
‘Outsider’ to this thing or entity, the Thing, which arrives and passes at the edge, which is linear yet
multiple …. If the anomalous is neither an individual nor a species, then what is it? It is a phenomenon, but
a phenomenon of bordering. … Thus there is a borderline for each multiplicity; it is in no way a center but
rather the enveloping line or farthest dimension, as a function of which it is possible to count the others, all
those lines or dimensions constitute the pack at a given moment (beyond the borderline, the multiplicity
changes nature)” (ibid, 244-5). As Deleuze and Guattari note, the initial distinction between anomal
(‘anomalous’) and abnormal (‘abnormal’) was made by Foucault’s teacher, Georges Canguilhem, whose
work The Normal and the Pathological greatly impacted Foucault’s own analysis of normalization, e.g., in
Foucault’s Collège de France lecture course entitled Abnormal.

210
macro- and micro-multiplicities, it also performs a second selective function by
distinguishing two kinds of micro-multiplicity. Deleuze and Guattari stress that it would
be an error to assume there is anything intrinsically ‘better’ about the molecular than the
molar, in the sense of a moral good. The privilege micropolitics enjoys over
macropolitics is strategic, since the former is the potential site of transformative political
agency;530 but this is not an inherent normative privilege, as is exemplified by what
Deleuze and Guattari call “microfascism,” a properly molecular form of subjection by
which “desire desire[s] its own repression.”531 Indeed, mass-multiplicities can even be
said to pose the greatest peril. “What makes fascism so dangerous is its molecular or
micropolitical power, for it is a mass movement: a cancerous body rather than a
totalitarian organism.”532
In other words, the danger of being reterritorialized and appropriated by an
apparatus of capture is not the only one facing the line of flight; there is another “moment
that must be confronted, the moment the transversal turns into a line of abolition.”533 This
is the moment of breakdown, the destructive force which, for example, we have seen to
be characteristic of the second regime of madness: “the line of flight crossing the wall,
…but instead of connecting with other lines and each time augmenting its valence,
turning to destruction, abolition pure and simple, the passion of abolition.”534 In the case
of the two regimes of madness problem, the line of abolition marks the collapse into
530
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suicide or catatonia, precisely because the schizophrenic flow of madness is unable to
bear the charge of being the sole expression of an absolute deterritorialization; that is, the
schizoid line of flight is deprived possible connections with other lines of flight, with the
deterritorializing tendencies of other social flows, and thus falls unsupported. (As we
discussed last chapter, this is the schizopolitical formulation of the problem of material
expression.) In the case of fascism, the line of abolition becomes collective, traversing the
social field and constituting a mass-multiplicity whose libidinal forces (what AntiOedipus calls ‘desiring-production’) are invested in a pure process of destruction. In
general, the line of abolition is what the line of flight becomes when, by failing to make
connections with other lines of flight, it cannot satisfy the conditions of its own
sustainability. What was a line of connection-creation then turns instead to
annihilation.535
The line of flight thus faces a double danger: (1) from the molar domain, the threat
of capture, which, figured by the subordinated diagonal, would undermine the line of
flight’s conditions of realization by blocking the transversal, preventing the construction
of lateral alliances; and (2) from within the molecular domain, the threat of abolition,
which would undermine the line of flight’s conditions of sustainability by setting it on a
course of destruction. At issue in both cases is a threat to the connective force of the line
of flight. Conversely, generating such force forms the strategic objective of transversal
politics.
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The principle of connection – “the way in which decoded and deterritorialized
flows boost one another, accelerate their shared escape”536 – can therefore be understood
as the transversal solution to the political problem of material expression, now articulated
as the problem of maintaining and quickening the creative-affirmative force of the line of
flight, ‘augmenting its valence’. That is, transversality, as the relational mode of
connection-creation, constitutes both a condition of realization and of sustainability for
the line of flight (as well as for the micro-multiplicity the destratifying trajectory of
which that line defines).
The transversal condition of realization goes unmet when the diagonal is
subordinated, the line of flight neutralized by striated space or rigidly segmented in
binary, circular, or linear modes. In other words, in the absence of transversal connection,
the centrifugal vector of escape is not realized as force, i.e., as transformative agency
capable of acting back upon the macropolitical conditions of social production; for
“molecular escapes and movements would be nothing if they did not return to the molar
organizations to reshuffle their segments, their binary distributions of sexes, classes, and
parties.”537 In turn, even when the conditions of realization have been met, in the absence
of creating other transversal connections, the force of flight cannot be sustained,
descending into a line of abolition. That is, the transversal condition of sustainability goes
unsatisfied when the line of flight cannot connect to other lines, instead turning cancerous,
an auto-destructive force of mutation.
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Deleuze and Guattari refer to the project of meeting this double condition of
realization and sustainability as one of constructing a ‘plane of consistency’:
It is the plane, in other words, the mode of connection, that provides the means of
eliminating the empty and cancerous bodies…, of rejecting the homogeneous
surfaces that overlay smooth space, and neutralizing the lines of death and
destruction that divert the line of flight. What is retained and preserved, therefore
created, what consists, is only that which increases the number of connections….538
The transversal principle of connection thus yields the practical imperative to augment
the positive valence of lines of flight by multiplying their connective force, and it
provides the selective criterion539 for evaluating between the “fascisizing” and
revolutionizing tendencies of mass-multiplicities. A nomadic, anomalous,
transformational multiplicity “becomes revolutionary” when, “by connecting” “a number
of minority elements,” it “invents a specific, unforeseen, autonomous becoming.”540 To
use Deleuze and Guattari’s example, such was the case with the events of May 1968 in
France, through which a molecular phenomenon of transformative political agency was
realized ‘by connecting a number of minority elements’ – indeed, by connecting the very
minoritarian singularities that we have seen championed by Foucault as transversal
struggles against individualizing subjection, e.g., “the youth, women, the mad, etc.”541
The connective strategy of transversal politics can thus be understood as the project
to realize and sustain transformative political force by ‘inventing’ collective processes of
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minoritarian becoming. As we have seen in our previous discussions of becoming-plebe
and becoming-black, and as is suggested by the anti-essentialist language of
‘invention,’542 ‘minoritarian’ refers not to a substantive identity – one grounded in a
macrosociological entity (race, sex/gender, class, sexuality, age generation), the
organization of which would result from rigid binary segmentation –, but rather to a
processual quality of becoming, that is, a connective mode of relation. And it is the
transversal logic of this mode of relation, finally, that provides the fundamental criterion
for distinguishing a non-denumerable or minoritarian multiplicity from a denumerable or
majoritarian one: whereas a majority always constitutes a denumerable set,
…the minority is defined as a nondenumerable set, however many elements it may
have. What characterizes the nondenumerable is neither the set nor its elements;
rather, it is the connection, the “and” produced between elements, between sets, and
which belongs to neither, which eludes them and constitutes a line of flight. The
axiomatic manipulates only denumerable sets, even infinite ones, whereas the
minorities constitute “fuzzy,” nondenumerable, nonaxiomizable sets, in short,
“masses,” multiplicities of escape and flux. … What is proper to the minority is to
assert a power of the nondenumerable….543
If, as we saw in Chapter 4, the initial formulation of schizo-politics sets into
opposition the transversal connection and axiomatic conjugation of decoded flows, the
later formulation of transversal resistance will articulate this connective project in terms
of harnessing the minoritarian ‘power of the nondenumerable’ to contest the axiomatic
manipulation of ‘denumerable and controllable’ (Foucault) human multiplicities. The
non-denumerability proper to the minority – the group as ‘multiplicity of escape and flux,’
a ‘constant generator of de-individualization’ (Foucault) – constitutes a counter-force to
the dominant social order by transforming the schema of possible social relations.
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In other words, minoritarian becoming, as a collective process of subjectivation,
gives rise to something like ‘a people,’ that is, to new forms of community whose very
mode of composition would challenge the rigid segmentation of the social formation.544
And just as the strategy proposed in “Intellectuals and Power” was for minorities
(‘women, prisoners, conscripted soldiers, hospital patients, and homosexuals’) to ‘enter
into a revolutionary process’ by singularizing their own forms of struggle, which could
then become laterally allied against a common regime of power to form a multiplycentered resistance movement; so, now, the aim advanced in A Thousand Plateaus is to
realize and sustain precisely those moments “the axiomatic cannot tolerate: when people
demand to formulate their problems themselves, and to determine at least the particular
conditions under which they can receive a more general solution.”545

5.4

Foucault’s Transversal Ethico-Politics: The Case of Becoming-Queer

“For example, no ‘gay liberation movement’ is possible as long as homosexuality is
caught up in a relation of exclusive disjunction with heterosexuality … instead of
bringing to light their reciprocal inclusion and their transverse communication in the
decoded flows of desire….”
— Deleuze and Guattari546
“Here again, a line of subjectivation is a process…. It is a line of flight. It escapes the
previous lines; it escapes from them. … Foucault’s research was going to show that
processes of subjectivation eventually took on other modes than the Greek mode, for
example in Christian apparatuses, modern societies, etc. Couldn’t we cite apparatuses
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where subjectivation no longer goes through aristocratic life or the aestheticized
experience of free men but through the marginalized existence of the ‘excluded’?”
bringing to light their reciprocal inclusion and their transverse communication in the
decoded flows of desire….”
— Deleuze547
5.4.1

Sexuality, Biopower, and the Politics of Friendship

It remains, finally, for us to detail a positive example of what a politics that
harnesses the ‘power of the nondenumerable’ might look like, and how it would contest
the exercise of power in capitalist society. I will thus conclude this chapter by providing
an account of Foucault’s late ethico-politics, which articulates precisely such a
transversal project of minoritarian becoming: namely, what may be termed becomingqueer. As the concrete development of what was presented formally in A Thousand
Plateaus, this project suggests another line in the Foucault-Deleuze block of becoming;
and as Foucault’s effort to singularize a form of minoritarian struggle, it serves as a
further response to the question of transversal resistance posed to him by Deleuze a
decade prior.
To understand how an ethical practice of queer subjectivation constitutes a mode of
resistance, and hence a politics, it must first be situated in relation to Foucault’s analysis
of biopower in the introductory volume of History of Sexuality (1976), completed the
year after Discipline and Punish. The concept of biopower refers to the mode of power
which takes life, whether that of the individual or the population, as its object of
production and control. Drawing again from the distinction first made in Anti-Oedipus
between micro- and macrophysics, Foucault characterizes modern biopower as a “bi-
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polar technology” that develops historically along two axes: (1) the micropolitical axis of
discipline, which he now refers to as “an anatomo-politics of the human body,” by which
the “body as a machine” is rendered docile and useful; and (2) the macropolitical axis of
administrative regulation, of “a bio-politics of the population,” by which the “species
body” as a statistical aggregate is managed and governed with respect to the conditions of
its basic biological processes.548
Like disciplinary power, which in fact constitutes one of its two poles, biopower
serves historically as a necessary condition for capitalism insofar as it makes possible the
“adjustment of the accumulation of men to that of capital, the joining of the growth of
human groups to the expansion of productive forces and the differential allocation of
profit….”549 In other words, as with discipline, the basic operation of biopower is
economico-political. This is why Foucault’s economico-political thesis holds for modern
power generally, whether the disciplining of individuals in panoptic assemblages, or the
bio-political regulation of the population. As Deleuze will later point out, at issue in both
548
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cases is a form of power exercised upon human multiplicities: on the one hand, an
anatomo-politics that functions to impose a certain conduct on a particular multiplicity of
individuals, where that multiplicity is limited in number and space;550 and on the other, a
bio-politics that functions to administer the conditions of life processes in a particular
multiplicity, where that multiplicity is a more expansive and open population.551
Accordingly, rather than being opposed to one another, discipline and bio-politics are
distinct but complementary strategies through which power operates in capitalist
society.552 Their convergent points of reciprocal support or mutual articulation form
crucial nodes in the modern diagram of force relations.553
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reinforcement as well as their availability and docility; it had to have methods of power capable of
optimizing forces, aptitudes, and life in general without at the same time making them more difficult to
govern. If the development of the great instruments of the state, as institutions of power, ensured the
maintenance of production relations, the rudiments of anatomo- and bio-politics, created in the eighteenth
century as techniques of power present at every level of the social body and utilized by very diverse
institutions (the family and the army, schools and the police, individual medicine and the administration of
collective bodies), operated in the sphere of economic processes, their development, and the forces working
to sustain them. They also acted as factors of segregation and social hierarchization, exerting their influence
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Now, if the apparatus of sexuality is of especial importance to Foucault’s analytic
of biopower, it is because the category of sex/sexuality serves as just such a site of
convergence between anatomo- and bio-politics, located “at the pivot of the two axes
along which developed the entire political technology of life. On the one hand it was tied
to the disciplines of the body: the harnessing, intensification, and distribution of forces,
the adjustment and economy of energies. On the other hand, it was applied to the
regulation of populations, through all the far-reaching effects of its activity.”554 Insofar as
it thus constitutes a vital tactical conjuncture through which biopower controls and
governs the conduct of individuals and groups, sexuality also becomes privileged
strategic terrain for forms of counter-conduct that would contest this exercise of power.
Foucault’s transversal ethico-politics therefore intervenes at precisely this pivot
point of biopower. As resistance to the ‘government of individualization,’ such a politics
challenges the techniques of subjection by which the apparatus of sexuality binds the
individual to herself and divides her from others through a normalizing form of identity.
Since, as we have seen Foucault suggest in his preface to Anti-Oedipus, such a process of
de-individualization takes shape through a mode of collective subjectivation that is itself
made possible by the construction of non-hierarchical group formations, it follows that
any politics of de-subjection will require the production of new relational forms – an
open network of “polymorphic, varied, and individually modulated relationships.”555
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Accordingly, when Foucault champions something like a queer cultural movement
as a shared form of ethico-political practice, he emphasizes precisely this task of creating
new modes of social relation:
Another thing to distrust is the tendency to relate the question of homosexuality to
the problem of ‘Who am I?’ and ‘What is the secret of my desire?’ Perhaps it would
be better to ask oneself, ‘What relations, through homosexuality, can be established,
invented, multiplied, and modulated?’ The problem is not to discover in oneself the
truth of one’s sex, but, rather, to use one’s sexuality henceforth to arrive at a
multiplicity of relationships. … Therefore, we have to work at becoming
homosexuals and not be obstinate in recognizing that we are. The development
toward which the problem of homosexuality tends is the one of friendship.556
The ‘question of homosexuality,’ then, does not refer to an inherent property, much less a
substantive nature, of being homosexual. The problem posed by homosexuality, which
Foucault names ‘friendship,’ is not to discover an essential self-relation but, rather, to
facilitate the production, transformation, and proliferation of a ‘multiplicity of
relationships,’ the schema for which cannot be given in advance.
Indeed, far from constituting the kind of identity politics for which it is sometimes
mistaken, which would be centered in molar forms of social identification and their
corresponding, rigidly segmented group interests, the Foucauldian question of
homosexuality and its philial project concern an active task of becoming, a collective
process of subjectivation that I am calling ‘becoming-queer.’557 This practice of
becoming takes shape through the construction of friendship, understood as a mode of
relation with two fundamental features: (1) as a “relationship that is still formless,”
friendship must be “invent[ed] from A to Z,” for its structure is unmoored from
556

Ibid, 135-6, my emphasis.
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institutional supports and its meaning, ungoverned by dominant social codes; and (2)
with regard to its positive content, this relation between friends encompasses “the sum of
everything through which they can give each other pleasure,”558 which is to say, the
shared creation of a reciprocal circuit of care.559
Foucault gives as an example of the formlessness of friendship the relation between
two men of “noticeably different ages” who, without a “code [that] would allow them to
communicate… [and] with nothing to assure them about the meaning of the movement
that carries them toward each other,”560 must together invent the very terms of that
relation – which is to say, must invent themselves as friends who are constituted through
the movement arising between them. Indeed, the space of this in-between is precisely that
of a non-localizable connection in A Thousand Plateaus, where ‘Between things does not
designate a localizable relation, but a transversal movement that sweeps one and the other
away.’ Friendship should not be conceived as a line running back and forth from one
fixed point to another but, rather, as a perpendicular vector passing between the friends
and impelling their co-becoming. By contrast to a relation that would obtain between preexisting terms, such as a contractual relation independent parties enter into, the friendship
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relation is itself dynamically constitutive of its proper terms. That is, friendship is an
auto-poetic relation, which is de-individualizing, insofar as the subject-position of an
original self in relation to the other is displaced in favor of a constituent movement of
joint becoming.
Of course, just as with the marginal and proletarianized plebe, this movement does
not mean ‘total identification,’ which would collapse the betweenness of the friends’
transversal trajectory.561 Rather, their co-becoming defines the coordinates of a shared
mode of life for which differentiation serves as a genetic principle. In contradistinction to
institutional or oppositional forms of social difference (rigid binary segmentarity), philial
differentiation affirms difference in its positivity as transversal connection. Thus, to
return to Foucault’s example, the age differential between friends, precisely because it
deprives them of a socially coded way of relating, makes the invention of a new relational
form possible, which propels both friends outside their age-based subject-positions. In
this way, the mode of life proper to collective processes of becoming-queer constitutes a
decoded flow of desire, a deterritorializing line of creative mutation that cuts across the
striated space of the social field:
Is it possible to create a homosexual mode of life? This notion of mode of life
seems important to me. Will it require the introduction of a diversification different
from the ones due to social class, differences in profession and culture, a
diversification that would also be a form of relationship and would be a ‘way of
life’? A way of life can be shared among individuals of different age, status, and
social activity. It can yield intense relations not resembling those that are
institutionalized. It seems to me that a way of life can yield a culture and an
ethics.562
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If the project of becoming-queer generates an ethics, it will be the very kind that
Foucault attributes to Anti-Oedipus: namely, an ethics of immanence, which realizes the
affective intensification of relationships ‘by means of multiplication and displacement,
diverse combinations.’ If this project generates a culture, it will be in the expansive sense
of “a culture that invents ways of relating, types of existence, types of values, types of
exchanges between individuals which are really new and are neither the same as, nor
superimposed on, existing cultural forms.”563 To displace prevailing cultural forms
through a radical production of the new entails a creative collective practice that crosses
over the historical lines of division between segmented group identities and interests.
Thus, echoing Deleuze and Guattari’s claim in the epigraph above regarding the inclusive
disjunction and ‘transverse communication’ between homo- and heterosexuality,
Foucault argues that if such a movement of cultural invention is to fundamentally
transform collective modes of life throughout the social formation, “then gay culture will
not only be a choice of homosexuals for homosexuals – it would create relations that are,
at certain points, transferable to heterosexuals. …[N]onhomosexual people can enrich
their lives by changing their own schema of relations.”564
Indeed, independently of any molar structure of identification, it is the transversal
form of the friendship relation, its perpendicular movement as a line of
deterritorialization, that enables the process of becoming-queer to enrich the relational
fabric or, in the language of Deleuze and Guattari, to effect a collective becomingintensive of the social formation. As Foucault puts it, “Homosexuality is a historic
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occasion to reopen affective and relational virtualities, not so much through the intrinsic
qualities of the homosexual but because the ‘slantwise’ [‘en biais’] position of the latter,
as it were, the diagonal lines he can lay out in the social fabric allow these virtualities to
come to light.”565 The agential force of this queer mode of collective subjectivation stems
from its slanting trajectory, its position ‘en biais’ – a term which, following the meaning
of biais in sewing, suggests the threading of a diagonal direction across the gridded
texture of a fabric.
For Foucault, then, the problem of friendship – articulated through the question of
homosexuality – can be put as follows: how, by virtue of the transversal movement of
becoming-queer, can ‘diagonal lines’ be woven into the ‘social fabric,’ such that they
create the conditions of material expression for a multiplicity of ‘affective and relational
virtualities’ to be realized? This indeed echoes the two Foucauldian problems previously
posed in the 1960s and 1970s. We have seen how, in History of Madness, the central
issue at the heart of the modern world concerned the insupportability and constitutive
division of the intensive experience of unreason, the expression of which becomes the
charge of modern literature. We have also seen how, in the analytic of power, the critical
question regarded how to construct lateral lines of alliance as a counter-network of
resistance to the relations of power exercised in capitalist society. Now, connecting and
extending aspects of both projects, the problem of Foucault’s immanent ethico-politics
becomes that of creating transversal lines of alliance that would contest the functioning of
power by providing a system of supports for the production of previously excluded
modes of relation and intensive experience.
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5.4.2

The Connective Strategy of Becoming-Queer: Minoritarian Resistance to
Neoliberal Governmentality

The problem of friendship and the project of becoming-queer to which it gives rise,
thus provide a Foucauldian response to the question of how to construct a nondenumerable multiplicity constituted through the transversal connection of decoded flows
or lines of flight of desire: in other words, a micropolitical connective strategy that would
both disrupt the operation of power and make possible radically new forms of existence.
For indeed, “what makes homosexuality ‘disturbing’” is precisely what makes Foucault’s
ethics of immanence a politics of resistance: namely, the decoded form and
deterritorializing force of “the homosexual mode of life,” including
…everything that can be troubling in affection, tenderness, friendship, fidelity,
camaraderie, and companionship, things that our rather sanitized society can’t allow
a place for without fearing the formation of new alliances and the tying together of
unforeseen lines of force. … Institutional codes can’t validate these relations with
multiple intensities, variable colors, imperceptible movements and changing
forms.566
Just as the extra-institutional formlessness of friendship and its genetic principle of
affirmative differentiation make possible the creative movement of co-becoming between
friends; so too the transformative political force of becoming-queer derives from its
destratifying trajectory with respect to the institutionalized set of relations that segment
the social formation. In this regard, Foucault’s philial project specifically contests the
operation of biopower. As we have seen, biopower’s function is to govern the population
by normalizing and controlling the conduct of individuals and groups, and it does so
through the denumeration and regulation of human multiplicities and the dispersion of
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techniques of subjection. On both fronts – that is, the macro-level of social institutions
and the micro-level of subjection – the project of becoming-queer functions as a form of
resistance. At the micro-level, this is because the invention of minoritarian modes of cobecoming constitutes a de-individualizing process of collective subjectivation, while at
the macro-level, this is because the creation of these new forms of relation challenges the
institutional relational framework through which the conditions of a population are
administered.
This latter point, moreover, must be emphasized, for modern power’s techniques of
administration over the population operate by limiting and simplifying the field of
possible social relations:
In effect, we live in a legal, social, and institutional world where the only relations
possible are extremely few, extremely simplified, and extremely poor. There is, of
course, the relation of marriage, and the relation of family, but how many other
relations should exist, should be able to find their codes not in institutions but in
possible supports, which is not at all the case! … We live in a relational world that
institutions have considerably impoverished. Society and the institutions which
frame it have limited the possibility of relationships because a rich relational world
would be very complex to manage [gérer]. We should fight against the
impoverishment of the relational fabric.567
It is no coincidence that the verb Foucault uses in reference to this governmental function
of power, ‘gérer’ (to manage or administer), is the same he reserves to depict biopower’s
“function of administering life,”568 since the ‘impoverishment of the relational fabric’ is a
bio-political strategy for rendering the population a governmentalizable object of
regulation and control.
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Indeed, as Foucault had pointed out two years earlier (1979), the very
institutionalization of the social domain, the historical formation of “civil society,” is
“absolutely correlative” to “the technology of liberal governmentality,”569 which is itself
the “framework of political rationality”570 for the exercise of biopower. The constitution
of ‘civil society’ in the second half of the 18th century responds to a central political
problem for the liberal art of governing: given that economic subjects of interest are
irreducible to juridical subjects of right, how can the governability of “these individuals,
who inhabit the space of sovereignty as subjects of right and, at the same time, as
economic men, …be assured” in order for “governmentality to preserve its global
character over the whole space of sovereignty”571? The answer, Foucault argues, is that
civil society – as “the emergence of a new object, a new domain,” which will also be
called “society” and “the nation”572 – functions as a field of political unity that integrates
the economic and juridical aspects of the subject, making possible the
governmentalization of homo economicus and the intensification of power’s exercise by
way of its extension through social institutions: “An omnipresent government, a
government which nothing escapes, a government which conforms to the rules of right,
and a government which nevertheless respects the specificity of the economy, will be a
government that manages civil society, the nation, society, the social.”573
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It is therefore this mode of liberal governmentality that impoverishes the relational
fabric so as to render the population and the individuals composing it governable,
operating at both the micro- and macro-political levels: that is, (1) by means of
individualizing techniques of subjection, producing homo economicus as the form of a
self-corporatizing individual whose “life itself … must make him into a sort of permanent
and multiple enterprise”574; and (2) through the institutionalization of a set of social
relations that can be administered and controlled, i.e., the production of civil society,
which “generaliz[es] the ‘enterprise’ form within the social body or social fabric,”
“extending the economic model of supply and demand and of investment-costs-profit so
as to make it a model of social relations and of existence itself, a form of relationship of
the individual to himself, time, those around him, the group, and the family.”575 In this
way, moreover, biopower performs its economico-political function, integrating the
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double accumulation of human populations and capital, while consolidating relations of
social hegemony and stratification.
The tendency of this liberal logic of socio-relational vitiation, which leaves the
institution of the restrictive nuclear family with a totalizing hold on the field of social
relations, receives perhaps its starkest articulation in Margaret Thatcher’s famous
statement that “there is no such thing as society: there are individual men and women,
and there are families.”576 But of course, what appears here as a claim about social
ontology, in fact describes the contingent effect of a political operation proper to liberal
governmentality – one which has only been accelerated by neoliberalism’s ‘ethos of
privatization,’577 and which constitutes exactly the kind of government of
individualization (‘separating the individual, breaking his links with others, splitting up
community life’) that transversal struggles are allied against.
Indeed, just as we saw with disciplinary power (e.g., the lateral invisibility
foundational to panoptic arrangements, or the prevention by the courts-police-prison
system of points of contact between the proletarianized and non-proletarianized plebe), so
too with biopower, it is by means of blocking transversal connections that the relational
arrangements of the social field are rigidly segmented and controlled. Accordingly, the
call for a collective, transversal project of queer subjectivation – for the creation of ‘a
culture and an ethics’ that would multiply lateral, extra-institutional connections, as so
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many freed ‘diagonal lines’ of minoritarian becoming traversing and intensifying the
‘social fabric’ – is a call to resist the bio-political exercise of neoliberal governmentality.
In sum: if power operates through the impoverishment of the social fabric so as to
more effectively manage a population, then contestation will take the form of enriching
the relational fabric of society, creating ‘new alliances and tying together unforeseen
lines of force.’ The Foucauldian project of becoming-queer can thus be understood as a
transversal ethico-politics aiming to establish, through the creation of a noninstitutionalized network of supports, the conditions of material expression for new
modes of existence and culture, “new forms of community”578 that challenge the
neoliberal techniques of control (individualizing subjection, relational vitiation), through
which biopower manages the conduct and conditions of the population.
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CHAPTER 6. INTENSITY, UPRISING, CRITIQUE: FOUCAULT’S POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY OF AGENCY

“For me, politics was the chance to have an experience in the manner of Nietzsche or
Bataille.”
— Foucault579
6.1

Return to Verticality: In Defense of the Limit-Experience

Over the course of the last three chapters, we have seen how Foucault’s political
thought develops in response to the problem of material expression: first indexed on the
concept of verticality, which issued into the abandoned literary politics of transgression,
this problem, set within the specific context of the capitalist social formation, finds a
more adequate solution through the articulation of transversal politics, an articulation
itself made possible by Foucault’s philosophical friendship with Deleuze.
It might seem to be implied by this chronological presentation that verticality is
surpassed by transversality as the conceptual basis for Foucault’s theory of political
agency or transformation. Such a conclusion would indeed cohere with the generally
accepted view that Foucault’s early fascination with the notion of transgression, and with
the category of the ‘limit-experience’ more generally, can be reduced to something like
an aspect of intellectual adolescence he later outgrew; for example, this view is expressed
clearly in Ian Hacking’s assertion that the tragic experience of unreason from History of
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Madness attests to a “romantic illusion” that Foucault will correct and “strip” from his
subsequent, more “mature” works.580
Without denying the auto-critical transformations of Foucault’s thought, I will, in
effect, argue against the general view that minimizes the abiding philosophical
significance, for his work, of the limit-experience. One of the chief objectives of the
present chapter will be to show how, rather than rejecting the concept of verticality along
with his literary politics, Foucault in fact modifies and redeploys it: the vertical form of
limit-experience is recast intensively through an analysis of revolt as the degree zero of
power’s exercise, which makes political agency possible (and serves as the ultimate
anchor for concretely realized human freedom); and the vertical form of critique is
elaborated as necessary for both the sustainability of collective uprising (or the
revolutionary process of collective subjectivation) and the ethico-political agency of
thought. In other words, rather than being eclipsed by transversality, the concept of the
vertical becomes its integral complement, allowing a more complete analysis of the set of
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necessary conditions for political agency, which is to say, of the solution to the political
problem of material expression.
Still, before pursuing this line of approach, it is worth considering at some length a
possible objection to it. As we saw in Chapter 3, whether in its experiential or critical
mode, verticality implies a kind of limit-relation to history: e.g., the work of the dreaming
imagination as ‘that which in existence is most irreducible to history’; the limitexperience of unreason at the degree zero of history, i.e., that the exclusion of which
enables the horizontal unfolding of reason or western culture; and the vertical critique of
this horizontal history, which uncovers arbitrary division and contingency at the ‘origin’
of what takes itself to be grounded in universal necessity. Generally speaking, the vertical
formulation of the problem of material expression may be put as follows: how can that
which is irreducible to history nevertheless act upon and transform the conditions of
history, that is, the historical conditions of social production? Now, in the case of
literature, we have already seen Foucault come to reject one way of conceiving this
vertical irreducibility, namely, as exteriority to the social formation. Why should we not
also think that this criticism would apply to the other instances of experiential verticality,
such as dreams and unreason, which are explicitly ‘transcendent’ forms of limitexperience?
In other words, why should we not accept the widely held view that Foucault’s
youthful interest in limit-experiences was merely a naïve romanticism, a vestige of
transcendent thought that will be shed through his subsequent analyses of discourse and
power? After all, doesn’t Foucault himself implicitly confirm this view when he later (1)
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offers a self-criticism of his notion of experience in History of Madness581 and (2)
suppresses the original preface of that work (which contained the crucial reference to the
‘constant verticality’ that ‘confronts Western culture with what it is not,’ disrupting
‘reason in its horizontal becoming’), ostensibly in response (and concession) to Derrida’s
famous critique?582 In short, if, from the beginning, the conceptual basis of verticality is
given by a form of experience that becomes philosophically suspect or expendable, why
return to verticality at all?

6.1.1

The Sublime Function of the Limit-Experience: The Project of Desubjectivation

In order to address this possible set of objections, let us begin by responding to
point (1) above. When Foucault retrospectively criticizes his “very floating”583 use of the
term “experience” in History of Madness, it is not the limit-experience of unreason that
he specifically distances himself from, so much as his recurrent appeals to a kind of
collective cultural perception or consciousness of madness, e.g., the ‘Great Fear’ said to
have gripped the classical period.584 In the editor’s introduction to History of Madness,
Jean Khalfa is thus correct to point out that such an invocation of “experience” borrows

581

See, for` example, Paolo Savoia, “Madness,” The Cambridge Foucault Lexicon, 277-278.
See, for example, Jean Khalfa, “Introduction,” History of Madness, xxiii.
583
Foucault, “Preface to The History of Sexuality, Volume Two,” Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 202.
584
See, for example, Psychiatric Power: “It seems to me that, above all, I was trying to study the image of
madness produced in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the fear it aroused, and the knowledge
formed with reference to it, either traditionally, or according to botanical, naturalistic, and medical models,
etcetera. It was this core of representations, of both traditional and non-traditional images, fantasies, and
knowledge, this kind of core of representations that I situated as the point of departure, as the site of origin
of the practices concerning madness that managed to establish themselves in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. In short, I accorded a privileged role to what could be called the perception of madness”
(Foucault, Psychiatric Power, 12-13). Notice that this self-criticism does not apply to the modern works of
unreason in the 19th and 20th centuries, that is, the tragic lineage running from Sade through Hölderlin and
Nietzsche to Artaud.
582

235
from the “vocabulary of the phenomenological approach,”585 which explains why
Foucault will later reproach himself for having offered what was “still an analysis of
representations”586 and therefore “still close to admitting an anonymous and general
subject of history.”587 However, where Khalfa errs is in identifying this
phenomenological notion of experience with the tragic or transgressive concept of the
limit-experience in the original preface.
Indeed, in an important interview with Duccio Trombadori from 1978, in which
Foucault emphasizes the essential and persistent impact of Nietzsche, Bataille, and
Blanchot on his thought, he explicitly distinguishes phenomenological experience from
limit-experiences:
The phenomenologist’s experience is basically a certain way of bringing a reflective
gaze to bear on some object of ‘lived experience,’ on the everyday in its transitory
form, in order to grasp its meanings. For Nietzsche, Bataille, Blanchot, on the other
hand, experience is trying to reach a certain point in life that is as close as possible
to the ‘unlivable,’ to that which can’t be lived through. What is required is the
maximum of intensity and the maximum of impossibility at the same time. …
Moreover, phenomenology attempts to recapture the meaning of everyday
experience in order to rediscover the sense in which the subject that I am is indeed
responsible, in its transcendental functions, for founding that experience together
with its meanings. On the other hand, in Nietzsche, Bataille, and Blanchot,
experience has the function of wrenching the subject from itself, of seeing to it that
the subject is no longer itself, or that it is brought to its annihilation or its
dissolution. This is a project of desubjectivation. The idea of a limit-experience that
wrenches the subject from itself is what was important to me in my reading of
Nietzsche, Bataille, and Blanchot….588
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Foucault thus opposes the limit-experience to phenomenological experience in
much the same way that, as we saw in Chapter 2, the experience of the sublime in Kant
can be opposed to ordinary empirical experience: that is, as a maximally intensive
experience of the impossible that ruptures both the unity of the subject – taken in its
transcendental function as the founding act of meaning, or, in Kantian terms, as the
‘formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations’ – and
the unity of the object, taken as the world of ‘everyday experience.’ This is also akin to
the opposition we encountered in Chapter 3, where Foucault contrasts the anthropological
analytic of finitude, made possible by Kant’s Copernican turn, to the radicalization of this
finitude through the limit-experience of transgression, in that instance exemplified in the
being of literary language (and the thought of the outside that modern literature opens
onto).589
In all of these cases, what is essential is the dissolution of the subject position as
original or constitutive ground. Indeed, the ‘project of desubjectivation,’ first articulated
by Foucault in terms of the tragic limit-experience of unreason, continues to animate his
thought, up to and including his late account of transversal political struggle “against the
589
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government of individualization,”590 that is, against “the type of individualization linked
to the state”591 (e.g., in the minoritarian project of becoming-queer).
Considering the consistently maintained conceptual distinction between the notion
of experience that Foucault will criticize himself for having employed, and the category
of the limit-experience; and considering that the philosophical upshot of the limitexperience, the ‘project of desubjectivation,’ continues to sound in Foucault’s articulation
of political struggle over two decades later; we can thus conclude that Foucault’s
retrospective objections to History of Madness do not provide grounds for dismissing the
vertical limit-experience as a viable political concept. Moreover, lest the particular
examples of the limit-experience in Foucault’s work appear to be limited to the 1960s (in
which case it might be argued that the thought remained merely an early influence), in the
same interview with Trombadori, Foucault explicitly indicates how the major line of his
archaeological and genealogical project consists in an effort to develop the concept of the
limit-experience, and specifically the Bataillean experience of transgression, from the
perspective of a critical history of thought:
Everything I’ve been concerned with up to now has to do basically with the way
men in Western societies have produced these experiences – fundamental ones, no
doubt – which consist in engagement in a process of acquiring knowledge of a
domain of objects, while at the same time they are constituting themselves as
subjects with a fixed and determinate status. … I made an effort, in particular, to
understand how man had transformed certain of these limit-experiences into objects
of knowledge – madness, death, crime. That is where one reencounters some of
Georges Bataille’s themes, but applied to a collective history which is that of the
West and its knowledge. It’s always a question of limit-experiences and the history
of truth.592
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It is thus no exaggeration to say that, far from the fleeting vestige of an immature
romanticism, the category of the limit-experience centrally informs the trajectory of
Foucault’s work, including History of Madness, The Birth of the Clinic (which analyzes
the appropriation of death as an object of positivist medicine), Discipline and Punish, and,
no doubt also, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1.593 These books should be understood in
the strict sense as historical critiques, that is, as analyses of the historical conditions of
possibility for the formation of fields of experience, including the constitutive processes
of what Foucault calls “objectivation” (“determining under what conditions something
can become an object for a possible knowledge, how it may have been problematized as
an object to be known, to what selective procedure it may have been subjected, the part of
it that is regarded as pertinent”) and “subjectivation” (“determin[ing] what the subject
must be, to what condition he is subject, what status he must have, what position he must
occupy in reality or in the imaginary, in order to become a legitimate subject of this or
that type of knowledge”).594
In other words, Foucault’s critical histories can be read as so many ‘vertical
reinterpretations’ of how different limit-experiences have been excluded, defused, or
appropriated as the basis for the formation of dominant regimes of power-knowledge,
including the production of normalizing and individualizing forms of subjectivity, or
what we have seen Deleuze and Guattari call the ‘binary segmentation’ of major and
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minor identities (the sane and the insane, the healthy and the sick, the law-abiding and the
criminal, the straight and the queer).

6.1.2

Foucault’s ‘Reply to Derrida’: Toward a Politics of the Limit-Event

Nevertheless, it remains the case that Foucault did, in fact, remove his original
preface from the second edition of History of Madness, a gesture which is often depicted
as a response to Derrida’s forceful critique. Further, in the 1972 edition, Foucault
replaced what had initially been the lead title, Folie et Déraison (‘Madness and
Unreason’: a rare example, for the title of a French book, of a second term being
capitalized), with what had been at first just the subtitle, Histoire de la folie à l’âge
classique (‘History of Madness in the Classical Age’). Thus, one might continue to press
the objection as follows: even if Foucault’s retrospective self-criticism refers to his overly
phenomenological account of the collective perception of madness, rather than to the
tragic limit-experience of unreason; and even if the general category of the limitexperience persists in informing his critical project; his editorial decisions still suggest a
critical distance taken from his early notion of experiential verticality, and thus cast doubt
on the viability of reconstructing a vertical politics. In order to answer this more difficult
objection, we must take a closer look at Derrida’s “Cogito and the History of Madness”
(presented in 1963, two years after the publication of History of Madness) and the
question of Foucault’s putative tacit concession nine years later.
Derrida’s essay challenges Foucault’s history of madness on two levels. The first,
taking aim at the original preface, claims to lay bare the fundamental “infeasibility” of
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Foucault’s project: namely, its attempt “to write a history of madness itself,”595 whether
as an ‘archeology of silence’ or in terms of a constitutive division between reason and
madness that would be the birth of western culture. For Derrida, this attempt, insofar as
Foucault’s history is itself necessarily a work of reason, is consigned to failure in advance:
either madness would have to be the subject of the work, which is impossible, since to
speak the language of madness would require that one actually be mad, and, following
Foucault’s own formula, where there is madness there is no work; or madness would
have to be the object of the work, in which case it would already have been ineluctably
appropriated by reason, and Foucault would thus be recommitting the very gesture of
violence that he condemns. Madness, then, as disqualified subject or already-captured
object: either way, it is impossible to render a history of madness in which the truth of
madness itself would speak.596
In turn, the second level of Derrida’s critique takes aim at a three page passage on
Descartes’s First Meditation, which appears at the beginning of Foucault’s second
595
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chapter, “The Great Confinement.” Here, Foucault suggests that the exclusion of madness
proper to the classical period, realized at a socio-institutional level through widespread
practices of internment, becomes realized at the epistemico-discursive level through the
surreptitiously grounding decision taken by the meditating subject to dogmatically refuse
the possibility of being mad as a skeptical reason for doubt. Derrida argues that
Foucault’s reading is both unfaithful to Descartes and symptomatic of the founding
impossibility of History of Madness: unfaithful, because Foucault does not sufficiently
attend to the Cartesian ‘order of reasons,’ according to which the madness hypothesis is
first surpassed by an equivalent but more universally accessible reason for doubt (the
dreaming hypothesis) and then covered by the evil genius hypothesis (which is the
madness hypothesis hyperbolized); and symptomatic, because whereas Foucault suggests
that the Meditations enact an exteriorization of madness (the madness to which he would
give voice, or at least whose silencing he would uncover), in fact, they open onto the
“mad audacity” proper to philosophy itself, namely, the ability of the basic metaphysical
truth of the Cogito to withstand the test of madness, to be “valid even if I am mad.”597
In other words, for Derrida, what Foucault in his preface calls “the obscure common
root”598 of reason and madness – the “degree zero of the history of madness, when it was
undifferentiated experience, the still undivided experience of the division itself”599 – is
not a tragic limit-experience expelled by philosophy as the latter’s first condition. Rather,
before any historical act of founding division would have been instituted, this common
root is embedded in the very ground of philosophy, in the “supreme self-confidence” and
597
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“hyperbolic audacity of the Cartesian Cogito,” “this zero point” or “impenetrable point of
certainty” that makes possible any “project of thinking.”600
It would thus seem that much of the force of Derrida’s critique is directed against
Foucault’s original preface. Nevertheless, most of the attention in the Foucault-Derrida
debate has centered around their competing interpretations of Descartes, and this, for the
apparently straightforward reason that Foucault – by removing his original preface from
the second edition of History of Madness; and by focusing his well-known rejoinder, an
essay entitled “My Body, This Paper, This Fire” and appended to that second edition, on
the disputed passage from the First Meditation – seems to have largely conceded
Derrida’s first line of criticism. In point of fact, however, Foucault penned two responses
to Derrida in 1972: the aforementioned appendix is a revision of an earlier essay, which
first appeared in the Japanese journal Paideia under the simple title “Reply to
Derrida.”601 This initial response is shorter than the more famous second version, and its
exegetical engagement with Descartes’s text, less developed; but what it shows, which
tends to drop out of the later text, is not only that Foucault does marshal an answer to
Derrida’s first set of charges, but that he does so in the strongest of terms, clarifying the
philosophical and political significance of the debate.
Two considerable issues are at stake here: (1) whether or not reason has its ground
in a constitutive exclusion, which would leave the rational project itself unjustified, with
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no foundation other than one of arbitrary violence; and (2) whether philosophical
discourse can enter into relation with what is radically outside it, or whether, with Derrida,
“the exterior (is) the interior,”602 “there is nothing outside the text,”603 and the supposed
radicality of exteriority is always already contained within, made possible by, and
reiterated through philosophy itself. In the first case, Derrida challenges the core of
Foucault’s project as a counter-history (and, specifically for our purposes, as vertical
critique), while in the second, he rejects the very concept of the ‘thought of the outside’
that was so integral to Foucault’s work throughout the 1960s (and to the vertical form of
the limit-experience).
Foucault’s answer in “Reply to Derrida,” unique to this essay, is to argue that if
Derrida cannot conceive of a form of thought that would open onto the outside – if he is
“so preoccupied with remaining in the interiority of philosophy” that he cannot
“recognize this external event, this limit event, this primary division”604 by which the
positivity of reason is predicated on the exclusion of madness –, then this is because
Derrida’s own thought is determined by three “postulates” that serve as the traditional
armature for the institution of philosophy in France.605 First, every form of knowledge or
rational discourse “entertains a fundamental relation with philosophy,”606 which confers
on the former its epistemic justification as rational or as knowledge (philosophy as law of
discourse). Second, any mistake made in regard to philosophy is not an error in argument
602
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so much as “a blend of Christian sin and Freudian slip,”607 a moral fault inadvertently
revealing a wayward inner logic that only philosophy can disclose and correct
(philosophy as totalization of meaning and moralization of truth). Third, philosophy, as
“the repetition of an origin that is more than originary, and which infinitely exceeds, in its
retreat, anything that it could say in any of its historical discourses,”608 is sealed off from
any event, any encounter with singular forces outside it that it would not have been able
to master in advance (philosophy as impermeable to the event).
In other words, Foucault’s reply to the first part of Derrida’s critique is to disclose
the dominant conditions of discourse that make his charge possible – and then to call
these conditions themselves into question. Indeed, for Foucault, the three postulates
summarize everything in the intellectual domain from which he had tried “for so long”609
to free himself.
In opposition to them, he advances three counter-theses, following from the method
of ‘archaeology’ that he had developed in the intervening years since Derrida’s essay.
First, philosophy is not foundational for knowledge; on the contrary, the formation of
philosophy as a kind of knowledge is itself subject to historico-epistemic conditions that
are exterior to it. Second, “the systematicity which links together forms of discourse,
concepts, institutions, and practices is not of the order of a forgotten radical thought that
has been covered over and hidden from itself, nor is it a Freudian unconscious,”610 but
rather, the unconscious of knowledge is constituted by a specific set of rules governing
the emergence of statements and discursive practices. Third, far from being impermeable
607
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to events, thought itself can be understood as an event (e.g., a singular, transformative
epistemic event, such as the Copernican turn), and the history of thought can be analyzed
in terms of “the ‘events’ that can come about in the order of knowledge, and which
cannot be reduced either to the general law of some kind of ‘progress’, or the repetition
of an origin”611; it is in this sense that Foucault refers to History of Madness as “the
analysis of an event.”612 He then applies this archaeological method to the exegetical
dispute over the First Meditation, arguing that the foundational exclusion of madness by
the meditating subject can only be apprehended when the text is read as a meditative
technique, that is, as a series of discursive events modifying the subject, rather than
through the traditional lens of the ‘order of reason’ imported by Derrida.
If, for Foucault, what is at stake philosophically in this debate with Derrida is the
evental status of thought, then conversely, the political stakes concern the thought of the
event. In an interview given just three months prior to the publication of “Reply to
Derrida,” Foucault identifies the categories of power and the event as central to the kind
of counter-knowledge that, as we saw in Chapter 4, he will later call a ‘philosophy of the
people’:
Under the categories of what has alternately been called ‘truth,’ ‘man,’ ‘culture,’
‘writing,’ etc., it is always a matter of warding off the shock of that which happens
[ce qui se produit]: the event. … In the broadest sense, the event and power are
what are excluded from knowledge, such as it is organized in our society. This is to
be expected, since class power (which determines this knowledge) must appear
inaccessible to the event; and the event, in its dangerous aspect, must be dominated
and dissolved in the continuity of a class power that remains unnamed. On the other
hand, the proletariat develops a form of knowledge where it is a question of the
struggle for power, of what must be done to give rise to the event, respond to its
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urgency, or avoid it, etc.; this is a knowledge that is absolutely inassimilable to the
first kind, since it is centered around power and the event.613
The appearance of impermeability to the event is required for the organization of a
dominant form of power-knowledge that must present itself as natural, necessary, or
universal so as to cover over its own contingency (hence mutability, fragility); in turn,
this concealment functions to safeguard the invisibility of power, to mask its exercise and
its effects on the conditions of the possible. Seen in this light, when Foucault opposes his
own mode of analysis to Derridean deconstruction by asserting that Derrida “does not
know the category of the singular event,”614 at issue is less a methodological question615
than the implied political charge that Derrida’s thought is determined by, and unwittingly
reinforces, ‘class power.’
Thus, far from tacitly conceding Derrida’s essential claim that ‘the exterior (is) the
interior,’ and thereby abandoning the thesis of constitutive exclusion along with his
original preface, Foucault instead situates Derrida’s critique itself, and his philosophical
project more generally, within the regime of power-knowledge that functions by
excluding the double thought of the singular event – ‘this external event, this limit event,
this primary division’ – and power. By positioning Derrida as “the most profound and the
most radical”616 contemporary example of philosophy qua dominant discourse, Foucault
thus seeks to flip deconstruction on its head, effectively charging it with being a
monolithic, logocentric, totalizing form of discourse that forecloses any relation to an
613
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outside and thus to difference as such, which is to say, to the singular event as production
of the new and force of transformation.
By contrast, what is needed, and what Foucault will seek to elaborate, is a form of
counter-knowledge ‘centered around power and the event’: a kind of minoritarian
philosophy (‘of the people’), which Deleuze and Guattari, referring to Foucault, call
“outside thought” or “counterthought,”617 and which Foucault, referring to Deleuze, calls
“thought of the multiple – of the nomadic and dispersed multiplicity”.618 Indeed, it is
precisely the “intensive thought” of Deleuze – about which Foucault writes: “new
thought is possible; thought is again possible”619 – that enables Foucault to recast the
concept of verticality, to which our next section will turn.
However, before concluding our consideration of the possible set of objections to
verticality’s return, the fact must still be addressed: in 1972, Foucault suppressed the
original preface of History of Madness, containing the key reference (in that work) to
experiential verticality, as well as the original title, containing the capitalized word
“Unreason.” What, then, did he reject exactly? I would suggest there are at least three
reasons for this self-distancing, all of which are addressed by (and help explain) the
subsequent conceptual developments of verticality.
First, the form of expression proper to the limit-experience of unreason – that
through which experiential verticality is realized – is the work of art, especially the work
of literature. Accordingly, Foucault effectively abandons this aspect of his earlier project
when he abjures his literary politics (by the end of 1970); it then becomes a matter of
617
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relocating the vertical form of limit-experience, from intellectual works to the collective
experience of political uprising.
Second, Foucault rejects the element of transcendence and its residual appeal to a
kind of existential authenticity that had characterized his early notion of the vertical limitexperience (e.g., the tragic axis of the death dream, or the invocation of Artaud and his
notion of the ‘authentically insane’). He then reformulates the irreducibility of
experiential verticality in terms of intensity (what Deleuze calls the ‘intensive,’ as
opposed to the ‘extensive,’ or ‘becoming,’ as opposed to ‘history’): in the will to revolt,
the vertical limit-experience becomes immanent, collectively realized and “transformed
into a force,”620 and the degree zero refers to the absolute limit of power’s exercise.
Third, with respect to critical verticality, while Foucault does not reject the general
notion of constitutive division, he does distance himself from what in the original preface
had suggested a certain primordiality of the limit-experience, which, preceding the
chronological order of history, would be realized in history as something like the return
of the repressed.621 Foucault maintains the critical concept of the degree zero as vertical
limit, 622 but he does so from the genealogical perspective that takes ‘origin’ to refer to a
site of emergence in the immanent plane of force relations, which is to say, as a singular,
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transformative event whose upsurge constitutes the entrance of force into history; such is
the production of the new, which is also a rupture in the historical conditions of social
production that constitutes the very possibility of political agency.
In sum, Foucault removed his original preface from History of Madness in response
to two problems. The first is the problem of transcendence, which prompts the vertical
limit-experience to be reconceived intensively, both with respect to the limit itself, i.e.,
the degree zero (of history, of power’s exercise), and with respect to the relation to that
limit (whether the genealogical perspective on history, or the collective experience of
political uprising). The second is the problem of material expression, since a new “form
of expression”623 other than literature must be conceived that would satisfy the conditions
of realization for this intensive experiential verticality to be ‘transformed into a force,’
prompting the conceptual convergence of vertical and transversal politics in Foucault’s
theory of revolt. Detailing Foucault’s response to these problems will ultimately provide
us the resources for constructing an account of the necessary conditions for political
agency.

6.2
6.2.1

Middle Experience: The ‘Vertical Dimension of Intensities’

The Verticality of Deleuzian Repetition: Evental Thought and Eternal Return

In Chapter 3, we saw how Deleuze offered Foucault a way out of the impasse
resulting from the collapse of literary politics in the face of the problem of capitalism.
What must now be shown is how this ‘way out’ is twofold, corresponding to the double
thought of power and the event that is excluded from the dominant organization of
623
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knowledge in society and affirmed by minoritarian counter-thought. On the one hand, as
we have seen, the thought of power, which Foucault credits Deleuze with having
explored,624 initiates the line of transversal politics. On the other hand, for Foucault,
Deleuze also opens the thought of the event, preparing a renewal of vertical politics by
allowing the irreducibility proper to verticality to be conceived immanently, as the
irreducibility of the intensive to the extensive.
Now, although not named as such, we have already encountered one formulation of
the Deleuzian concept of the event: namely, the breakthrough, the “revolutionary line of
flight,” “the revolutionary break” that “cannot be achieved except at the cost of, and by
means of a rupture with, causality.”625 Similarly, with respect to Deleuze’s earlier event
philosophy, discussed by Foucault in his review of Logic of Sense and Difference and
Repetition (“Theatrum Philosophicum,” published in November 1970), events are in
some sense irreducible to the macrophysical causal order in which they are realized:
“Physics concerns causes, but events, which arise as its effects, no longer belong to it.”626
Perhaps we can already begin to sense how verticality, which from the first had
concerned a basic irreducibility to history and the “rational concatenation of causes,”627
would align with the thought of the event. It is as though Foucault, just as he is rejecting
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the vertical exteriority of literature628, finds in Deleuze’s ‘intensive thought’ of
“incorporeal materiality”629 a new way to conceive verticality, indexed no longer on an
ontology of literary language but an evental metaphysics of force, or what Foucault calls
“a metaphysics of the incorporeal event”630: “a metaphysics freed from its original
profundity as well as from a supreme being”; “a metaphysics where it is no longer a
question of the One Good but of the absence of God”; a metaphysics, in short, that
“revolves around atheism and transgression” and recalls “Sade and Bataille”631.
Indeed, it is precisely in terms of the transgressive sublime function – that is, the
dissolution of the subject achieved through an intensive limit-experience of thought – that
Deleuze can be situated in relation to Sade and Bataille, as well as other vertical thinkers
in between, such as Nietzsche and Artaud. While there is a longer story to tell than is
presently possible concerning Deleuze’s metaphysics of intensive difference in
Difference and Repetition, the specifically vertical nature of what he calls ‘repetition for
itself’ indicates how Deleuze’s thought – which Foucault describes as “genital thought,
intensive thought, affirmative thought, acategorical thought”632 – enables Foucault to
recast the concept of verticality.
For Deleuze, there are two basic “forms of repetition”: the first, a “repetition of the
Same, explained by the identity of the concept or representation,” is a “horizontal,”
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“extensive,” “ordinary” repetition; the second is a “vertical,” “intensive,” “singular”633
repetition in which difference itself is what repeats. Now, in general, repetition consists in
“elements that are absolutely identical (if they are not identical, then there is no
repetition), but yet must also be different (if they are not distinguishable, then we once
again have no repetition, as we only have one event).”634 In the first, horizontal form of
repetition, “when we find ourselves confronted by identical elements with exactly the
same concept,”635 repetition is representational: the common concept is what accounts for
the identity of the elements (the sense in which they are the same), while their difference
must be referred to the subject of representation, to “a change … produced in the mind
which contemplates….”636
In other words, as was the case with phenomenological experience, horizontal
repetition is grounded in the synthetic activity of a constitutive subject; and as was the
case in our discussion of vertical and horizontal language in early Foucault, horizontality
633
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indicates the representational function of thought, in this instance, discursive cognition.
By contrast, in the second, vertical form of repetition, the identical element that is
repeated is not some one thing, cognizable under a concept with extension in the ordinary
world of objects. Rather, the identical element repeated is repetition itself, repetition
eternally repeating – and thus performing precisely the kind of infinitely recursive, autodoubling function that, as we saw in Chapter 2, is distinctive of verticality. Further, and
for the same reason, the difference ‘between’ elements is understood not by reference to
the subject of representation, but to an auto-differing of the element of repetition with
itself: that is, what is repeated, what recurs in ‘repetition for itself,’ is ‘difference in itself,’
a pure process of becoming that disperses the fixed identity of the subject. To better
understand this latter point, let us consider the limit-case, privileged by Deleuze, of
Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence.
The thought of the eternal return, first introduced in the penultimate paragraph of
Book Four of The Gay Science, begins as a meditation on becoming.637 Arising in the
hour of one’s ‘loneliest loneliness,’ the thought is posed by one’s ‘demon’ as a
hypothetical test: how would you be affected if you heard that the absolute entirety of
past and present existence, including your own in its irreversible necessity and singularity,
were to be eternally repeated and endlessly re-lived? Would you be crushed by the weight
of resentment, sorrow, and spite, or would you rejoice and declare the good news and its
daimonic bearer divine? Most simply, then, the thought of the eternal return opens as an
ethical test of self-affirmation – all things are so tightly entwined that to affirm yourself,
637
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you must affirm the absolute infinity of past and present time – and yields the practical
maxim: act in such a way that you can will or desire your action to be repeated an infinite
number of times.
One who is able to pass this test is thus able to ‘will the past,’ which for Nietzsche
is the ultimate criterion of becoming-active, the distinguishing mark of the transmutation
of reactive force by which ressentiment is overcome.638 But since the past invariably
issues into the present, one can only will the past absolutely if one can affirm the very
passage and transience of time itself: the infinite movement of destruction and creation,
the eternal rhythm of passing away and returning, the pure process of becoming. This
speculative affirmation of what Deleuze calls ‘the being of becoming’ doubles as a
practical ethical affirmation: one can only will the past by affirming the necessity of its
role in effectuating the present; by affirming this present moment itself in both its
singular necessity (this instant could not be any different than it is without altering the
entirety of the infinite past) and necessary passage; and by thus incorporating the past
into the futural movement of one’s own active self-becoming.
To say Yes to the eternal return, then, is to will or desire the repetition of the past as
an affirmation of the future – which is to say, precisely Deleuze’s concept of ‘repetition
for itself,’ or vertical repetition, in Difference and Repetition, “making repetition the
category of the future.”639 In other words, the infinite past is affirmed in the very activity
of becoming by which the future, too, is affirmed: the affirmation of the open Moment
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and the eternity it expresses640 achieves the synthesis of time as the double affirmation of
past and future.641 By affirming oneself in one’s movement of radical self-becoming, one
affirms one’s very being as becoming, as a singular expression of the being of becoming
by which existence itself is affirmed and affirms itself. And it is this thought of radical or
pure becoming, the ontological primacy of the being of becoming, that explains
Foucault’s claim that Deleuze’s metaphysics ‘revolves around atheism and transgression,’
i.e., around a fundamental groundlessness conceived through an intensive movement of
thought by which the representational or phenomenological subject position is undone:
“Repetition in the eternal return never means continuation, perpetuation or prolongation,
nor even the discontinuous return of something which would at least be able to be
prolonged in a partial cycle (an identity, an I, a Self) but, on the contrary, … presupposes
the dissolution of all prior identities.”642
We can thus see how Deleuze, for Foucault, opens anew the possibility for vertical
thought – ‘genital thought, intensive thought, affirmative thought, acategorical thought’ –,
breaking with the representational operation of discursive cognition through the idea of
eternal recurrence. As Foucault writes, “We must avoid thinking that the return is the
form of a content that is difference,” which would be to conceive the eternal return on the
640
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horizontal model of repetition; “rather, from an always-nomadic and anarchic difference,”
or difference in itself, “to the unavoidably excessive and displaced sign of recurrence,” or
repetition for itself, “a lightning storm was produced which will bear the name of
Deleuze: new thought is possible; thought is again possible.”643
Such thought is genital, a reference to Artaud,644 insofar as it is “an event-thought
… instead of a subject-thought,” “grappling with exterior forces instead of being gathered
up in an interior form”645; intensive, insofar as what occurs in the idea of vertical
repetition is the auto-intensification of thought itself, thought increasing its proper power
of activity by passing through the test of the eternal return; affirmative, insofar as it is by
affirming eternal recurrence, as the being of becoming, that thought effects its own
becoming-active; and a-categorical, insofar as such thought functions as an ‘apresentational’646 singularity or degree of power, a “thought-event”647 generating force,
by contrast to representational or discursive thought, e.g., the Kantian understanding,
which operates through apprehensive and recognitive syntheses to subsume objects of
intuition under concepts. Indeed, the example of Kant is doubly relevant, for the thought
of vertical repetition is precisely akin to the experience of the sublime, which, all while
undoing the foundational structure of the transcendental subject, elevates thought to its
643
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greatest intensity, to thought’s own absolute, which is for it a ‘soul-stirring delight’
(Kant).
In short, like the vertical line of flight in early Foucault that frees language from its
horizontal function as communication, Deleuze opens a form of outside thought through
the idea of vertical repetition that frees thought itself from its representational function.

6.2.2

Vertical Intensity and the ‘Liberation of Difference’

In this light, let us turn, finally, to the passage in “Theatrum Philosophicum” where
Foucault, referring to Difference and Repetition, first casts “the vertical dimension” in
terms of intensities. Foucault begins by depicting “the functioning of the concept,” the
hallmark of discursive cognition, as that which allows the multiplicity of the manifold to
be ordered according to a table of representations: “For the concept to master difference,
perception must apprehend global resemblances (which will then be decomposed into
differences and partial identities) at the root of what we call ‘diversity’ [le divers].”648
The concept allows any singularity encountered to be recognized, represented as an
intelligible objet of intuition on the basis of its resemblance to other representations
(falling under the same concept), from which it can then, in turn, be comparatively
differentiated. In other words, once the extensity of a singularity is established (that is,
identified as an object of intuition subsumed under a concept), its intensity can be
captured or represented as a relative quantity (greater or less): “Each new representation
must be accompanied [s’accompagne] by those representations which display the full
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range of resemblances; and in this space of representation (sensation - image - memory),
likenesses are put to the test of quantitative equalization and graduated quantities, and in
this way the immense table of measurable differences is constructed.”649 This ‘immense
table’ is, indeed, how representational thought organizes the manifold as a denumerable
and orderable multiplicity, ‘mastering difference’ by reducing it to a hierarchical metric
of comparison. And as with horizontal repetition, where the necessary difference between
identical elements is ultimately located in a modification of the mind who contemplates
them, so too, discursive cognition refers back to a subject – in this case, the subject of
“good sense” – that serves as “the world’s most effective agent of division in its
recognitions, its establishment of equivalences, its sensitivity to gaps, its gauging of
distances, as it assimilates and separates.”650
It will thus come as no surprise that when Foucault articulates verticality in terms of
intensity, he does so in calling for the overcoming of “the philosophy of representation”:
“Let us pervert good sense and allow thought to play outside the ordered table of
resemblances; then it will appear as the vertical dimension [une verticalité] of intensities,
because intensity, well before its gradation by representation, is in itself pure
difference…. One must give rise to thought [Il faut penser la pensée] as intensive
irregularity. Dissolution of the Me.”651 As in Foucault’s earlier formulation, ‘verticality’
refers to that which is ‘outside’ the ‘space of representation’ and ‘before’ the procedures
ordering the latter (in this case, by capturing pure difference and reducing it to a measure
of comparative ‘gradation’); in some sense, then, vertical irreducibility is still understood
649
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in terms of exteriority and anteriority. Further, verticality retains its transgressive sublime
function, dissolving the identity of the subject, or undoing what Bataille called le moisujet. However, rather than to a quasi-primordial experience of transcendence, ‘the
vertical dimension’ refers now to an intensive vector of thought652: both the thought of
intensity (intensity as le pensé, or that which is thought) and thought as intensity
(intensity as la pensée, or thought itself), befitting the auto-implicative structure of
verticality.653
Moreover, as intensity, this vertical vector of thought ‘is in itself pure difference,’ a
singular event or ‘intensive irregularity’ productive of the new. We have seen how this
holds in the eternal return, where what recurs in vertical repetition is difference in itself
as the being of becoming; it also holds for intensity generally, insofar as “intensity
affirms difference”654 in its positivity as intensive singularity. This characteristic of
intensity distinguishes it from essential properties, which presuppose difference as
negation, as in the proposition, “if x differs from y, x is not y.”655 Henry Somers-Hall
explains this point through the example of “the Aristotelian notion of definition”: “when
we want… to talk about the essence of man, we d[o] so by attributing a property to him
called a difference. This difference allow[s] us to divide the genus into two opposed
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classes: the rational and the non-rational. Negation [i]s thus fundamental to the process of
definition, and to the specification of properties.”656
Such is the operation of constitutive division at the level of thought, akin to the
dividing practices of ‘binary segmentarity’ (Deleuze and Guattari) at the level of the
social formation: that is, a procedure for the “subjection of difference”657 by which
essential identities are formed through exclusive disjunction between binary opposites.
Indeed, this is a general feature of categorical thinking, or what Foucault calls “the
philosophy of representation,” in which “the relationship of two predicates, like red and
green, is merely the highest level of a complex structure: the contradiction between red
and not-red (based on the model of being and non-being) is active on the lowest level; the
nonidentity of red and green (on the basis of a negative test of recognition) is situated
above this; and this ultimately leads to the exclusive position of red and green (in the
table where the genus color is specified).”658
Thus, when Foucault, concluding that “[d]ifference can only be liberated through
the invention of an acategorical thought,”659 characterizes Deleuze’s atheistictransgressive metaphysics as ‘a-categorical’ and ‘affirmative,’ he describes in effect a
form of ‘counterthought’ (Deleuze and Guattari), one taking as its domain of analysis the
656
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‘vertical dimension of intensities,’ which is to say, the evental field of productive
difference. In such a way does Deleuze, in addition to having explored the thought of
power, advance the thought of the singular event – which advance thereby enables
verticality itself to be rethought intensively. As we will see, it is this intensive-vertical
dimension, precisely, that will be the locus of agential force, designating a condition for
the possibility of political agency, and, as Foucault will say of revolt, “a last anchor point”
for “[a]ll the forms of established or demanded freedom....”660
We can also begin to see how verticality and transversality conceptually interrelate,
for vertical counter-thought is perfectly consistent with the later, transversal formulation
of subversive minoritarian counter-discourse. Take, for example, a principle aim of
transversal politics discussed last chapter, namely, to provide the conditions for a
“philosophy of the people” to achieve for itself, “through revolt and struggles, the force
to express itself”661: this kind of project can now be characterized in terms of constructing
a collective form of expression that would realize, as force, what is experienced by ‘the
people’ at the vertical level of intensity. That is, if transversal connection satisfies a
condition for the realization of political agency, it will do so by providing a form of
expression adequate to solving the vertical problem of material expression (i.e., how that
which is irreducible to history can nevertheless transform the conditions of history),
conceived now in intensive terms through the ‘incorporeal materiality’ of the event. This,
as we will see, is precisely what is at issue in Foucault’s account of political uprising.
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Finally, before taking leave of “Theatrum Philosophicum,” it is worth briefly
remarking on Foucault’s first sentence introducing Difference and Repetition: “Instead of
denouncing the fundamental omission that is presumed to have inaugurated Western
culture, Deleuze, with the patience of a Nietzschean genealogist, points to the variety of
small impurities and paltry compromises.”662 In effect, Foucault here sets Deleuze apart
from, if not in opposition to, the lineage of thought running from Heidegger to Derrida,
that is, the critique of metaphysics as the forgetting of Being (that ‘fundamental omission
that is presumed to have inaugurated Western culture’). Instead, Foucault aligns Deleuze
with the Nietzschean tradition of genealogy, anticipating his own seminal essay several
months later, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.”663
However, it is difficult to not also hear in Foucault’s phrasing an implicit selfdistancing from his original preface to History of Madness, where, again with reference
to Nietzsche, Foucault writes: “At the centre of these limit-experiences of the Western
world is the explosion, of course, of the tragic itself – Nietzsche having shown that the
tragic structure from which the history of the Western world is made is nothing other than
the refusal, the forgetting and the silent collapse of tragedy.”664 In both Foucault’s
preface from 1961 and his allusion to Heidegger in 1970, what is in question is a
fundamental forgetting taken to be constitutive of the history of Western culture: in the
first case, however, it is a thesis advanced by Foucault, whereas in the second, it is one
against which he favorably contrasts Deleuze.
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I would thus suggest that there is a conceptual displacement from the early period
of Foucault to the middle period, which is made possible, at least in part, by the impact of
Deleuze on Foucault, and which can be marked, with respect to Foucault’s intellectual
ancestry, by his shift in emphasis from the Nietzsche of Birth of Tragedy to that of the
Genealogy. At issue in this displacement – which is something like the becomingimmanent of Foucault’s thought – will be a rethinking, in intensive terms, of the relation
between vertical critique and history: which is also to say, a rethinking of the ‘limit event’
(‘external event, primary division’) that would no longer appeal to a quasi-primordial
origins story, nor to an attendant experience of transcendence, but to the emergence of
singular events within an immanent field of force relations.

6.3

Middle Critique: The ‘Vertical’ Relation of Genealogy to History
6.3.1

The Contingency and Singularity of Evental Emergence

In important respects, there is a clear continuity between Foucault’s earlier analysis
of Nietzschean interpretation (in “Nietzsche, Freud, Marx,” the essay Foucault presented
at the 1964 Nietzsche conference organized by Deleuze) and his turn to genealogy.665 In
both cases, Foucault locates in Nietzsche a form of vertical critique that would disclose
the singular and contingent conditions for what is taken to be grounded in universal
necessity: e.g., revealing the ‘ideal depth’ of conscience or consciousness, taken as the
essence of human being, to be in fact the historical effect of force relations, and
665
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specifically, of the reactive forces of ressentiment, which, blocked from discharging
themselves in herd society, are re-directed inward, bringing about “the internalizing of
man” from which there “first grows in man that which he later calls his ‘soul.’”666
Indeed, this example, which we discussed in Chapter 2, illustrates a basic principle
of genealogical critique, already active in Foucault’s earlier formulation of vertical
interpretation: namely, what we might call the contingency thesis. Articulated as an antiessentialist critique of original identity, this thesis holds that “behind things,” there is
“not a timeless and essential secret but the secret that they have no essence…. What is
found at the historical beginnings of things is not the inviolable identity of their origin; it
is the dissension of other things. It is disparity.”667 Thus, for instance, genealogy situates
the ‘soul’ as a chance effect of history, and specifically, of a relation between forces
(thus indicating a constitutive ‘disparity’ or difference).
The same can be said for the modern moral values installed through the singular
event that Nietzsche calls the ‘slave revolt in morality’: to discover the ‘historical
beginnings’ of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ is to show how they are founded not in universal moral
truth, but in the ‘dissension’ from or rejection of an older system of values; indeed, it is to
show how the modern ‘good’ is but the derivative, reactively-formed contrast concept of
‘evil,’ which is itself the negative transvaluation of what had previously constituted the
‘good’ (the overflowing strength, etc., of noble morality). As for the purported freedom
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of the ‘soul,’ “genealogical analysis shows that the concept of liberty is an ‘invention of
the ruling classes’ and not fundamental to man’s nature or at the root of his attachment to
being and truth.”668 That is, rather than pertaining to the essence of the soul or the
original truth of man’s identity, the ‘concept of liberty’ is itself the effect of a powerknowledge regime, which is to say, a strategic instrument deployed in a struggle between
disparate forces.
In turn, from the application of the contingency thesis to the case of the ‘soul’, there
follows another basic feature of genealogy, which was already active in Foucault’s
formulations of experiential verticality: namely, the dissolution of the subject: “Where
the soul pretends unification or the Me [le Moi] fabricates a coherent identity, the
genealogist sets out to study the beginning – numberless beginnings, whose faint traces
and hints of color are readily seen by a historical eye. The analysis of descent permits the
dissociation of the Me, its recognition and displacement as an empty synthesis, in
liberating a profusion of lost events.”669 Just as the vertical limit-experience ruptures the
unity of the ego-subject (moi-sujet), so, too, genealogy performs the transgressive
sublime function, “shattering the unity of man’s being….”670 However, it does so through
its movement as vertical critique, “follow[ing] the complex course of descent,” which is
to say, “maintain[ing] passing events in their proper dispersion” so as to reveal “that truth
or being lies not at the root of what we know and what we are but the exteriority of
accidents.”671
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In other words, recalling Foucault’s depiction seven years prior of the interpretive
excavator who, by “descend[ing] along the vertical line and show[ing] that this depth of
interiority is in reality something other than what it says,” “restore[s] the glittering
exteriority that was covered up and buried”672; and anticipating Foucault’s proposal 13
years later for “a historical ontology of ourselves” as the “historical investigation into the
events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of
what we are doing, thinking, [and] saying”673; genealogy dispels the self’s pretense to an
inner essence or original identity by disclosing the contingent external events that have
determined our forms of knowledge and modes of being, “reintroduc[ing] into the realm
of becoming everything considered immortal in man.”674 Indeed, this includes locating
the intensive dimension of our affective experience within the evental field of becoming,
for genealogy “must seek [events] … in what we tend to feel is without history – in
sentiments, love, conscience, instincts…. We believe that feelings are immutable, but
every sentiment, particularly the noblest and most disinterested, has a history.”675
The ‘analysis of descent’ thus reveals the historical contingency of the events that
have constituted our field of possibility, or the set of conditions for what we can say,
think, feel, do, and become.676 This descending ‘vertical line’ of critique (tracking with
Nietzsche’s term Herkunft, “descent”) is, in turn, complemented by an ascending vertical
line of analysis, which isolates what Foucault, following Nietzsche’s term Entstehung,
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calls “emergence, the moment of arising. It stands as the principle and the singular law of
an apparition.”677 In other words, genealogical critique follows a double vertical
movement of (1) descent and (2) emergence; and while the work of the former is ‘to
maintain passing events in their proper dispersion’ so as to demonstrate the contingency
of what has constituted contemporary reality, the task of the latter is to grasp these events
in the singularity of their ‘arising.’678
By locating the event in its singular ‘apparition’ or “eruption,”679 crossing over the
“threshold of emergence”680 and entering into history, genealogy thus allows Foucault to
re-articulate what, in History of Madness, he had termed the ‘degree zero’ of history. At
issue in both cases is an event – what Foucault, in his first reply to Derrida a year later,
will call a ‘limit event’ – that is constitutive or transformative of history, yet in some
sense irreducible to it. This irreducibility designates a kind of limit-relation to history;
and the form of analysis its perspective makes possible, whether ‘vertical reinterpretation’
or what Foucault will now call ‘effective’ history (following Nietzsche’s wirkliche
Historie, another term for genealogy), contests the traditional conception of history:
The traditional devices for constructing a comprehensive view of history and for
retracing the past as a patient and continuous development must be systematically
dismantled. … An entire historical tradition (theological or rationalistic) aims at
677

Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 376. Note that Foucault’s term apparition, which connotes
the phantasmatic, suggests a connection here with Deleuze’s concept of the phantasm, discussed by
Foucault in “Theatrum Philosophicum.” The notion of phantasm also appears in Nietzsche’s Genealogy
(e.g., II, §12), as cited by Foucault: “If [the world] appears as a ‘marvelous motley, profound and totally
meaningful,’ this is because it began and continues its secret existence through a ‘host of errors and
phantasms’” (Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 381).
678
This double movement of descent and arising would seem to be pre-figured in “Nietzsche, Freud, Marx”
by the counter-intuitive imagery, discussed in Chapter 3, of the descending interpreter whose interpretation
is itself an ascending projection: “For if the interpreter must go to the bottom himself, like an excavator, the
movement of interpretation is, on the contrary, that of a projection [surplomb], of a more and more elevated
projection….” (Foucault, “Nietzsche, Freud, Marx,” 273)
679
Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 380.
680
Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morality, II, §6; cited by Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 378.

268
dissolving the singular event into an ideal continuity – as a theological movement or
a natural process. ‘Effective’ history, however, deals with [fait resurgir] events in
terms of their most unique characteristics, their most acute manifestations.681
Like the notion of horizontal history in Foucault’s work on madness, which refers
to a teleological and progressivist understanding of historical time, traditional history
assumes the “suprahistorical perspective” of “a history whose function is to compose the
finally reduced diversity of time into a totality fully closed upon itself….”682 Foucault
also refers to this as “de-eventalized history,” which explains its objects of analysis by
ascribing them “the most unitary, necessary, inevitable, and (ultimately) extrahistorical
mechanism or structure available,” e.g., “[a]n economic mechanism, an anthropological
structure, or a demographic process….”683 By contrast, the function of genealogy is to
“record the singularity of events outside of any monotonous finality,”684 throwing into
relief the disruptive and anarchic difference that they introduce into the field of history.
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6.3.2

Limit-Event: The Becoming-Force of Vertical Intensity in and against History

Indeed, it is here in particular that we can discern the impact of Deleuze on
Foucault’s turn to genealogy, for the analysis of emergence is conducted in terms of a
differential multiplicity of force relations. Anticipating Foucault’s comment the following
year to Deleuze that reading his works, from Nietzsche and Philosophy to Anti-Oedipus,
had been “essential” because, “under the ancient theme of meaning…, you have
developed the question of power, of the inequality of powers and their struggles,”685
Foucault writes:
Genealogy, however, seeks to reestablish the various systems of subjection: not the
anticipatory power of meaning, but the hazardous [hasardeux] play of dominations.
Emergence is always produced in a particular state of forces. The analysis of the
Entstehung must delineate this interaction, the manner of the struggle that these
forces wage against each other or against adverse circumstances…. Emergence is
thus the entry of forces; it is their eruption, the leap from the wings to center
stage….686
If the affirmative-intensive thought of vertical repetition in Deleuze’s metaphysics
is a matter of freeing difference from subjection to categorical thinking, the genealogical
project of vertical critique is a matter of meticulously analyzing ‘various systems of
subjection.’ However, this analysis, undertaken with “the acuity of a glance … that is
capable of liberating divergence and marginal elements,”687 is specifically attentive to the
inversions of force relations, which constitute systematic transformations by which
something new is produced (e.g., the slave revolt in morality). And this emergence of the
new, this ‘entry of forces’ is not to be explained teleologically by reference to final
causes (‘the anticipatory power of meaning’), but strategically and contingently in terms
685
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of aleatory struggles; for an event just is “the reversal of a relationship of forces…. The
forces operating in history do not obey destiny or regulative mechanisms, but the luck of
the battle. They do not manifest the successive forms of a primordial intention and their
attention is not that of a conclusion, for they always appear through the singular
randomness of events.”688
Forces, then, ‘operate in history’; yet their singular, evental ‘eruption’ into history
can neither be predicted nor ultimately explained by means of the laws of historical
causation, whether the latter be conceived ‘theologically’ as ‘destiny’ or ‘rationalistically’
as ‘mechanism.’689 It is therefore the element of force itself that is irreducible to history,
for the event is precisely that which is constitutive of history without being derivable
from it. That is, the event functions as a kind of immanent degree zero of history; and
rather than owing to a form of quasi-primordial transcendence, the anteriority of this
degree zero refers to the ontological primacy of intensive difference; for the event, as a
reversal of forces itself productive of force, is nothing other than a singular expression of
what Deleuze calls ‘the being of becoming,’ and what, with reference to Foucault fifteen
years later, he will term the “perpetual becoming” of forces: “there is a becoming of
forces which doubles history.”690 As Foucault puts it, “The world such as we are
acquainted with it is not this ultimately simple configuration where events are reduced to
accentuate their essential traits, their final meaning, or their initial and final value. On the
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contrary, it is a profusion [myriade] of entangled events,”691 which is to say, a differential,
non-denumerable multiplicity of force relations.
In such a way, the irreducibility distinctive of verticality is recast intensively in
terms of evental becoming, a thought expressed by Deleuze and Guattari in What is
Philosophy? when they write: “becoming … is born in History, and falls back into it, but
is not of it. … What History grasps of the event is its effectuation in states of affairs or in
lived experience, but the event in its becoming … escapes History.”692 And indeed, we
can begin to see here how the transversal analysis of lines of flight, as centrifugal vectors
of force, will connect to the vertical analysis of intensity: namely, as the intensive vector
of becoming which ‘escapes History.’
Further, in addition to helping Foucault address the problem of transcendence by
providing an immanent conception of degree zero, this reformulation of irreducibility, as
the limit-relation between the event and history, suggests a possible solution to the
vertical problem of material expression. We have seen that Foucault, with Deleuze,
conceives the ‘vertical dimension of intensities’ through the ‘incorporeal materiality’ of
the event; and since events now appear as becomings of force, or as singular expressions
of the ‘perpetual becoming’ of forces, we can characterize the event as the incorporeal
materiality of becoming. On the other hand, “History is the concrete body [le corps même]
of becoming,”693 which is to say, the very corporeal materiality of becoming. Now, if the
problem of material expression concerns how that which is irreducible to history can
691
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nevertheless act upon and transform history, then we have provisionally discovered the
general outline of a solution: the difference between the incorporeality of the event and
the corporeality of history accounts for how the former is irreducible to the latter, while
their common materiality accounts for how one could act upon the other.694

6.3.3

The Transformative Force of Vertical Thought as Genealogical Critique

Genealogy would thus be that form of critique which apprehends, as so many
singular events, what we might call the ‘becoming-force’ of the intensive-vertical
dimension in history.695 This is one sense in which effective history can be understood as
a form of vertical critique. More specifically: just as with intensive thought, in which
‘intensity’ refers to both what is thought (le pensé) and thought itself (la pensée), the
‘verticality’ in vertical thought also refers to both what is thought (the thought of
verticality) and thought itself (thought as verticality)696; and when genealogy apprehends
the ‘becoming of forces’ that ‘doubles history,’ it functions in the first sense, as the
thought of verticality. However, as is suggested by its double vertical movement of
descent and emergence, genealogy also functions as vertical thought in the second sense,
which Foucault makes explicit in writing that effective history
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…has no fear of looking down, but it looks from above and descends to seize the
various perspectives, to disclose dispersions and differences, to leave things
undisturbed in their own dimension and intensity. … Effective history studies what
is closest, but in an abrupt dispossession, so as to seize it at a distance …. The final
trait of effective history is its affirmation of a perspectival knowledge. …
Nietzsche's version of historical sense is explicit in its perspective and
acknowledges its system of injustice. Its perception is slanted, being a deliberate
appraisal, affirmation, or negation …. Through this historical sense, knowledge is
allowed to create its own genealogy in the act of cognition; and wirkliche Historie
composes a genealogy of history as the vertical projection of its position [La
wirkliche Historie effectue, à la verticale du lieu où elle se tient, la généalogie de
l'histoire].697
There are two ways in which genealogical critique itself, taken as a form of thought,
performs a vertical function. The first is related to the contingency thesis and the
hermeneutical vector of descent: by contrast to traditional historians’ “pretension to
examine things farthest from themselves,”698 the genealogist examines ‘what is closest,’
what is constitutive of her actuality, and thereby conducts what Foucault calls a ‘history
of the present’; in doing so, however, the genealogist de-familiarizes this present,
dispossessing it of what was taken to be natural, normal, or necessary. As Foucault will
put the point thirteen years later in his essay “What is Enlightenment?”, the genealogist
problematizes the present by asking: “In what is given to us as universal, necessary,
obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of
arbitrary constraints?”699
In this manner, genealogical critique calls into question the self-evidence of
contemporary reality’s horizon of intelligibility. Foucault will characterize as vertical the
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point of view that carries out this function of de-familiarization – as, for example, in his
review essay eight years later on a book by the journalist Jean Daniel, who poses the
question of “what is concealed under that precise, floating, mysterious, utterly simply
word ‘today’. Jean Daniel wrote L’Ere des ruptures [The Age of Ruptures] from a vertical
viewpoint on his journalist’s trade,”700 as “a quest for those subtler, more secret, and
more decisive moments when things begin to lose their self-evidence,”701 moments which
disclose “that everything one perceives is evident only against a familiar and little-known
horizon, that every certainty is sure only through the support of a ground that is always
unexplored.”702
The second vertical function performed by genealogy, related to its role as an
ungrounding critique of the conditions of the present,703 is the auto-doubling relation it
establishes with respect to history. In Chapter 3, we saw how Foucault defined the being
of literary language in terms of the auto-superposition of a language ‘erected vertically
above itself,’ by contrast to the ordinary form of language as communication or
horizontal conveyance of meaning. The same kind of distinction can be drawn here
regarding history.704 By contrast to the horizontal (progressivist, teleological) form of
history, which presupposes a totalizing perspective beyond history (from which vantage
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point the contingent singularity of events could be reduced either to the meaning of a
final cause or original intention, or to the generality of a mechanism), effective history, as
the ‘genealogy of history,’ is defined in terms of the auto-superposition of a history
erected vertically above itself: à la verticale du lieu où elle se tient, ‘in a vertical relation
to where it takes up position,’ to where it takes up itself taking up position, etc. We see
here the recursive, auto-doubling function proper to verticality, only now this function is
performed by virtue of Nietzschean perspectivism. Genealogy affirms itself as a
‘perspectival knowledge,’ that is, as a form of knowledge immanently emplaced within
its own domain of inquiry, actively intervening within this domain with an evaluative eye
toward transforming it; and indeed, as a critical history of the present, the genealogist is
implicated in her own genealogy, situated within that present and equally the object of
evaluation and transformation.
In turn, from this twofold vertical function of genealogical critique as defamiliarizing and auto-doubling, two implications follow that are fundamental for
Foucault’s thought. First, critical thought is work that one conducts upon oneself as a
practice of self-transformation. In this way, and in a manner that obliquely recalls
Foucault’s existential poetics sketched at the end of “Dream and Existence,”705 vertical
critique is akin to vertical experience, for the “transformation of one’s self by one’s own
knowledge is … something rather close to the aesthetic experience.”706 Indeed, genealogy
is in essence a kind of auto-critique, later formulated as “a historical ontology of
705
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ourselves,”707 through which the self becomes de-familiarized and ungrounded,
encountering itself as a stranger or double: “History becomes ‘effective’ to the degree
that it introduces discontinuity into our very being …. ‘Effective’ history leaves nothing
around the self …. It will uproot its traditional foundations and relentlessly disrupt its
pretended continuity. This is because knowledge is not made for understanding; it is
made for cutting.”708
In such a way does vertical critique perform the transgressive sublime function,
unmooring and undoing the form of the subject (what Deleuze calls the ‘man-form’), and
thereby opening up new possible modes of becoming or processes of subjectivation. In
other words, as Foucault will later put it, vertical critique constitutes a kind of
“philosophical ethos,” “a limit-attitude” that “takes the form of a possible crossing-over
[franchissement],” “separat[ing] out, from the contingency that has made us what we are,
the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think,” and
thereby “seeking to give new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work
of freedom.”709
Relatedly, the second implication, following from genealogy’s immanent vertical
perspectivism, is that critical thought, as an instrument ‘made for cutting,’ is itself
generative of force, constituting an event. That is, ‘effective’ history should be
understood literally, as an activity of thought that is itself productive of the new,
effectuating or realizing the actual: “In reality, knowledge is an event that falls under the
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category of activity….When Nietzsche speaks of the perspectival character of knowledge,
he is pointing to the fact that … knowledge is always a certain strategic relation in which
man is placed. … One can speak of the perspectival character of knowledge because
there is a battle, and knowledge is the result of this battle.”710 If perspectivism thus refers
to knowledge as a ‘strategic relation’ transforming the field of forces in which it
intervenes, then the verticality of genealogy’s perspective on history will refer
specifically to the transformative strategy of auto-critique as itself a form of struggle,
mapping “the lines of fragility” of the present, in which one is embedded, in order “to
make a topographical and geological survey of battle”711 that gives rise to ‘a possible
crossing-over.’ And insofar as the auto-transformative force of this critical undertaking,
“as work carried out by ourselves upon ourselves as free beings,” constitutes what
Foucault calls ‘the practice of freedom,’712 vertical critique will satisfy a condition of
possibility for ethico-political agency.
Foucault’s turn to genealogy therefore directs the trajectory of his own intellectual
activism, composing what we might call a ‘strategics of truth’: “I would like to produce
effects of truth which might be used for a possible battle, to be waged by those who wish
to wage it, in forms yet to be found and in organizations yet to be defined. … Telling the
truth so that it might be attackable. Deciphering a layer of reality in such a way that the
lines of force and the lines of fragility come forth, the possible points of resistance and
attack….”713 It is precisely in this sense that Deleuze will characterize Foucault as a
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cartographer, mapping the ‘lines of force’ constitutive of the social field (which Deleuze,
following Foucault’s analysis of Bentham’s Panopticon, calls the ‘diagram’) so as to
make possible the connection and quickening of a multiplicity of counter-currents of
resistance.714 Indeed, this strategics of truth constitutes, at the level of critical thought, the
very connective strategy that orients transversal resistance, working to prepare the
conditions for so many emergent lateral lines of alliance to be forged between
minoritarian struggles.
We can thus begin to elaborate how vertical critique supports and sustains
transversal politics, enumerating the set of functions defining the intellectual’s role in
facilitating political agency. Like a political analogue to Artaud’s notion of the ‘superior
lucidity’ of the ‘authentically insane,’715 the first function of Foucault’s intellectual
activism, proper to vertical critique, can be called the visionary function: that is, to see the
intolerable there where it remains unseen, and to make it visible. It is in this regard that
Deleuze will later refer to Foucault as “a kind of seer. And what he saw was actually
intolerable. … For Foucault, to think was to react to the intolerable, the intolerable things
one experienced.”716 Further, since the intolerable itself marks a limit, that threshold
where actuality cannot but be transformed, the function of “thinking as vision, as
capturing the intolerable” is also one of “thinking at something’s limit. It was two things:
seeing something unseen and thinking something that was almost at a limit.”717 Indeed, as
in the case of the GIP, the ability to see an unseen limit is to possess a kind of evental
vision, what Deleuze calls Foucault’s “keen political intuition”: “Political intuition, for
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me, is the feeling that something is going to happen and happen here, not somewhere else.
A political intuition is a very rare occurrence. Foucault sensed that there were little
movements, small disturbances in the prisons. He was not trying to take advantage of
them or cause them. He saw something.”718
To perform the visionary function is thus to intuit and make visible the experience
of the intolerable, thereby disclosing a limit that is also the site of an emergent singular
event; as we will detail in the next section, this is the absolute limit of power’s exercise,
the degree zero of the political that is both the source of revolt and ‘last anchor point’ for
‘all the forms of established or demanded freedom.’ Further, to reveal the intolerable as
intolerable is thus also, through the vertical operation of de-familiarization, to compel us
to no longer tolerate what passes as normal, “to sharpen intolerance to the facts of power”
to which we are inured; it is “an art of bringing out the exorbitant in the ordinary, and the
revolting brutality in what we tolerate out of habit. … It is a matter of multiplying ‘points
of repulsion’ in the political fabric and extending the surface of possible dissidences.”719
In this way, the visionary dimension of intellectual activism indicates how vertical
critique can act as a catalyst for the connective strategy of transversal politics.
Second, the intellectual performs an enunciative function, helping to establish or
secure the conditions for the emergence of a form of expression, or what we have seen
Deleuze and Guattari call a ‘collective assemblage of enunciation,’ through which a
minoritarian population would compose a subversive form of counter-discourse. As we
discussed in Chapter 4, this function is exemplified in the GIP’s aim to “produce new
718
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conditions for statements”720 – in that instance, for statements made by inmates and their
families about the exercise of power in prison. The enunciative function, in turn, is
complemented by a third, to which it is closely linked: namely, an amplifying function by
which counter-discursive statements would be amplified, relayed, and circulated, set into
connection with other minoritarian collectivities subjected to a common regime of power.
To use Deleuze and Guattari’s language, the amplifying function enables a multiplicity of
lines of flight to connect to one another, augmenting their valence and magnifying their
efficacy as transformative force. Or, as Foucault puts it: “The voices of an incalculable
number of speaking subjects must resonate and give voice to an innumerable experience.
… All sorts of experience must be given voice; we must lend an ear to aphasiacs, to the
excluded, to the moribund,” to all those “who effectively confront the dark and solitary
face of struggle. I believe the task of a practitioner of philosophy living in the West is to
lend an ear to all these voices.”721
In sum: by re-articulating vertical critique genealogically as a historico-critical
analysis of the immanent field of force relations, Foucault develops the double thought of
power and the event – the very thought that, as we have seen, is central to subversive
counter-knowledge as ‘a philosophy of the people’ –, since both power and the event are
conceived as functions of interactions between forces (the former as their dominant
codification, the latter as their transformative reversal). And this thought, which
consummates the ‘intensive turn’ characteristic of the middle period of verticality, forms
the basis for Foucault’s subsequent elaboration of both a transversal politics of
720
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connection (beginning with the problem of power in capitalist society) and, as we will see
next, a vertical politics of revolt.

6.4

Late Experience: The ‘Vertical Relation’ of Political Uprising to History

“There are more ideas on the earth than intellectuals often imagine. And these ideas are
more active, stronger, more resistant, and more impassioned than politics is capable of
conceiving. One must attend to the birth of ideas and to the exhibition of their force: not
in books that would pronounce them, but in the events in which they manifest their force,
in the struggles that one conducts for ideas, against them or for them. It is not ideas that
motor the world. But it is precisely because the world contains ideas (and because it
constantly produces them) that it is not without resistance conducted by those who rule
it….”
— Foucault722
6.4.1

The Vertical Experience of the Intolerable: The Fact of Revolt as the Ratio
Cognoscendi of Freedom

As indicated in the initial epigraph to this chapter, Foucault directly situates his
account of “political experience” within the tradition of the limit-experience descended
from Nietzsche and Bataille. The name he will give to this specific kind of experience is
soulèvement – a term often translated as ‘revolt,’ but the vertical imagery of which, as a
movement of elevation coming from below, is better conveyed by the word ‘uprising.’ In
addition to serving as the exemplar of evental emergence, political uprising, as an
individual or collective response to the intolerable, is the form that vertical experience
will take after Foucault has recast the concept of verticality itself immanently in terms of
‘the dimension of intensities.’
In Chapter 4, the prison movement provided an example of political uprising,
analyzed as the breakout or breakthrough of what Deleuze and Guattari call “a
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revolutionary line of flight” (e.g., the case of George Jackson). Such a centrifugal vector
of revolt, as a “revolutionary break” or “rupture with causality,”723 can now be
understood as a limit-event, or a singular event that transforms the conditions of the
possible. Indeed, what Deleuze and Guattari characterize in Anti-Oedipus in terms of
desiring-production – that is, “the order of desire and its irruption,” which alone
“accounts for the reality this rupture [with causality] assumes at a given moment, at a
given place”724 –, they articulate 12 years later, on the topic of May 1968, in terms of that
dimension of revolt which is irreducible to historical causation:
In historical phenomena such as the revolution of 1789, the Commune, the
revolution of 1917, there is always one part of the event that is irreducible to any
social determinism, or to causal chains. Historians are not very fond of this aspect:
they restore causality after the fact. Yet the event is itself a splitting off from, or a
breaking with causality; it is a bifurcation, a deviation with respect to laws, an
unstable condition which opens up a new field of the possible.725
We see here the irreducibility to history that is the hallmark of the vertical
dimension, framed as that aspect of the insurrectionary event which exceeds ‘any social
determinism’ or ‘causal chains,’ i.e., which can be neither explained nor predicted by the
existing set of social, economic, and political conditions and processes. Like the entry of
force into history through the singular emergence of the event, political uprising is a
production of the new, and specifically, of ‘a new field of the possible’: the event “is an
opening onto the possible,” but “the possible does not pre-exist, it is created by the
event.”726 That is, rather than actualizing a latent but extant possibility, the event of revolt
transforms the very conditions of the possible, doing so creatively by realizing something
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new. “The event creates a new existence, it produces a new subjectivity”; and because it
thus “passes as much into the interior of individuals as into the depths of a society,”727 the
event must be grasped from the perspective of an experience that opens onto new modes
of life.
In effect, then, political uprising performs the de-familiarizing function proper to
the contingency thesis of vertical critique, disclosing the contemporary horizon of
possibility (what we can say, think, do, feel, become), in its mutability and fragility, as
the historical product of struggles between forces. And if historical ontology opens ‘the
possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think’ (Foucault),
thereby satisfying a condition of possibility for ethico-political agency; the ‘possible’ that
the event of popular revolt creates – ‘a new existence, a new subjectivity’ – is what
Deleuze and Guattari call “the composition of a people,”728 a process of collective
becoming-revolutionary. Further, just as the visionary function of intellectual activism is
to perceive and make visible the intolerable where it has remained unseen, “what counts”
in the event of political uprising – that which is singular and transformative, however
surrounded it may be by “slogans, idiocies, illusions” – is “a visionary phenomenon, as if
a society suddenly saw what was intolerable in it and also saw the possibility for
something else. It is a collective phenomenon in the form of: ‘Give me the possible, or
else I’ll suffocate…’”729 Thus, what is visionary in revolt is exactly what is also
irreducible: the experience, both individual and collective, of the intolerable and its
possible overcoming, that is, of the limit and the practice of freedom.
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As we have discussed in the previous two chapters, it is just this sort of ‘collective
phenomenon,’ distinctive of non-denumerable multiplicities, that the anti-transversal
operation of power aims to prevent, defuse, or control.730 Indeed, we can begin to see
how the transversal and vertical threads our analysis converge: if the principle of
transversal connection designates the conditions for the realization and sustainability of
the line of flight; the ‘visionary phenomenon’ of revolt indicates how the irreducible
verticality of political experience is a necessary condition of possibility for the line of
flight, or for political agency, understood as the transformation of the conditions of social
production.
However, before we are positioned to provide a fuller account of political agency,
we must first develop Foucault’s conceptual treatment of revolt, analyzing more precisely
how uprising constitutes a vertical limit-experience. It is straightforward enough to
establish that revolt takes a vertical form: Foucault makes this explicit in a brief homage
to the philosopher and journalist Maurice Clavel, written in the wake of the Iranian
Revolution, when he describes uprising generally as “that which, in history, escapes from
history…. What escapes from history is the instant, the fracture, the tearing, the
interruption. … Uprising … lifts human beings into a vertical relation to their land and
their humanity [Le soulèvement ... dresse les hommes à la verticale de leur terre et de
leur humanité].”731 The collective experience of revolt is thus structurally akin to the
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Kantian sublime, opening a rupture or “fracture of the present”732 through the autoelevating movement by which a person or a people confronts their proper humanity. And
indeed, just as, for Kant, the sublime functions as the ratio cognoscendi of human
freedom, calling us to a duty that “elevates a human being above himself (as part of the
sensible world)”733; so, too, political uprising is an experience of the irreducibility of
human agency that makes possible the practical realization of freedom.
In an important essay on the uprising in Iran, published the week following his
piece on Clavel, Foucault articulates this irreducibility in terms of a limit-relation that
obtains between revolt and both history and politics:
Revolts belong to history. But, in a certain way, they escape from it. The impulse
[mouvement] by which a single individual, a group, a minority, or an entire people
says, ‘I will no longer obey,’ and throws the risk of their life in the face of an
authority they consider unjust seems to me to be something irreducible. Because no
authority is capable of making it utterly impossible … [a]nd because the man who
rebels is finally inexplicable; it takes a wrenching-away that interrupts the flow of
history, and its long chains of reasons, for a man to be able, ‘really,’ to prefer the
risk of death to the certainty of having to obey.734
Recalling the ‘centrifugal movement’ of becoming-plebe as an intensive vector of
insurrectionary force, as well as the ‘constant verticality’ of unreason that disrupts the
horizontal flow of history and its ‘rational concatenation of causes,’ political uprising is
‘something irreducible,’ emerging at the degree zero of both (1) power and (2) history.
In the first case, revolt is the political experience of the exercise of power as being
both intolerable and, in the end, mutable. One stakes one’s life on the refusal to continue
with what had been tolerated until now, on the demand for transformation, the possibility
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of which is concretely created in the very demand for it. This insurrectionary ‘impulse,’
this movement of restiveness capable of traversing the social fabric (‘a single individual,
a group, a minority, or an entire people’), is something that no exercise of power is
‘capable of making utterly impossible’: for, as we saw in Chapter 4, unlike a relation of
violence (acting directly on bodies) or a state of domination (in which those subjected
have no field of possible action available to them), power is defined as ‘a set of actions
on possible actions’; and it therefore requires the relative agency of those whose actions
are acted upon.735 Thus, to render impossible the will to revolt, which would necessitate
taking the lives of all those who stake theirs insurrecting, would be tantamount to
destroying the power relation itself.
That is, the very will to revolt – ‘to prefer the risk of death to the certainty of having
to obey’ – constitutes the absolute limit of power’s exercise; and it is for this reason that
“[a]ll the forms of established or demanded freedom, all the rights that one asserts, even
in regard to the seemingly least important things, no doubt have a last anchor point there,
one more solid and closer to experience than ‘natural rights.’”736
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In the second case, like the emergence of a singular event as the becoming-force of
vertical intensity, uprising is both “‘outside’ history and in history,”737 ‘belonging’ to it
but also ‘escaping’ from it. The will to revolt of the one who insurrects is ultimately
‘inexplicable’ according to the laws of historical causation: her experience, desire, and
action can neither be explained according to a rational predictive calculus, nor derived
from a set of historical (read: pre-existing social, economic, political, cultural) conditions
and their ‘long chains of reasons.’ Borrowing from the historian François Furet’s work on
the French Revolution, Foucault articulates this irreducibility in terms of the “distinction
between the totality of the processes of economic and social transformation,” i.e., the
long historical duration of material conditions, flows, structures, and practices in which
all events are situated, “and the specificity of the revolutionary event,” i.e., “the
specificity of what people experienced deep inside, but also of what they experienced
[vivent] in that sort of theater that they put together from day to day and which
constituted the revolution.”738
The importance of framing this distinction in terms of what ‘belongs’ to history and
what ‘escapes’ it is that the latter, the singularity of the revolutionary event as individual
and collective experience, can neither be reduced to nor derived from the former, the set
of macropolitical conditions and processes. To use Deleuze and Guattari’s language, the
intensive or molecular dimension cannot be reduced to, or explained in terms of, the
extensive or molar dimension. Nor is the specificity or experience of the event merely
737
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occasional (as the contingent occasion for a historically determined process) or
epiphenomenal (as the subjective aspect of an objective process, with the former exerting
no causal force on the latter); for the collective daily staging of the revolt (protests,
marches, strikes, sit-ins, vigils, stands of civil disobedience taken, etc.) is what actually
‘constitutes the revolution.’ For example, in the case of Iran, when “a people rose up in
revolt[,] it rose up, of course, in a context of crisis, of economic difficulties, etc., but the
economic difficulties in Iran at that time were not sufficiently great for people to take to
the streets, in the hundreds of thousands, in the millions, and face the machine-guns barechested. That’s the phenomenon that we have to talk about.”739
It is in the following sense, then, that the singular event is both ‘in’ and ‘outside’
history: the phenomenon of revolt is double, containing both an extensive dimension (in
the above example, the conditions of macroeconomic crisis) and an intensive one (what
constitutes the singularity of the uprising); and it is the latter that is privileged from the
(genealogical) perspective of the transformative emergence in history of evental force.
The same can be said at the level of the insurrectionary individual, who, in the vertical
experience of political uprising, “was double: he had his political calculation, which was
this or that, and at the same time he was an individual caught up in that revolutionary
movement, or rather that Iranian who had risen up against his king. And the two things
did not come into contact, he did not rise up against his king because his party had made
this or that calculation.”740
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In other words, to choose the possibility of death rather than the certainty of
injustice is neither the result of a calculation of interests nor of determining structures,
but the expression of an irreducible agency; and indeed, this “fact” that “people do revolt”
is “how subjectivity (not that of great men, but that of anyone) is brought into history,
breathing life into it.”741The irreducibility, to power and history, of the will to revolt is
thus a necessary condition for the possibility of political agency and the practice of
freedom: “If societies persist and live, that is, if the powers that be are not ‘utterly
absolute,’ it is because, behind all the submissions and coercions, … there is the
possibility of that moment when life can no longer be bought, when the authorities can no
longer do anything, and when, facing the gallows and the machine guns, people
revolt.”742
Once again, the parallel with Kant is apt, for Foucault’s reference to ‘facing the
gallows’ echoes the famous “gallows” example from the Critique of Practical Reason,
where Kant aims to illustrate how the fact of reason discloses to us our moral duty (that
which ‘elevates a human being above himself’) and thereby our freedom. Like the man
who, given the choice between acting unjustly and facing the gallows, realizes that he has
within him the power to refuse the former, to prefer death to the certainty of committing
injustice, and thereby is made cognizant of his inner freedom; and in turn, like the
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experience of the dynamical sublime, where, confronted in our fragile vulnerability by
nature’s overwhelming power, we become aware of an indomitable power of a different
order within ourselves, capable of resisting even nature’s might; the limit-experience of
political uprising – the will to revolt as the desire to risk death and disobey rather than
suffer certain injustice – discloses to those who insurrect an irreducible agency that no
form of power can ever render impossible or utterly dominate. For the ‘fact of reason,’
Foucault thus substitutes the ‘fact of revolt’ as a kind of ratio cognoscendi of human
freedom.
If the principle of connection is the transversal condition of realization and
sustainability for political agency, the irreducibility of uprising is its vertical condition of
possibility: “Hence, precisely, the need to grasp what is irreducible in such a movement –
and deeply threatening for any despotism, whether that of yesterday or that of today.”743
However, we must still inquire further into how the vertical and the transversal relate,
which will require taking a closer look at the examples of revolt in which Foucault was
engaged.

6.4.2

March and May 1968: Becoming-Revolutionary and the Problem of Collective
Subjectivation

Before the GIP, Foucault’s first direct encounter with political revolt occurred in the
student uprisings in Tunisia in March 1968, which he describes as “a real [véritable]
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political experience for me.”744 Foucault lived and taught in Tunisia from 1966 to 1968,
and from the beginning, he was “deeply impressed”745 by the political activism and
courage of the students there. Remarking, in a letter from December 1966, on the
reception of Althusser’s thought among the Tunisian students, Foucault writes: “It’s
curious to see what is for us pure theoretical discourse suddenly become verticalized [se
verticaliser] here in an almost immediate imperative.”746 Twelve years later, in his
interview with Trombadori, Foucault elaborates: “In Tunisia…, everyone appealed to
Marxism with a radical vehemence [violence] and intensity and with an impressive
enthusiasm [élan]. For those young people, Marxism didn’t just represent a better way of
analyzing reality: at the same time, it was a kind of moral energy, a kind of existential act
that was quite remarkable.”747
The verticalization of Marxist discourse, elevated to ‘an almost immediate
imperative,’ thus refers to the role played by critical thought in giving rise to a collective
political experience: an intensive process of becoming-revolutionary, wherein thought
both (1) expresses a kind of ethical duty and (2) catalyzes the force of political agency. In
other words, and again resonating with Kant, vertical critique is the movement by which
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thought, disclosing an existentially gripping imperative through a limit-experience,
makes possible the practical realization of human freedom.
For Foucault, then, the Tunisian student uprising manifested the vertical form of
political experience proper to revolt, the will to risk ‘an absolute sacrifice’ when faced
with the intolerable exercise of power: “what can prompt in an individual the desire, the
ability, and the possibility for an absolute sacrifice, without there being any reason to
suspect in their action the least ambition or desire for power and profit? That was what I
saw in Tunisia, the evidence of the necessity of myth, of a spirituality, the unbearable
[intolérable] quality of certain situations produced by capitalism, colonialism, and
neocolonialism.”748 Indeed, it is in just these terms of anti-capitalist struggle that Foucault
will situate the Iranian uprising a decade later, and the ‘political spirituality’ serving as its
form of expression for the self-composition of a people. However, it is also, precisely, the
phenomenon of collective subjectivation that Foucault found wanting in the students
revolts in Paris that came two months after those in Tunisia: “People in France spoke of
hyper-Marxism, of a proliferation of theories, of a splintering into small groups. It was
exactly the opposite, the reverse, the contrary of what had intrigued me [m’a passionné]
in Tunisia.”749
Rather than constructing a movement capable of expressing or realizing the shared
experience of the will to revolt as transformative force, which is to say, as political
agency, the ‘events of May’ instead devolved into a fractious set of ‘hyper-Marxized’
disputes, limited to the kind of institutionalized discursivity for which we have seen
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Foucault reproach Derrida. And indeed, it is on the same grounds that Deleuze and
Guattari diagnose the failure of French society to realize the transformation made
possible in May ’68: “When a social mutation appears, it is not enough to draw the
consequences or effects according to lines of economic or political causality. Society
must be capable of forming collective agencies of enunciation that match the new
subjectivity, in such a way that it desires the mutation. … French society has shown a
radical incapacity to create a subjective redeployment on the collective level, which is
what ’68 demands….”750
One might thus conclude about the student revolts in Paris that, on the one hand,
they provided a necessary condition of possibility for political agency, insofar as they
constituted a vertical limit-event breaking from historical causation and creating the
possible it opens onto751; but that, on the other hand, the transversal conditions of
realization and sustainability for political agency were never met, insofar as no collective
form of expression or assemblage of enunciation was ever constructed that was adequate
to realize the vertical-intensive will to revolt as a force of transformation. In other words,
May ’68 could not offer a (transversal) solution to the (vertical) problem of material
expression.

750

Deleuze and Guattari, “May ’68 Did Not Take Place,” 234.
This would at least seem to be the view of Deleuze and Guattari. It is not as clear for Foucault, who, in
his interview with Trombadori, points out the differences in intensity and stakes between Tunisia and Paris:
“Actually, when I returned to France in November or December of 1968, I was surprised, astonished, and
even disappointed, considering what I had seen in Tunisia. In spite of their violence, their passion, the
struggles had not involved the same cost, the same sacrifices, by any means. There’s no comparison
between the barricades of the Latin Quarter and the real risk of getting, as in Tunisia, fifteen years of prison”
(Foucault, “Interview with Michel Foucault,” 381).
751

294
6.4.3 A Transversal Form of Material Expression for the Realization of Political
Agency: The Case of Iran
It is in this light that we can understand Foucault’s fascination and involvement
with the popular political uprising in Iran from 1978 to 1979: namely, as a form of revolt
capable of achieving the conditions of realization for political agency, and thereby
coming closer to solving the problem of material expression. Emerging at what Foucault
depicts as the “dark” historical moment when all hope in anti-capitalist revolutionary
politics had been extinguished by the failures of socialist regimes,752 the Iranian revolt, as
a “movement that wants to disengage itself from both external domination and internal
politics,”753 challenged not only a particular government (that of the Shah), but the global
hegemonic apparatus of capitalism itself. Hence the radicality of the struggle: “It is the
insurrection of men with bare hands who want to lift the fearful weight, the weight of the
entire world order that bears down on each of us, but more specifically on them, these oil
workers and peasants at the frontiers of empires. It is perhaps the first great insurrection
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against global systems, the form of revolt that is the most modem and the most
insane.”754
Now, while Foucault’s enthusiasm for the Iranian revolutionary movement is by no
means uncontroversial, what concerns us is less the question of whether he was “blind to
the dangers of Islamic government,”755 than the significance that the Iranian uprising held
for him as an event of collective becoming-revolutionary, by which the self-composition
of a people would act upon and transform the conditions of the social formation. For what
interested Foucault in Shi’ism is not its codification in an Islamic state, but the shared
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critical ethos it inspires when, “in the face of established powers, [it] arms the faithful
with an unremitting restlessness. It breathes into them an ardor wherein the political and
the religious lie side by side,”756 enabling a “revolutionary event … which is at the same
time an inner experience, a sort of constantly recommenced liturgy, a community
experience….”757 In other words, Shi’ism makes possible the collectivization of a vertical
limit-experience – like Bataillean transgression, an ‘inner experience,’ but transformed
into ‘a community experience,’ animated by restive ‘ardor’ and realized by way of the
ceaseless repetition of public professions of faith through insurrectionary political action.
Seen from this point of view, the Iranian revolt offers a singular example of how
vertical and transversal politics can converge so as to satisfy both the conditions of
possibility and realization for political agency. The shared vertical experience of uprising
becomes the manifestation or expression of what Foucault calls, to his own surprise, “an
absolutely collective will,” the like of which “few peoples in history have had,”758
indicating one kind of solution to the problem of collective subjectivation. What Foucault
had previously assumed to be “like God, like the soul, something one would never
encounter” – that is, a transcendent idea for which no corresponding experience would
ever be possible, and which is itself a historical product of power-knowledge, “a political
myth” used to “justify institutions” –, he encountered in Iran as a singular event: “This
collective will, which, in our theories, is always general, has found for itself, in Iran, an
absolutely clear, particular aim, and has thus erupted into history.”759 And indeed, the
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transformative force of this singular limit-event was realized, at least in part, through the
auto-intensifying form of vertical repetition that the popular protests took:
The demonstrations were repeated, and the machine-guns fired yet again. And this
occurred in an almost identical way, with, of course, an intensification each time,
but without any change of form or nature. It’s the repetition of the demonstration.
… [T]he demonstration, in its very repetition, had an intense political meaning. The
very word demonstration [manifestation] must be taken literally: a people was
tirelessly demonstrating [rendait manifeste] its will. There was in these
demonstrations a link between collective action, religious ritual, and an expression
of public right. … In the streets of Tehran there was an act, a political and juridical
act, carried out collectively within religious rituals – an act of deposing the
sovereign.760
Unlike the generality and theoretical abstraction of the European idea of collective
will, the singularity of the collective will in Iran, concentrated by the insurrectionary aim
of ‘deposing the sovereign,’ made manifest a becoming-revolutionary of the people,
which was also the becoming of a people tout court. Foucault’s epistolary comment
regarding the Tunisian students – that ‘what is for us pure theoretical discourse suddenly
verticalizes itself here in an almost immediate imperative’ – can thus be applied to the
collective will to revolt in Iran, ‘an expression of public right’ achieved through
‘collective action’ that takes form in the vertical repetition of ‘religious ritual,’
intensifying its own transformative effect ‘in its very repetition’ with each subsequent
staging. And unlike other cases of uprising or revolution, such as May ’68 and the
Cultural Revolution,761 “the revolt spread without splits or internal conflicts”: to use
Foucault’s examples, there were neither divisions based on class (the oil workers’ strike
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was supported by the bazaar bourgeoisie; the “modern industrialized sector” did not
separate from the “‘traditional’ sector”), nor age generation (the liberation of political
prisoners did not divide the “old and new oppositionists”), nor culture or political
ideology (the students, who were “more westernized and more Marxist,” held common
cause with “the mullahs from the countryside”).762
Indeed, it is just this complex unity that contains the key for understanding how the
Iranian revolt exemplified a transversal political movement. Unlike revolutions that are
led by a vanguard party or some other particular segment of society, where unification is
a result of hegemony and centralization, on Foucault’s view, the ‘unified collective will’
in Iran was achieved through a process of transversal connection, operating by lateral
proliferation to form a decentralized, non-representational mass multiplicity:
In Iran, the rejection of the regime is a massive social phenomenon. This does not
mean that the rejection is confused, emotional, or barely self-conscious. On the
contrary, it spreads in an oddly [singulièrement] effective manner, from the strikes
to the demonstrations, from the bazaars to the universities, from the leaflets to the
sermons, through shopkeepers, workers, clerics, teachers, and students. For the
moment, however, no party, no man, and no political ideology can boast that it
represents this movement. Nor can anyone claim to be at its head. This movement
has no counterpart and no expression in the political order. The paradox, however,
is that it constitutes a perfectly unified collective will. … It is the same protest, it is
the same will, that is expressed by a doctor from Tehran and a provincial mullah, by
an oil worker, by a postal employee, and by a female student wearing the chador. …
This political will is one of breaking away from all that marks their country and
their daily lives with the presence of global hegemonies.763
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Now, Foucault’s qualifying phrase ‘for the moment’ refers to November 26, 1978.
In historical hindsight, of course, we know that the return and rule of Khomeini in early
February of 1979 also ushered in a return to the rule of a centralized and repressive
regime by the end of March. However, just as the “spirituality which had meaning for
those who went to their deaths has no common measure with the bloody government of
an integrist clergy,”764 so, too, must we distinguish the acephalous nature of the
revolutionary movement as a ‘massive social phenomenon’ from the later hierarchy and
rigid segmentation of the Islamic Republic.765 For the fact that the political agency of the
revolt went unsustained does not mean that it was never realized; and on Foucault’s
account, the ‘singularly effective manner’ in which it was realized precisely instantiates
the connective strategy of transversal politics. That is, the becoming-revolutionary of the
Iranian people proceeded by means of lateral multiplication throughout the social field,
creating a network of relays between those who, from a myriad of singular sites, suffer
the same exercise of power ‘that marks their country and their daily lives with the
presence of global hegemonies.’
In such a way, a process of collective subjectivation took form that was capable of
manifesting itself as a unified will, or, to speak with Deleuze and Guattari, as a
revolutionary subject-group on the order of desire and its irruption. And indeed, for
Foucault, what accounts for the singular efficacy of the popular revolt in Iran was how
Shi’ism, giving rise to “the thousands of political centers that have been spawned in
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mosques and religious communities in order to resist the shah’s regime,”766 functioned
precisely as a non-hierarchical collective assemblage of enunciation. As “a matter of
organization[, a]mong the Shi’ite clergy, religious authority is not determined by a
hierarchy”; rather, “this power, which essentially resides in the interplay of speaking and
listening,” comes from articulating a kind of critical ‘philosophy of the people’ that is
voluntarily “listened to”: “This is true even in the smallest communities, where
neighborhood and village mullahs gather around themselves those attracted by their
words. From these volunteers comes their subsistence … and from them comes their
influence. But from them also comes the unrelenting plea to denounce injustice, to
criticize the government, to rise up against unacceptable measures…”767 This would be
the radical critical strand of Shi’ism, its popular-revolutionary ‘virtuality,’ the connective
force of which was powerful enough to realize the kind of undivided plebe that
Foucault’s own political activism in the prison movement and beyond had sought to
promote.
We should finally be positioned to understand the connection between vertical and
transversal politics. What makes the Iranian uprising such an instructive example of
political agency is the way in which Shi’ism provided a transversal solution to the
vertical problem of material expression:
…the Shi’ite religion … is much more than a simple vocabulary through which
aspirations, unable to find other words, must pass. It is today what it was several
times in the past, the form that the political struggle takes as soon as it mobilizes the
common people. It transforms thousands of forms of discontent, hatred, misery, and
despairs into a force. It transforms them into a force because it is a form of
expression, a mode of social relations, a supple and widely accepted elemental
766
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organization, a way of being together, a way of speaking and listening, something
that allows one to be listened to by others, and to yearn for something with them at
the same time as they yearn for it.768
To function effectively as a form of popular political struggle is to realize as force
the ‘thousands of forms of discontent, hatred, misery, and despair,’ which is to say, the
collective experience of the intolerable; it is to harness and connect an intensive affective
multiplicity that traverses the social field, in such a way that it can act upon and
transform the conditions of social production, i.e., the extensive set of political, economic,
social, and cultural processes of organization. In other words, when it ‘mobilizes the
common people’ in this way, Shi’ism satisfies the condition of realization for political
agency, enabling the vertical dimension of intensity, which is irreducible to history, to
erupt into and transform history as a singular event: namely, as the limit-event of political
uprising. And Shi’ism is capable of realizing such transformative force, of answering the
problem of material expression, precisely insofar as it constitutes a popular, ‘supple,’
non-hierarchical ‘form of expression’: a collective assemblage of enunciation, ‘a way of
speaking and listening’ that allows the articulation of a shared experience of the
intolerable exercise of power, as well as a shared desire for transformation; a mode of
collective subjectivation, ‘a way of being together’ by which a people composes itself as
such; and a ‘mode of social relations, a supple elemental organization’ that would
connect transversally across lines of rigid segmentation, enriching the relational fabric.
In short, political agency is realized when the experiential verticality of a collective
will becomes materially expressed as force through a transversal form of expression; in
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such a way does the incorporeal materiality of intensity become capable of acting upon
and transforming the corporeal materiality of history.
Moreover, a Nietzschean analysis of force is doubly appropriate here: for, in
addition to constituting the emergence of a singular event – a reversal of forces that is
also the entry of force in history –, popular uprising, as the auto-poeisis of a people,
transmutes what is reactive in the experience of the intolerable (‘discontent, hatred,
misery, despair’) into an active-affirmative force.769 Indeed, just as ethico-political
agency is realized through the activity of vertical critique ‘as work carried out by
ourselves upon ourselves as free beings’; so, too, the realization of political agency can
be understood in terms of historico-ontological self-transformation. And in the case of
Iran, on Foucault’s view, precisely such transformation was made possible by the criticalcreative stand of Shi’ism, understood as a way “of living the Islamic religion as a
revolutionary force”:
In rising up, the Iranians said to themselves – and this perhaps is the soul of the
uprising: “Of course, we have to change this regime and get rid of this man, we
have to change this corrupt administration, we have to change the whole country,
the political organization, the economic system, the foreign policy. But, above all,
we have to change ourselves. Our way of being, our relationship with others, with
things, with eternity, with God, etc., must be completely changed, and there will
only be a true revolution if this radical change in our experience takes place.” I
believe that it is here that Islam played a role. … [A]bove all, in relation to the way
of life that was theirs, religion for them was like the promise and guarantee of
finding something that would radically change their subjectivity.770
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The ‘soul of the uprising’ – that is, the animating principle of revolt, both its
generative and motive force – is the collective desire for deep self-transformation, for a
‘radical change’ in both individual and community experience that creates a renewed
mode of subjectivity. And this transvaluative process of collective subjectivation, by
which the limit-experience of the intolerable becomes the impetus for the creative
realization of a new possible, constitutes the very intensive movement of political agency,
taking form (given expression, becoming realized, lived as force) through the Shi’ite
religion.

6.4.4

In the Wake of Tehran: Vertical Auto-Critique as Political Agency’s Condition of
Sustainability
Now, if the Iranian uprising exemplifies the realization of political agency, a two-

part question remains: was it able to sustain this agential force? – to which we know the
unfortunate answer, as witnessed by the instatement of ‘the bloody government of an
integrist clergy’ that had ‘no common measure’ with the spirituality of those who staked
their lives in revolt –; and if not, why not?
In Chapter 4, we analyzed the conditions of realization and sustainability for
political agency in terms of the transversal connection of lines of flight, and we
concluded that such connection faces two dangers: (1) the molar threat of capture, as in
institutional appropriation or blockage; and (2) the molecular threat of abolition, as a kind
of inner tendency toward destruction. In light of the repressive nature of the regime that
installed itself following the Iranian Revolution, it would seem that the failure to sustain
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the political agency of the revolt could be explained as a problem of State capture and the
re-imposition of rigid segmentation. But while doubtless true, this remains an incomplete
explanation, for account must also be taken of the second, more subtle danger; and in
keeping with the kind of agential priority we have seen both Foucault and Deleuze accord
the micropolitical or intensive dimension, the threat of abolition will have heuristic
privilege insofar as it indicates a necessary condition of sustainability for political agency.
Shi’ism provided a form of expression capable of realizing a collective process of
becoming-revolutionary; yet this very form is itself “based on traditions, institutions that
carry a charge of chauvinism, nationalism, exclusiveness,” so many potential fascisms or
tendencies toward reactive force, “which have a very powerful attraction for
individuals.”771 When such destructive virtualities, e.g. misogyny, anti-Semitism,
xenophobia, homophobia, etc., are activated and take sway, transversal connection no
longer operates as the popular movement’s principle of composition; and what replaces it
is precisely a reactive form of group subjection, a hierarchical mode of organization
where identity is predicated on a prior set of exclusions. Therefore, in order to prevent the
revolutionary line of flight from collapsing into a line of abolition – which is to say, in
order to sustain political agency – these reactionary tendencies must themselves be called
into question and overcome. The movement which is ‘a way of living the Islamic religion
as a revolutionary force’ must be capable, in turn, of effecting a becoming-revolutionary
of this religious form of expression itself.
In other words, if the ‘soul of uprising’ is the collective will for self-transformation,
then in order for this will to be sustained as an animating force, it must be capable of
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continuing to transform itself, of staking out its own limits in order to cross over them.
This is no doubt why Foucault, in the days before Khomeini’s return, distinguishes and
even prioritizes the molecular problem facing the revolt: “Apart from the problem of the
immediate succession to the shah, there is another question that interests me at least as
much: Will this unitary movement, which, for a year now has stirred up a people faced
with machine-guns, have the strength [force] to cross [franchir] its own frontiers and go
beyond the things on which, for a time, it has based itself?”772 Having realized itself as
evental force, the popular revolt is confronted by a new problem: whether or not its
powers of activity are such that it can apply the radical-critical ‘ardor’ of its ‘unremitting
restlessness’ to itself, as the catalyst for its own continued becoming.
In short, what emerges as a necessary condition of sustainability for political agency
is what was analyzed in the preceding section as a condition of possibility for ethicopolitical agency: namely, the limit-attitude of vertical critique. Indeed, this is the form of
auto-critique that is necessary for historico-ontological transformation, working by means
of the contingency thesis ‘to give new impetus to the undefined work of freedom.’ In
Chapter 2, at the end of our discussion of Nietzschean interpretation and Zarathustra’s
‘ascent into the depths,’ we identified the principle of self-recreative activity as a
fundamental aspect of critical verticality, the trajectory of the vertical axis containing
within itself the source of its own motility. Bringing together the vertical and transversal
components of our analysis, we can now posit, as a solution to the transversal problem of
political-agential sustainability (i.e., the danger of abolition), a kind of collective vertical
critique: an auto-transformative practice, at once a “permanent critique” and “permanent
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creation of ourselves,”773 which would select out tendencies toward reactive force insofar
as they imperil intensive micropolitical processes of connection. As Foucault puts it, “I
believe that the work of deep transformation can be done in the open and always
turbulent atmosphere of a continuous [permanente] criticism.”774
Vertical critique would thus meet a necessary condition for sustaining the
transversal composition of political agency. The argument for this conclusion can be
presented in brief:
1. Transversal connection designates both a condition of realization and a condition
of sustainability for political agency: that is, the vertical experience of
insurrection cannot be realized as a force (i.e., the vertical problem of material
expression cannot be solved) without transversal connection serving as the
compositional principle for a collective form of expression; and such
transformative force cannot be sustained, cannot renew its proper process of
becoming-revolutionary, without transversal connection continuing to function in
this way.
2. What threatens the continued functioning of transversal connection, and hence the
sustainability of political agency, is the danger of abolition; and it is the tendency
toward reactive force that poses this threat, i.e., that turns the line of flight into a
line of abolition.
3. Vertical critique, when it functions effectively as a critical ethos (limit-attitude), is
the practice or activity of thought that selects out or eliminates these tendencies of
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reactive force, diagnosing their role in reintroducing rigid segmentation and the
intolerable exercise of power.
4. Therefore, vertical critique, when it functions effectively as the limit-attitude,
satisfies a necessary condition of sustainability for political agency.
It follows from this argument that one strategic objective for critical thought will be to
facilitate the sustainability of political agency by advancing the limit-attitude as a
collective ethos. And it is here, the political role of the intellectual returning to the fore,
that we encounter Foucault’s late concept of vertical critique.

6.5

Late Critique: The ‘Vertical Relationship of Discourse to its Own Present Reality’

“I dream of the intellectual as destroyer of certitudes and universalities, who, in the
inertias and constraints of the present, locates and marks the weak points, the openings,
the lines of power; who incessantly displaces himself, doesn’t know exactly where he is
heading nor what he’ll think tomorrow because he is too attentive to the present; who …
contributes to posing the question of knowing whether the revolution is worth the effort,
and which one (I mean which revolution and which effort), it being understood that only
those who are willing to risk their lives to bring it about can respond to the question.”
— Foucault775
6.5.1

Vertical Critique as a Necessary Condition ‘For Any Transformation’

At the end of section III above, we analyzed the triple political function of the
intellectual in terms of (1) a visionary function, by which the intolerable would be
intuited and disclosed as such; (2) an enunciative function, by which the conditions for a
collective form of expression (or assemblage of enunciation) would be constructed; and
(3) an amplifying function, by which a set of lateral relays would be facilitated between a
multiplicity of singular expressions of struggle. If the second and third functions refer to
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the problem of collective subjectivation and the connective strategy of transversal politics,
the first function opens onto a vertical politics: what is perceived and made visible,
before it has erupted into history as force, is the political limit-experience of uprising, the
intensive germ of revolt the possibility of which no form of power can destroy without
ending the power relation as such; and it is the vertical perspective of genealogical
critique, orienting the ‘art of bringing out the revolting brutality in what we tolerate out of
habit’ so as ‘to sharpen intolerance to the facts of power,’ that affords the mode of vision
capable of such ‘political intuition.’
The intellectual as critical ‘visionary’ will thus take up the characteristically vertical
perspective in limit-relation to history and power: “one must at the same time look
closely, a bit beneath history, at what cleaves and stirs it, and keep watch, a bit behind
politics, over what must unconditionally limit it.”776 It is the vertical experience of the
intolerable that, ‘beneath history,’ disrupts and breathes life into it (history), making
political agency possible and constituting the absolute limit of power’s exercise. In turn,
it is the vertical critique of the intolerable, understood as a historical ontology of the
present, that de-familiarizes the given horizon of intelligibility so that the intolerable can
be seen as intolerable, and the operation of power, disclosed in its fragile contingency. In
this way, critical thought is a necessary condition ‘for any transformation,’ including the
transformation of the conditions of social production proper to political agency: “A
critique does not consist in saying that things aren’t good the way they are. It consists in
seeing on what type of assumptions, of familiar notions, of established, unexamined ways
of thinking the accepted practices are based. Criticism consists in uncovering that thought
776
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and trying to change it …. Understood in these terms, criticism (and radical criticism) is
utterly indispensable for any transformation.”777
Vertical critique is thus integral to transformative agency in general. Indeed, what is
at issue here is the agential force of thought itself, for “[t]hought is freedom in relation to
what one does, the motion by which one detaches oneself from it, establishes it as an
object, and reflects on it as a problem.”778 That is, the activity of critical thought impels
the practice of freedom, understood as the labor of transformation conducted by ourselves
upon ourselves – what we have been calling ‘ethico-political agency,’ and what, when
realized collectively as the ‘soul of revolt,’ constitutes political agency. For it is vertical
critique, “the diagnosis of what today is” through an historical ontology of ourselves, that,
by “following lines of fragility in the present,” provides a “description … made in
accordance with these kinds of virtual fracture which open up the space of freedom
understood as a space of concrete freedom, that is, of possible transformation.”779 This is
why Foucault refers to thought as “that essential element in human life and human
relations”780: if “[f]reedom is the ontological condition of ethics,”781 and if thought
constitutes freedom in relation to action, then thought provides the ontological condition
of ethics from the perspective of action.
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In other words, vertical-critical thought meets the necessary precondition for ethical
agency, which is also and necessarily ethico-political agency insofar as the conditions of
possibility for what we can do (say, think, become) are circumscribed within the
historical field of power relations. In turn, as we have seen, the collectivization of the
limit-attitude, by facilitating and renewing the process of popular auto-transformation,
would satisfy a condition of sustainability for political agency. In both cases, whether at
the (ethico-political) level of the conditions of possible action or the (political) level of
the conditions of social production, agency is understood in terms of transformative force,
just as ‘concrete freedom’ is cast in terms of a ‘possible transformation,’ which is also to
say, a transformation of the possible. And in both cases, transformative agency, as the
practice of freedom, owes its impetus and sustenance to vertical critique, whether such
critical verticality be depicted as the philosophical ethos proper to historical ontology, i.e.,
the limit-attitude as the experimental practice of auto-critique undertaken in the desire to
‘radically change one’s subjectivity’; or whether as a ‘visionary phenomenon’ (Deleuze
and Guattari) disclosing the intolerable as such through a popular movement of
intransigence that demands – and, in the demand, produces – a new possible. In this light,
the political experience of uprising itself, whether individual or collective, has a verticalcritical structure; and in turn, as we will see below, there is a particular sense in which
vertical critique constitutes a form of revolt.
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6.5.2

Return to Kant: The Verticality of the Critical Attitude and the Philosophy of the
Event

Now, we have seen how, for Foucault, the double thought of power and the event is
fundamental to a ‘philosophy of the people’ that would compose a subversive form of
counter-knowledge. If the guiding thought or problem of transversal politics, to which the
enunciative and amplifying functions of the intellectual correspond, is the thought of
power, then the critical-visionary function of vertical politics, in turn, is oriented by the
thought of the event. It is no doubt for this reason that in an interview from 1978, just
before his engagement in the Iranian uprising, Foucault, locating himself within the
genealogical lineage of Nietzsche, distinguishes his own work from philosophy “in the
classical sense of the word” (à la Derrida) insofar as he (Foucault) is “interested in the
event” as a “philosophical category”:
…it was Nietzsche, I think, who first defined philosophy as an activity that leads to
an understanding of what’s happening, of what’s happening right now. In other
words, we are pervaded [traversés] by processes, movements and forces, which we
don’t know, and it is doubtlessly the philosopher’s task to be a diagnostician of
these forces, to diagnose contemporary reality. … Philosophy of the present,
philosophy of the event, philosophy of what is happening right now.782
Directing its line of descent, genealogy, as a historical critique of the present, grasps
contemporary reality as the degree zero of history, which is to say, as the site of
emergence of events, understood as the reversal or eruption of forces. As we have seen,
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this relation to the present is precisely what accounts for the vertical perspectivism of
genealogical critique, its de-familiarizing and auto-doubling functions, and its
transformative efficacy as a strategics of truth: the vertical relation of genealogy to
history designates a historical ontology of our own present, of ourselves in this present,
and of what we are doing when we reflect on this present and ourselves within it, such
that we become capable of transforming both (this present and ourselves).
Indeed, it is in just this sense that Foucault, in his penultimate lecture course at the
Collège de France in 1983, will place himself in the intellectual tradition that poses “the
question of the present as a philosophical event to which the philosopher who speaks of it
belongs”: that is, “philosophy as the surface of emergence of a present reality, as a
questioning of the philosophical meaning of the present reality of which it is a part, and
… as the philosopher’s questioning of this ‘we’ to which he belongs and in relation to
which he has to situate himself.”783 We see here the recursive auto-doubling function, or
productive self-referential structure, proper to vertical thought: critical philosophy is both
itself an event (‘a philosophical event,’ ‘the surface of emergence’ of the “difference …
today introduce[s] with respect to yesterday”784) and a form of reflection upon itself as an
event; and it is the analysis of itself as an event that constitutes the very event that it is.785
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In other words, the ‘philosophy of the event’ is itself an event of philosophy, which is to
say, the singular emergence of critical thought as a transformative force in history.
If anything has changed from the middle to the late articulation of vertical critique,
it is that Foucault now locates this kind of evental philosophy in the minor critical
tradition of Kant, specifically, in the way that Kant poses the problem of modernity in his
writings on the Enlightenment and the French Revolution.786 By contrast to the horizontal
mode in which “the question of modernity had been posed in terms of a longitudinal axis,”
i.e., in terms of “the polarity between Antiquity and modernity” and their comparative
evaluation, Kant opens up
…a new way of posing the question of modernity…, which is no longer in a
longitudinal relationship with the Ancients, but in what could be called a sagittal
relationship or, if you like, a vertical relationship of the discourse to its own present
reality. The discourse has to take its own present reality into account in order, [first],
to find its own place in it, second to express its meaning, and third to designate and
specify the mode of action, the mode of effectuation that it realizes within this
present reality.787
Vertical critique thus appears in Kant as an auto-referential form of thought that analyzes
(1) the contemporary conditions of its own emergence, (2) the singularity of this
emergence as a historical event, and (3) the transformative effect that this event of
thought realizes in the field of actuality.
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(1) In the first case, the contemporary conditions of the vertical critique of
modernity788 refer to the Enlightenment itself as a kind of collective critical attitude, the
general refusal to be unduly governed by arbitrary forms of authority (which refusal
becomes realized as a political event in the Revolution): in other words, a philosophical
ethos manifesting the kind of restiveness that animates the will to revolt. Indeed, like the
‘centrifugal movement’ or vector of escape proper to the line of flight, the Enlightenment,
as Foucault notes, is defined by Kant “simply as ‘Ausgang,’ as way out, exit, a movement
by which one extricates oneself from something, without saying anything about what one
is moving towards.”789 More specifically, this form of escape is “‘man’s way out from his
self-incurred tutelage,’ …a movement of getting out … which constitutes precisely the
significant element of our present reality.”790
(2) Thus, the singularity of the Enlightenment as a historical event, defining
modernity by the practice of vertical auto-critique, is the breaking-away from a certain
form of self-maintained subjugation. And by posing the question of the Enlightenment in
this way, Kant issues a “call for courage” for humanity to lift the “minority condition” in
which it has been “maintained in an authoritative way” – a condition which, whether in
the domains of religion, law or knowledge, is defined by humanity’s “incapacity to use its
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own understanding precisely without something which would be someone else’s
direction.”791
As we saw in Chapter 5, for Foucault, this excessive authority that maintains
humanity in its subordinate condition is a form of governmentalization: that is, a complex
set of strategies operating through and organizing the social, political, and economic
institutions, relations, and practices by which the conduct of a population is managed, and
“through which individuals are subjugated in the reality of a social practice through
mechanisms of power that adhere to a truth.”792 On Foucault’s view, governmentalization
emerges historically in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as a kind of secularization
and expansion of the function of pastoral power, according to which every individual is
bound by a relation of absolute obedience to let themselves be governed in each of their
actions for the entirety of their lives, and where this submission is mediated by a form of
truth linking the self-knowledge of the individual to a dogmatic authority.793 Once only
the province of ecclesiastical institutions, this individualizing technique proliferates in
every new area where the problem of governing is posed: “how to govern children, how
to govern the poor and beggars, how to govern a family, a house, how to govern armies,
different groups, cities, States and also how to govern one’s own body and mind.”794
Governmentalization thus emerges as an individualizing and totalizing regime of powerknowledge that produces individuals as subjects in the double sense of being “subject to
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someone else by control and dependence, and tied to [one’s] own identity by a
conscience or self-knowledge.”795
However, according to Foucault, there develops in agonistic tandem with
governmentalization a “critical attitude” that resists it, a practice or “art of not being
governed quite so much.”796 The three historical points of anchorage for this critical
attitude anticipate the three areas where Kant calls for the courage of humanity to
exercise its own understanding: in the religious domain, a biblical critique that contests
ecclesiastical rule with respect to the truth of the Scriptures; in the legal domain, a
juridical critique that asserts the rights of natural law so as to contest unjust political rule;
and in the domain of knowledge, a scientific critique that contests unjustified
authoritarian determinations of truth.797 In each of these cases, critique functions to limit
an excessive authority by challenging the production of knowledge through which the
latter operates, thereby disrupting the techniques of subjection by which humanity is
maintained in a minority condition. As “the movement by which the subject gives himself
the right to question truth on its effects of power and question power on its discourses of
truth,” and thus as “the art of voluntary insubordination” and “reflected intractability,”
“[c]ritique would essentially insure the desubjugation of the subject in the context of
what we could call, in a word, the politics of truth.”798
(3) We may therefore characterize the transformative effect that the critical
philosophy of the event realizes in the field of contemporary reality in terms of the
desubjugating self-transformation of those who rise up against an intolerable form of
795
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governmentalization. That is, vertical critique, as the ‘art of reflected intractability,’
provides strategic orientation for the intensive will to revolt and renewed impetus for the
movement of ethico/political agency. Hence the significant stakes of that tradition of
critical thought to which Foucault belongs: “In its critical aspect – and I mean critical in a
broad sense – philosophy is that which calls into question domination at every level and
in every form in which it exists, whether political, economic, sexual, institutional, or what
have you.”799 On Foucault’s view, it is this critical attitude that Kant reactivates when he
poses the question of the Enlightenment as both a critical analysis of the present
condition of humanity and a summons to no longer let what we say, think, and do be
governed by dogmatic forms of authority.

6.5.3

Epilogue: Parrhesia as the Critical Philosophic Form of Revolt

From a tragic counter-history of rationalist positivism, through an intensive
reformulation as the genealogy of force relations, to the critical limit-attitude of historical
ontology, vertical critique remains the manner in which Foucault conceives the agential
force of thought as subversive or transformative. This analysis accounts for Foucault’s
late fascination and identification with Kant’s “What is Enlightenment?”, which Foucault
himself describes as “something of a blazon, a fetish for me.”800 Further, it sheds light on
the political stakes, rarely commented upon, of the turn to Antiquity that guided his
historical research in the 1980s, which is typically presented as a movement away from
the problem of power toward an interest in pre-Christian ethics (as so many aesthetic and
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ascetic practices of self-care). For if the critical attitude designates the manner in which
thought, realized as “a mode of behavior, a form of will,”801 enables and sustains political
agency; then the project “to construct a genealogy of the critical attitude in Western
philosophy”802 must be understood as a political one. And it is just this project – which,
as the vertical critique (genealogy) of critique, demonstrates the recursive auto-doubling
function proper to verticality – to which Foucault dedicates his last three lecture courses,
finding in the ancient Greek concept of parrhesia (‘free speech,’ ‘outspokenness’) “the
roots of what we could call the ‘critical’ tradition in the West.”803
Indeed, when, at the beginning of his lecture course in 1983, Foucault situates the
tradition of vertical critique in Kant, he does so precisely as a means of orienting his
subsequent interpretation of parrhesia. Whatever else might be said about the
discontinuity of Foucault’s research program between the first volume of The History of
Sexuality (1976) and the two volumes that followed eight years later, there is also a clear
line of philosophical consistency running from beginning to end of Foucault’s work,
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insofar as the lineage of vertical critique runs from Nietzsche (first the Birth of Tragedy,
then the Genealogy) through Kant ultimately back to the figure of Socrates. For it is
Socrates who, in refusing to follow the unjust dictates of the Thirty Tyrants, “gives, as a
philosopher, an example of philosophical resistance to political power, an example of
parrēsia which will remain for a long time a model of the philosophical attitude towards
power: the philosopher’s individual resistance.”804
Parrhesia can be thus understood as the individual form of uprising proper to
critical philosophy. Recalling Foucault’s experience in the Tunisian student revolts, when
philosophical discourse was verticalized into an ‘almost immediate imperative,’ in the
case of parrhesia, the will to revolt – that vertical-intensive mode of political experience
at the degree zero of power’s exercise – finds as its ground the ethical duty of care:
“parrhesia is a verbal activity in which a speaker expresses his personal relationship to
truth, and risks his life because he recognizes truth-telling as a duty to improve or help
other people (as well as himself).”805
Foucault analyzes parrhesia according to five characteristics, all of which bring to
mind the role of Socrates in Plato’s Apology.806 The first two are frankness, or a direct
and unadorned manner of address, and truth, understood as both the sincerity and content
of one’s discourse: one speaks frankly and truly, and what one speaks is true. Indeed, the
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‘personal relationship’ between the parrhesiastes and the truth that he807 speaks, on
which he stakes his life, demonstrates the auto-doubling structure of verticality: “I tell the
truth, and I truly think that it is true, and I truly think that I am telling the truth when I say
it. This doubling or intensification of the statement of the truth by the statement of the
truth of the fact that I think this truth and that, thinking it, I say it, is what is essential to
the parrhesiastic act.”808
The third characteristic of parrhesia is danger, since one incurs a risk, and
demonstrates the virtue of courage, by frankly speaking the truth. And it is precisely this
element of risk that distinguishes the truth-telling activity of parrhesia as a disruptive and
potentially transformative event: “we can say there is parrēsia when the statement of this
truth constitutes an irruptive event opening up an undefined or poorly defined risk for the
subject who speaks. … [I]t is a truth-telling, an irruptive truth-telling which creates a
fracture and opens the risk: a possibility, a field of dangers, or at any rate, an undefined
eventuality.”809 In turn, the reason that the activity of such truth-telling “demands the
courage to speak the truth in spite of some danger” is that parrhesia – precisely like the
‘philosophy of the people’ that Foucault had discussed a decade earlier – is a counterdiscursive mode of critique in relation to the unjust operation of power, “com[ing] from
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‘below,’ as it were, and … directed towards ‘above’”: “Parrhesia is a form of criticism
… in a situation where the speaker … is in a position of inferiority with respect to the
interlocutor. The parrhesiastes is always less powerful than the one with whom he
speaks.”810 This fourth characteristic, criticism, explains why Foucault considers
parrhesia to be something like the original form of critical attitude in the West,
functioning precisely as a limit to power.811
Finally, what moves the parrhesiastes to undertake this philosophical practice of
frankly, truly, and courageously critiquing the undue exercise of power is the feeling of
ethical duty: “No one forces him to speak, but he feels that it is his duty to do so.”812
Duty is thus the fifth characteristic of parrhesia, and here, once again, Foucault rejoins
Kant. If, as we saw in section IV, Foucault effectively substitutes the limit-experience of
political uprising for Kantian moral feeling as the ratio cognoscendi of human freedom;
then in turn, we may now conclude that it is moral feeling, disclosing “a specific relation
to moral law through freedom and duty,”813 which compels the parrhesiastes to rise up
and stake his life so that the critical truth he speaks may limit or modify the excessive
effects of power.
In sum, parrhesiastic truth-telling exemplifies the activity of vertical critique as a
properly philosophical event of revolt, for “the speaker uses his freedom and chooses
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frankness instead of persuasion, truth instead of falsehood or silence, the risk of death
instead of life and security, criticism instead of flattery, and moral duty instead of selfinterest and moral apathy.”814 In so doing, the parrhesiastes demonstrates three kinds of
agency: (1) ethical agency, insofar as he freely chooses to speak out on the basis of the
duty to care for others and himself; (2) ethico-political agency, insofar as his speaking out
constitutes a practice of freedom by which he shapes his relationship to himself, which
relationship is itself immanent to the field of power relations; and (3) political agency,
insofar as such speaking out is ‘an irruptive event which opens a fracture’ and aims to
transform the conditions of the social order.
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION: ON THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR
POLTICAL AGENCY

In the preface to the second volume of The History of Sexuality, published shortly
before his death in 1984, Foucault, reformulating the historico-critical enterprise of his
oeuvre, posits three basic principles of thought. In light of our preceding analysis, these
principles can be understood as designating thought’s three vertical traits. The first is “the
principle of irreducibility of thought”: like the vertical dimension of revolt that is
irreducible to history, thought itself is that irreducible aspect of experience which cannot
be explained in terms of historical causation; thus, while all forms of experience “may
perfectly well harbor universal structures” and “may well not be independent of the
concrete determinations of social existence,” “neither those determinations nor those
structures can allow for experiences … except through thought.”815 That is, thought
designates the ineliminable intensive dimension of experience that accounts for the
possibility of transformative agency, such that “[t]here is no experience that is not a way
of thinking and cannot be analyzed from the viewpoint of a history of thought,” i.e., from
the perspective of genealogy, by contrast to the reductive viewpoint of a social
determinism (e.g., traditional Marxism, structuralist history, etc.).
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Second is “the principle of singularity of the history of thought: there are events of
thought.”816 In addition to its irreducibility, “thought has a historicity which is proper to
it,” which entertains “complex relations” with “all the other historical determinations (of
an economic, social, or political order)”, but which remains distinct from the latter.
Indeed, this is what Foucault, referring in 1968 to the “axis of description” orienting
History of Madness and The Birth of the Clinic, had characterized as thought’s “vertical
dimension,” “the relations that are able to obtain between a form of knowledge and the
social, economic, political, and historical conditions in which this knowledge is
constituted.”817
That is, thought not only has a history, but is itself fundamentally historical and thus,
as is sometimes said, contingent ‘all the way down’: thought is inseparable from the
historical field of problematization in which it emerges. Even when functioning critically
as ‘outside thought’ to work upon and transform what Deleuze calls the dominant ‘image
of thought’ (e.g., the ‘God-form’ of the classical period and the ‘man-form’ of the
modern period818), a relation of immanence obtains between thought and the historical
field of force relations in which it intervenes; indeed, it is in just this sense that the
intensive reconceptualization of verticality allowed the relation between vertical critique
and history to no longer be cast in terms of transcendence. In short, the history of thought
is composed of so many singular events, and thought itself must be grasped as a historical
force, entering into (potentially transformative) relation with other kinds of forces ‘of an
economic, social, or political order,’ without being reducible to these.
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If the first principle of thought refers to its intensive aspect, its incorporeal
materiality that cannot be reduced to the corporeal materiality of history, the second
refers to thought’s apparition within this corporeal materiality, embodied in practices
capable (in principle) of acting upon and transforming the extensive conditions of the
social formation. And if the first principle is a challenge posed by (critical) philosophy to
(traditional) history concerning the relation between thought and freedom, conversely, the
second is a challenge posed by (critical) history to (traditional) philosophy concerning the
historical contingency and singularity, rather than universal necessity, of thought.
Finally, connecting the critical strains of both philosophy and history, the third
principle of thought, echoing the philosophical ethos of historico-critical ontology, is “the
principle of the history of thought as critical activity”: critique “does not mark out
impassable boundaries or describe closed systems; it brings to light transformable
singularities. These transformations could not take place except by means of a working of
thought upon itself.”819 In other words, it is the auto-critical movement of thought, or the
auto-affective structure of thought qua critique, that is necessary for transformative
agency; and this ‘working of thought upon itself’ precisely describes the vertical
operation of thought, its recursive auto-doubling function, the first instance of which we
analyzed in the Kantian sublime. If the first and second principles refer, respectively, to
the aspects of thought that escape and belong to history, the third refers to that aspect of
thought situated at the limit between them, at the degree zero of history as the becomingforce of the intensive, or the emergence of a singular event.
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With this view of the threefold verticality of thought in place, let us conclude by
outlining the set of necessary conditions for political agency. First, a distinction must be
drawn between political agency and ethico-political agency. Political agency refers to the
transformation of the conditions of social production: it is essentially transformative, a
rupture in a historically determined process or causal sequence. In Deleuzian parlance,
political agency would thus be a line of flight collectivized and sustained. Ethico-political
agency, on the other hand, refers to the work that one conducts upon oneself as a free
being, and thus most basically to a practice of freedom: namely, the activity of thought as
“freedom in relation to what one does.”820 Ethico-political agency is thus the germ of
transformation, brought about through vertical critique, that is, through the special
manner by which thought takes itself up, works upon, and transforms itself. Vertical
critique, in turn, can play this role by virtue of thought’s two other vertical traits: its
irreducibility, which accounts for how ‘subjectivity is brought into history, breathing life
into it’; and its historicity, which explains how it can act upon the conditions of history.
Political agency and ethico-political agency are therefore distinct, but each can also
be conceived through the other. On the one hand, political agency can be derived from
ethico-political agency, since the latter is the germ of all transformation, including the
collective transformative force of political agency. In other words, there is no agency,
including political agency, without the element of thought. And this element of thought –
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as freedom in relation to what one does; that is, as opening the concrete space of possible
transformation in relation to what one does; that is, as the transformation of the possible,
of the conditions of the possible, in relation to what one does, says, thinks, becomes – just
is ethico-political agency. This might also be put: ethico-political agency is a
precondition for political agency. In turn, however, ethico-political agency can be
understood as a form of political agency, since the latter refers to the transformation of
the conditions of social production, and what ethico-political agency does is work upon
the historical conditions of its own social production, separating out what is contingent so
as to enable the experimental practice of becoming-otherwise.
There is thus a reciprocal circuit set up between ethico-political agency and political
agency. Ethico-political agency is a precondition for political agency and is constituted
through the movement of vertical critique (e.g., the contingency thesis, history of limits,
limit-attitude), which prepares the vertical political experience (the intolerable) that is
itself a necessary condition of possibility for political agency. In turn, vertical political
experience requires a transversal form of expression in order to meet the necessary
condition of realization for political agency (becoming-force). And this transversal form
of expression must continue to undergo its own process of becoming-revolutionary – in
other words, transversal connection must continue to operate as the compositional
principle of collective subjectivation – in order to meet the necessary condition for the
sustainability of political agency, a condition requiring vertical critique (which checks
against the threat of abolition and reactive force) as a kind of collective critical attitude.
Finally, it is this work of the critical limit-attitude, in turn, that reconstitutes the practice
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of freedom, understood as thought’s labor of concrete transformation, which is to say,
again, ethico-political agency.
In short, with respect to political agency: (1) ethico-political agency and vertical
experience are its necessary conditions of possibility; (2) transversal connection is its
necessary condition of realization; and (3) vertical critique is its necessary condition of
sustainability, reconstituting ethico-political agency in turn. The solution to the vertical
problem of material expression (how vertical intensity, which is irreducible to history,
can act upon and transform the conditions of history) is transversal connection as the
compositional principle of collective subjectivation. In turn, the solution to the
transversal problem of material expression (how the line of flight can be sustained,
connected to other lines of flight, rather than collapsing into a line of abolition) is vertical
critique as the collective principle of self-transformation and practice of ethico-political
freedom.
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